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场外衍生品市场监管的演化博弈分析
引用本文:斯文.场外衍生品市场监管的演化博弈分析[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2013,15(3):39-46.
作者姓名:斯文
作者单位:上海社会科学院世界经济研究所,上海,200020
摘    要:金融危机使场外衍生品市场广受争议, 政府监管的缺失被认为是酿成灾难性后果的根源之一。从有限理性的角度出发, 运用演化博弈的分析框架, 对市场交易主体与政府监管主体之间的策略选择、演变轨迹及影响因素展开了讨论, 发现复制动态系统中存在5个局部均衡点, 并且在不同情形下趋向于不同的均衡点。依据模型的结论, 得出增强我国场外衍生品市场监管效率的对策建议, 包括加大监管强制效力、完善监管激励机制、降低监管成本支出、推动产品规范运行、健全市场自律机制等措施。

关 键 词:场外衍生品  政府监管  演化博弈  演化稳定策略
收稿时间:2012/9/30 0:00:00

Evolutionary Games in Regulations of OTC Derivatives Market
SI Wen.Evolutionary Games in Regulations of OTC Derivatives Market[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2013,15(3):39-46.
Authors:SI Wen
Institution:1.Institute of World Economics, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai 200020, China
Abstract:The OTC derivatives market is widely criticized in the financial crisis. The lack of government regulation is considered one of the fundamental causes of disastrous consequences. Under the conditions of limited rationality and the framework of evolutionary games, the paper studies strategies selection, the evolution of the trajectory and impact factors between the market traders and government regulators. And it finds that the replicator dynamic system has five partial equilibrium points and tends to the different equilibrium point in the different cases. Finally, based on the conclusions of the model, it makes suggestions for efficiency improvement of the OTC derivatives market regulation in China.
Keywords:OTC derivatives  government regulation  evolutionary games  evolutionary stable strategy
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