不完全合约下BOT利益相关者的博弈与融资效率分析 --以A水库BOT项目为例

BOT作为一种特许经营权方式,将民间资本引入公用事业的建设、经营,能提高效率、缓解政府融资压力。但在现有体制下,由于过程不规范、制度不完善,在不完全合约下隐含着诸如政府失信等风险。为此试以A水库BOT项目作为案例,运用博弈论,说明在此不完全合约下各方行为更多是由长期以来形成的“潜规则”进行协调,并指出其效率损失和提出相应的政策建议。

The game of BOT interest correlatives and the analysis of financial efficiency in incomplete treaty

BOT,as a kind of franchise,introduces folk capital into the construction and management of public service,and it can increase efficiency and relieve government's financial pressure.However,at the present system of organization,because the procedure is not standard and the system is not perfect,risks like government's credibility are hidden in incomplete treaty. Thus tentative to take reservoir A,project BOT as a case example,with the game theory,that each party's behavior in the incomplete treaty are more coordinated by the "hidden rules" formed for a long time is explained.And the efficiency loss is pointed out,and relevant policy suggestions are put forward.