Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy |
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Authors: | Magnus Hoffmann |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Magdeburg, 39016, Magdeburg, Germany
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Abstract: | If property rights to consumption goods are insecure, the incentives to trade in a barter economy are reshaped. In a pure exchange economy, we examine the case where two contestable consumption goods are vital to two agents and initial endowments follow a binary distribution. In line with the existing literature, we examine in a two-stage game how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. We find that, depending on the exogenous preference and appropriation-effectiveness parameters, two different regimes emerge in equilibrium: trade and appropriation, and peaceful coexistence, with the latter regime exhibiting efficiency with respect to the goods traded. However, inefficiencies arise due to the investment in defensive activities necessary to deter appropriation. Thus, we have found an endogenously determined measure for the transaction cost underlying a market which replicates the outcome of a Walrasian market. |
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