战略联盟契约风险对策研究

战略联盟契约风险问题,即隐藏行动的道德风险问题,依赖于显性激励合同与隐性激励合同的结合,并考虑相对业绩比较的保险功能才能得以彻底解决。战略联盟短期合作的契约风险可采用包含监控(内控与外控)变量的最优激励合同(显性合同)来解决。在设计激励方案时,盟主必须考虑激励盟友的成本与盟主利益的一致性,而且还要考虑收益和成本的均衡。只有当观测成本小于由此带来的代理成本的降低时,将监控变量写进激励合同才有价值。联盟要长期合作,必须有效发挥隐必激励合同的作用,通过现期努力对产出的影响来改进市场对能力的判断,强化声誉效应,弱化棘轮效益,从而强化激励监控机制,进而使战略联盟的契约风险问题得到有效的解决。

Study of Strategy on Contract Risk in Virtual Alliance

Contract risk in virtual alliance,i.e.moral hazard with hidden action,depends on both combining explicit and implicit incentive mechanisms and considering insurance function of comparisons of relative achievement.The risk in short period cooperation is settled down by optimal incentive contract (explicit contract),which includes internal or external monitoring variables.When designing the incentive scheme,the sponsor should consider not only consistency of the cost of incentive alliance member and his profit but also equilibrium of himself in income and cost.It is only when the observing cost is less than the reducing of agent’s cost that the sponsor can write monitoring variable into contract.For a long period corporation of alliance,the effect of implicit incentive mechanism should be exerted.With the effect of present effort on output,the judgment of market to ability is improved,strengthens reputation effects,weakens ratchet effects,and boosts up incentive and monitoring mechanism,then further the contract risk in virtual alliance will be effectively resolved.