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我国银行业风险与存款保险制度的完善
引用本文:龚秀国.我国银行业风险与存款保险制度的完善[J].四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005(1):17-21.
作者姓名:龚秀国
作者单位:四川大学,经济学院,四川,成都,610064
摘    要:在银行业即将对外全面开放之际,我国银行业潜伏着巨大危机。我国所谓的"隐性存款保险制度"不是一个公平的、有效的防范银行业风险和提高银行管理水平的制度。因此,应实行强制性存款保险制度并根据银行不同风险暴露实行差别性存款保险费率,从而规避保险制度中普遍存在的逆向选择和道德风险问题。

关 键 词:存款保险  银行业风险  逆向选择  道德风险
文章编号:1006-0766(2005)01-0017-05
修稿时间:2004年7月15日

China's Banking Risk and Perfection of Deposit Insurance System
GONG Xiu-guo.China's Banking Risk and Perfection of Deposit Insurance System[J].Journal of Sichuan University(Social Science Edition),2005(1):17-21.
Authors:GONG Xiu-guo
Abstract:Under the tremendous pressure of tougher foreign competition in the years to come, China's weak banking system has been undergoing fundamental reforms and is now becoming more and more vulnerable. But the so-called"implicit deposit insurance system", as implied by governmental actions in dealing with distressed banks, is unable to provide a fair and efficient institutional framework to tackle the great risks in China's banking system. The author recommends the establishment of compulsory deposit insurance system with discriminatory premiums based on risk exposure of depository institutions to eliminate the widespread problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance system.
Keywords:deposit insurance  banking risk  adverse selection  moral hazard  
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