财富、不对称信息与企业中控制权的分配

本文通过构建信号传递模型,研究了企业家财富、不对称信息和企业中权力分配三者之间的关系.文章指出,企业家可以通过两种方式向投资者传递其私有信息,一是向企业中投入一定的自有资本,二是将部分控制权让渡给投资者.这两种信号传递工具相互之间存在一定的替代性,但对于优质企业家而言具有不同的成本.在分离均衡条件下,企业家向企业中投入自有财富所产生的分离成本,要小于将控制权让渡给投资者所带来的分离成本,所以企业家更偏好于选择向企业中投入自有财富来传递私有信息.本研究对企业中控制权的"相机转移"现象提供了一个更为合理的解释.

Wealth, Asymmetric Information and the Allocation of Control Right in Enterprises

This paper investigates the interrelationship between the wealth of entrepreneur, asymmetric information and the allocation of power in enterprises by setting up a signaling model. Asymmetric information exists between the entrepreneur and outside investors, but standard theories of control rights in financial contracting offer little insight into these findings. In order to avoid pooling by bad types, a good type entrepreneur can transmit his private information by two means: investing self-owned capital in the enterprise and relinquishing partial control right to the investors. Although these two means of signaling can substitute each other, they incur different cost for good type entrepreneurs. Under conditions of separating equilibrium, less separating cost is incurred by investing entrepreneurs' own capital than by transferring partial control right to the investors. Therefore, if the entrepreneur is financially resourceful, he'll prefer to transmit his private information by investing selfowned wealth in the enterprise, and thus no transfer of control rights is necessary. If the entrepreneur is incapable of recapitalizing due to wealth constraint, he will have to give up partial control rights to the investors while investing self-owned capital in the enterprise at the same time, so that his private information can be signaled. For the entrepreneur who is financially weak, even if he invests all selfowned wealth in the enterprise and gives up total control rights to the outside investors, he is unable to transmit his private information. In this case, he cannot avoid pooling by bad type entrepreneurs and gets the outside investment in spite of good quality of his enterprise. There exists threshold of wealth for entrepreneur to initiate his business, which is related to the entrepreneur's reputation, the society and economy environment and outside investors' monitoring capability. This paper gives a more reasonable explanation for the contingent allocation of control rights in enterprises.