Finite Horizon Bargaining With Outside Options And Threat Points |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Randolph?SloofEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018, WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | We characterize equilibrium behavior in a finite horizon multiple-pie alternating offer bargaining game in which both agents have outside options and threat points. In contrast to the infinite horizon case the strength of the threat to delay agreement is non-stationary and decreases over time. Typically the delay threat determines equilibrium proposals in early periods, while the threat to opt out characterizes those in later ones. Owing to this non-stationarity both threats may appear in the equilibrium shares immediately agreed upon in the first period. When the threat to opt out is empty for both agents, the outcome corresponds exactly with the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution. The latter observation may prove useful for designing experiments that are meant to test economic models that include a bargaining stage.JEL CLASSIFICATION CODES: C78, C91.The useful remarks of an anonymous referee greatly improved the presentation of the material and are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. |
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Keywords: | bargaining finite horizon implementation NBS outside options |
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