Core implementation via dynamic game forms

Implementation of a social choice correspondence (SCC) involves finding a decentralized choice mechanism for which the solution is a manifestation of the SCC. We examine whether dynamic game forms with corelike solutions are feasible candidates for implementation. When the solution is the -, -, or intermediate-cores respectively, such feasibility is found to require a choice structure which embeds a sequential dictatorship, in turn implying the SCC has a partial dictator. Implementation via the strong equilibrium set is found feasible iff society consists of a single citizen. Tapering the range of permissible utility profiles to include only von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities does little to rectify these impossibility results. Effectivity functions are used as analytical tools and several new effectivity function concepts are introduced.The author is grateful for comments by Tatsuro Ichiishi and B. Kelly Eakin. Errors or shortcomings are the sole responsibility of the author.