| 双重信息不对称下销售渠道双目标混合激励模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 田厚平,刘长贤.双重信息不对称下销售渠道双目标混合激励模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(3):34-47. |
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| 作者姓名： | 田厚平 刘长贤 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京理工大学经济管理学院,南京,210094 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目，教育部人文社会科学研究项目，南京理工大学自主科研专项计划资助项目，南京理工大学"卓越计划紫金之星"及经济管理学院资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 销售渠道在企业与消费者之间扮演着重要的桥梁作用,销售人员的销售能力和销售努力等信息均为其私有而不为企业所共知时,企业如何甄别其真实能力信息并对其销售努力实施有效激励是个重要问题.针对上述问题,给出了基于线性合约的双目标混合激励模型,通过模型求解得到并刻画了最优合约的3个特征.首先,为辨别高能力类型与普通能力类型这两种不...
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| 关 键 词： | 销售渠道 合约设计 混合激励模型 逆向选择 道德风险 |
Bi-objective incentive model in distribution channel under the framework of dual information asymmetry |
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| TIAN Hou-ping,LIU Chang-xian.Bi-objective incentive model in distribution channel under the framework of dual information asymmetry[J].Journal of Management Sciences in China,2011,14(3):34-47. |
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| Authors: | TIAN Hou-ping LIU Chang-xian |
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| Institution: | TIAN Hou-ping,LIU Chang-xian School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science & Technology,Nanjing 210094,China |
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| Abstract: | Because the distribution channel acts as an important bridge between the firms and the customers,a key question is how a firm can screen the true capability of its salesmen and provide incentives to make them work hard while the sales capability and sales efforts are both of their private information.In this paper,to solve the above problem a bi-objective model is developed based on the linear contract,and then three main findings are obtained by analysis of the model.First,to screen the true capability of ... |
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| Keywords: | distribution channel contract design mixed incentive model adverse selection moral hazard |
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