General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures |
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Authors: | Franz Dietrich |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Masstricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands;(2) Centre for Junior Research Fellows, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz, Germany |
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Abstract: | Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log likelihood ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom (“Epistemic Monotonicity”) which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not be a vote for an alternative; it may be any type of input, for instance a subjective degree of belief or probability of the correctness of one of the alternatives. The case of a profile of subjective degrees of belief is particularly appealing, since no parameters such as competence parameters need to be known here. |
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