力量不对等供应链中不同定价权下的契约选择

寄存契约为供应商管理库存运营模式中的一种,零售商偏好寄存契约从而把库存风险转移给供应商,而供应商则偏好传统模式从而不需承担库存风险.从批发价格的定价权出发,探讨力量不对等供应链中成员偏好某种契约的务件.分析在力量不对等的供应链中,当批发价格为外生批发价格,即批发价格由外部市场决定时,供应链中成员在传统模式和寄存契约下的决策问题,并分析外生批发价格的大小如何影响供应链中成员的契约选择;当批发价格为内生批发价格,即批发价格由供应链中强势方(零售商或供应商)决定时,分别分析供应链中成员在传统模式和寄存契约下的决策问题,并横向分析不同力量对比度的供应链中,供应链成员如何选择契约和供应链的最终运行模式,从而为供应链成员的运营模式选择提供一定的科学指导.

Contracts Choice with Different Pricing Power in the Unbalanced Bargaining Power Supply Chain

Consignment contract is one kind of VM1 varieties. The retailer prefers the consignment contract so that the inventory risk can be transfered to the supplier while the supplier is better off with traditional model. The contracts choice is discussed in the unbalanced bargaining power supply chain based on different pricing power structures. Firstly, when the wholesale price is exogenous in the unbalanced bargaining power supply chain decided by the market, the members' decisions are discussed in the traditional model and consignment contract respectively. The effect of exogenous wholesale price on the contracts choice is ana-lyzed. Secondly, the members' decisions are discussed in the traditional model and consignment contract where the wholesale price is decided by the strong member in the supply chain (the dominated retailer or the dominated supplier). Based on the anal-ysis, the contracts choice is discussed with the endogenous wholesale price in the unbalanced bargaining power supply chain.