地方政府竞争下的产业选择、就业和收入分配

文章构建了基于地方政府竞争的数量模型。研究表明:在一系列的激励下,中国的地方政府为经济增长而展开了激烈竞争。由于资本密集型产业相对于劳动力密集型产业来说,具有更高的生产效率和更强的增长效应,因此,地方政府在引进和选择产业发展时,会倾向于优先发展资本密集型产业。为此,他们会采取多种措施来吸引、扶持资本密集型产业的发展,忽视劳动密集型产业。而资本密集型产业的过度发展,一是会造成机器和技术对劳动力的替代,使得中国出现"低就业的增长";二是造成资本在收入中的谈判能力不断提高,而劳动力的谈判能力不断降低,从而使得国民收入的初次分配中资本的占比不断提高,而劳动的占比则不断降低。

Local Government Competition ,Industry Selection, Employment and Income Distribution

This essay develops an econometric model based on local governments’ competition.The study shows that local governments in China compete with each other intensely for economic growth.Compared with labor-intensive industries,as capital-intensive industries have higher production efficiency and stronger growth effect,local governments intend to develop capital-intensive industries preferentially.They will adopt a variety of measures to attract and support the development of capital-intensive industries;meanwhile neglecting the development of labor-intensive industries.However,the over-development of capital-intensive industries brings two consequences:the substitution of labor by machine and technology which may lead to the "low employment growth",and the constant capital improvement of bargaining power,while labor’s bargaining power gradually diminishes,which makes the proportion of capital increase in the initial distribution of national income and the proportion of labor decrease.