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中国古代运输业官民关系的演化规律及启示--以宋代为例
引用本文:逯宇,荣朝和.中国古代运输业官民关系的演化规律及启示--以宋代为例[J].北京交通大学学报(社会科学版),2016,15(2):28-35.
作者姓名:逯宇  荣朝和
作者单位:北京交通大学 经济管理学院,北京,100044;北京交通大学 经济管理学院,北京,100044
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“基于交通/物流时间价值的经济时空关系研究”(41171113)。
摘    要:通过构建运输业官民博弈演化模型,选取宋代运输业官民关系逐步恶化的案例进行经济学分析和验证,揭示中国古代运输业官民关系博弈演化规律。官方一向有动力不断扩大运输业公共部门、加大运输业投资、增加管制强度、干预和挤压民间运输主体的正常经营收益。而巨大的社会成本转移给底层组织和底层民众,逐渐激化社会矛盾形成对体系的负向激励和瓦解力量,成为历代运输业官民关系变化的制度原因。历代运输业官民关系恶化的教训对当前我国运输业的发展与体制改革具有重要启示作用。

关 键 词:运输业  官民关系  博弈演化模型  宋代历史

The Evolution of the Government-People Relationship in Transport Industry in Ancient China and Its Inspiration---Taking Song dynasty as an example
LU Yu,RONG Chao-he.The Evolution of the Government-People Relationship in Transport Industry in Ancient China and Its Inspiration---Taking Song dynasty as an example[J].Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University Social Sciences Edition,2016,15(2):28-35.
Authors:LU Yu  RONG Chao-he
Abstract:With an economic analysis of the deteriorating government-people relationship in transport industry in Song dynasty,this paper reveals the evolutionary law of the government-people relation-ship in transport industry based on a Game Evolutionary model.The government is constantly motiva-ted to expand transport public sectors,increase the investment,strengthen the management,and de-crease the profits of nongovernmental transportation subjects.The cost is then transferred to the un-derclass organizations and individuals,which gradually intensifies the social contradictions and nega-tive incentives and disintegrates the industrial system.This is the institutional cause of the changing government-people relationship in transport industry in the past dynasties,which is enlightening to the current structural reform and development of our transportation system.
Keywords:transport industry  government-people relationship  Game Evolutionary model  the histo-ry of Song dynasty
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