知识主体的突进与退隐:从笛卡尔到福柯

在西方哲学的知识论传统中,哲学家们倾向于把主体和客体理解为他们各自规范的知识观念所要求的必要功能。在古代哲学家们的思想中,自然和客体知识的可能性问题受到主要讨论,但没有明确地思考主体问题。近现代主体观的兴起所依赖的个体观念只是在后来的基督教思想中才进入哲学传统。以个体观念为先决条件的个体责任的观念已然现身于奥古斯丁的著作中。奥古斯丁对自我的直接诉求,天才般地开启了笛卡尔的"我思"观念的源头。由此形成的笛卡尔的知识主体,是一个抽象的认识论的假定,一个消极的旁观者。康德有限度地追随了笛卡尔的主体观念,但把笛卡尔的作为消极的旁观者的主体改造成了积极的行动者。康德在知识观上的这种"哥白尼式的"革命,构成了随后德国唯心主义主体观的基础。整体上看,康德之后的主体观存在着一种越来越向笛卡尔的主体观和古希腊的主体观隐退的明显倾向,及至海德格尔后期和后结构主义,这种倾向最终导致了向古希腊知识主体的全面回归。

The Progress and Retreat of Knowledge Subject: From Descartes to Foucault

In the western philosophical tradition of the theory of knowledge,philosophers tend to comprehend subject and object as functions of the requirements imposed by their respective normative conceptions of knowledge.In ancient thought,issues surrounding the nature and possibility of objective knowledge are mainly discussed without explicit reflection on the problem of the subject.This subjective concept only enters the philosophical tradition in later Christian thought.This conception of individual responsibility presupposing the notion of individuality is already present in the writings of Augustine.Augustine’s direct resort talented to himself opens the source of Cartesian cogito.The Cartesian subject of knowledge based on this is an Abstract epistemological posit and a passive spectator.Kant follows finitely Descartes in understanding the epistemological subject,but transforms the subject as a passive spectator into a positive actor.This Kantian Copernican Revolution in the conception of knowledge becomes a basic notion of subject in later German idealist tradition.As a whole,there is a tendency to withdraw into the Cartesian and Greek conception of subject.To Heidegger and post-structuralism,it leads to return generally to Greek subject eventually.