网络效应与多寡头市场技术许可竞争策略研究

考虑一个由一家在位许可企业与多家寡头企业组成的网络产品市场,分析当产品具有网络效应时在位许可企业在固定费许可下最优的许可证数问题,证明在位企业是否进行许可、进行独家还是多家许可受到网络效应强度、市场容量、市场集中度、研发效率的影响。当市场容量较小时,在位企业将垄断;当市场容量足够大时,许可总是最优的--若网络强度较小,无论市场集中度如何,多家许可均优于独家许可;若网络强度适中,对市场上具有研发潜力的企业都进行许可较优;若网络强度很大,在市场集中度较大时,多家许可优于独家许可;若市场集中度较小,则进行独家许可还是多家许可取决于发放许可证数。另外在许可企业不能实行价格歧视时,最优的固定费随着受许企业整体研发效率和许可证数的提高而减小。

Network Effect and Research on Technology Licensing Strategies in Oligopoly

This paper considers a network product oligopolistic market made up of an incumbent licensor and a number of enterprises,and analyzes the optimal number of licenses in fixed-fee licensing by the incumbent when the products are of network effects.We show that whether to license and to sole-licensing or multi-licensing depend on intensity of network effect,market capacity,market concentration and R &;D efficiency.When the market is rather small,the incumbent will be a monopolist.When the market is large sufficiently,it's always optimal to license.If the intensity of network is very small,no matter how the market concentration,multi-licensing dominates sole-licen sing.If the intensity of network is moderate,the incumbent licensor will license all the enterprises in the market.If the intensity of network is rather large,when the market concentration is relatively large,it is superior to multi-licensing than sole-licensing;when the market concentration is small,then whether to sole-licensing or multi-licensing depends on the number of licenses.Meanwhile,when the incumbent licensor can't make price discrimination,the optimal fixed fee reduces as the overall R&;D efficiency by licensees and the number of licenses by licensor increases.