| Abstract: | One of the central questions in the study of special purposegovernments is how to explain their proliferation over the pastfifty years. Of particular concern to scholars has been therise of a hidden government that is not highly accountable throughregular democratic processes. This article looks specificallyat one form of special purpose government, known as a "publicauthority," and amends the conventional explanation that localgovernments principally create public authorities to addresspublic finance concerns. First, I argue that full "service publicauthorities," which administer and make policy about a particularservice arena, raise different concerns about democratic accountabilityfrom a "conduit authority" and are a nonparsimonious solutionto a public finance problem. Second, drawing on an archivalsurvey of the institutional choices of county governments indealing with solid waste policymaking in New York State, I findthat while public finance is a driver in the choice to createa service public authority, equally, if not more important,are the needs of local government to resolve a policy problemin a politically competitive environment. |
