地方政府行政决策裁量权的运行逻辑与制度激励

国务院《全面推进依法行政实施纲要》提出,要健全行政决策机制,完善行政决策程序,建立健全决策跟踪和责任追究制度。在我国公共管理中,中央政府与地方政府形成事实上的委托代理关系,中央政府的法律政策需要通过地方政府的行政决策进行贯彻,在此过程中,地方政府享有相当宽泛的裁量空间。但是,这种行政决策裁量权在运行中受到干部晋升标准、利益集团干扰、官员风险规避等多种因素干扰,出现了一定程度的偏离。有必要通过公法的制度性安排,促使其良性运行。

The Operational Logic and Institutional Incentives of Administrative Policy making Discretion of Local Government

The State Council of China calls for perfecting administrative policy making mechanism, completing administrative policy making process, and constructing policy making following and accountability system. The central and the local governments form principal agent relation defacto in public administration. The administrative policy making discretion of local government is very significant to the implementation of the central law and policy. Because it is subject to promotion standard, interest group, and risk aversion, the administrative policy making discretion appear departure. So institutional arrangement in public law should be constructed to promote to benign operation.