考虑厂商承诺行为的产品延伸服务市场竞争分析

本文研究了信息不对称下厂商承诺行为对产品延伸服务市场结构与厂商博弈均衡的影响。通过建立寡头厂商的价格博弈模型,分析了无承诺,单边承诺和双边承诺三种市场中厂商的Bertrand-Nash均衡定价与相应的利润水平和市场占有率,并进一步探究了厂商行为发生的特点和条件以及对于市场结构和消费者福利的影响关系。研究表明:(1)厂商承诺行为影响信息不对称市场的厂商价格博弈均衡;(2)厂商承诺行为主要取决于产品延伸服务水平的阈值区间和消费者对产品延伸服务的偏好差异程度;(3)市场上的优势厂商总是承诺的先行者,并且会努力选择最大的产品延伸服务水平;(4)厂商承诺有助于提升服务水平,提升消费者剩余。

Analysis of Market Competition on Product-Supplementary Service by Considering Firm’s Commitment Behavior

In this paper,we investigate the impacts of commitment on the market structure and Bertrand competition in the produc-tsupplementary service(PSS)market with information asymmetry.Agame theoretic model is employed to look for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in three kinds of market structure with are non-commitment PPS market,unilateral commitment PPS market and bilateral commitment PPS market.With the equilibrium on firm's pricing,profit and market share,it is analyzed that the condition of firm'behavior and its relationship with the market structure and consumer welfare.The results show that:(1)Obviously the equilibrium of the market is different by the effect of firm's commitment to PSS level; (2)Firm's commitmentaction is determined by the distribution interval of PPS level and customer's taste of PSS;(3)The dominant firm always is the leader to of fer commitment,which to the PPS level is maximized as possible as it can;(4)Firm's commitment action increase the PPS level,which is beneficial to consumer welfare.