| 命题的本格初探 |
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| 引用本文： | 顿新国,宋荣.命题的本格初探[J].河南社会科学,2012,20(10):49-51,108. |
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| 作者姓名： | 顿新国 宋荣 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 南京大学哲学系,江苏南京,210093
2. 华中师范大学政法学院,湖北武汉,430079 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金项目(11BZX061);国家社科基金青年项目(11CZX051);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(08JC720006);江苏省社会科学基金项目(102XC009) |
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| 摘 要： | 命题是逻辑哲学的核心概念,许多哲学家提出了自己关于命题本格的观点。弗雷格认为命题即被构造的思想,罗素认为命题是由词项构成的统一体,维特根斯坦认为命题是可能世界的集合。辨析以上观点可以指认:命题是被构造的抽象实体,它是真值载体,独立于自然语言而存在,具有合法的本体论地位。
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| 关 键 词： | 命题 本格 抽象实体 真值载体 |
On What is Proposition |
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| Dun Xinguo, Song Rong.On What is Proposition[J].Henan Social Sciences,2012,20(10):49-51,108. |
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| Authors: | Dun Xinguo Song Rong |
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| Institution: | Dun Xinguo, Song Rong |
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| Abstract: | Proposition is central to philosophy of mind. But there is no agreement on what is it. Frege thought proposition was constructed thoughts. Russell thought that proposition was constituted of terms. For Wittgenstein, proposition is the fact that represents other facts. And according to possible world semantics, proposition is the set of possible worlds. This article shows that proposition is a kind of abstract entity, the carrier of truth value, and that it exists independent of natural language. |
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| Keywords: | Proposition ontological status abstract entity carrier of truth |
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