农村公共政策执行中监督强化的底层逻辑

村镇两级是政策执行的直接推动者，也是政策效果自下而上反馈的第一个环节，这一反馈的真实性直接影响到政策监督的有效性。在发达地区富人治村的背景下，村干部对体制及体制资源的依赖性减弱，镇村两级的干部从偏闭合型关系向非闭合型关系转变。此外，基层政权深度嵌入村庄：以联村干部等为主的基层组织建设作为组织基础，在镇村之间有效化解信息不对称等的难题；通过对联村干部进行目标责任考核，增加其推动政策落实的压力和动力。从而形成以基层政权深度嵌入村庄为基础的非闭合型乡村关系，这种乡村关系构成了政策监督强化的底层逻辑。

Bottom Logic of Supervision and Strengthening in Rural Public Policy Execution

Villages and towns are not only the direct drivers of policy implementation, but also the first links in the bottom-up feedback line. The truth of the feedback directly affects the effectiveness of policy supervision. Under the background of developed areas where villages are managed by the rich, the dependence of system and system resource is reduced and the relationship between town and village is getting non-closed. In addition, the grassroots regime is deeply embedded into villages. The village cadres from town as a foundation for organization can effectively dissolve the problem of information asymmetry. Target responsibility appraisal through the village cadres can increase the pressure and motivation to promote policy implementation. Thereby the non-closed relationship which the grassroots regime is deeply embedded into villages can be formed. That relationship composes the bottom logic of supervision and strengthening in the rural public policy execution.