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政府信用缺失的经济学分析
引用本文:魏延明,张洁梅.政府信用缺失的经济学分析[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2003,2(Z1):12-17.
作者姓名:魏延明  张洁梅
作者单位:华南农业大学,经济贸易学院,广东,广州,510642
摘    要:近年来,地方政府都不同程度地存在着信用问题,它极大地影响了政府的形象和威信,影响了社会整体信用水平的提高,影响了社会交易与资源配置的效率.文章从经济人假设出发,利用博弈理论和成本收益分析,从剖析政府官员微观个体行为的角度,分析政府信用缺失问题.试图证明唯有从制度变革入手,才能从根本上解决政府信用缺失问题,并提出了制度建设的方向.

关 键 词:政府信用  博弈  成本-收益比较
文章编号:1672-0202(2003)S0-0012-06
修稿时间:2003年7月8日

An Economic Analysis of the Credibility Absence of the Government
WEI Yan-ming,ZHANG Jie-mei.An Economic Analysis of the Credibility Absence of the Government[J].Journal of South China Agricultural University:Social Science Edition,2003,2(Z1):12-17.
Authors:WEI Yan-ming  ZHANG Jie-mei
Abstract:The non - credibility or deceit of local government destroies government' s authority, impede the improvement of the level of social credibility and cut down the efficiency of transaction and the arrangement of the natural resources. In the article, the non - credibility of the government is analyzed by game theory, and cost - revenue analysis is used to explain the action of government employees. It is expected to prove that institution - making is the only way to solve the problem of the non - credibility of the government, and this article also suggests the direction of institution - making.
Keywords:the credibility of the government  game theory  cost - revenue comparison  
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