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有限理性的Stackelberg双寡头技术 创新演化博弈分析
引用本文:姚丰桥,陈通.有限理性的Stackelberg双寡头技术 创新演化博弈分析[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2011,13(4):25-28,57.
作者姓名:姚丰桥  陈通
作者单位:1.天津大学 管理学院,天津 300072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目,天津市科技计划资助项目
摘    要:技术创新事关企业存亡和社会福祉。针对市场中垄断寡头技术创新问题,建立了Stackelberg双寡头技术创新策略的博弈支付矩阵,在此基础上,运用演化博弈理论,得出了双寡头技术创新的演化稳定策略,研究表明,Stackelberg双寡头是否采用技术创新策略不但与技术创新前后成品的边际成本、价格相关,也与企业在市场中的地位有关,因此双方基于利益考量并不一定采取一致的技术创新策略。

关 键 词:有限理性    演化博弈    技术创新    寡头
收稿时间:2010/6/10 0:00:00

Based on Bounded Rationality Stackelberg Duopoly Evolutionary Game Analysis of Technological Innovation
YAO Fengqiao and CHEN Tong.Based on Bounded Rationality Stackelberg Duopoly Evolutionary Game Analysis of Technological Innovation[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2011,13(4):25-28,57.
Authors:YAO Fengqiao and CHEN Tong
Institution:1.School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072
Abstract:Technological innovation is related to corporate survival and social well-being. Aiming at the market in the issue of monopoly, technological innovation, using game theory methods, a duopoly innovation strategy game payoff matrix is established. On the basis of this, by referring to evolutionary game theory, duopoly evolutionary stable strategy of technological innovation is obtained. Research results show that in deciding on whether to adopt the strategy of technological innovation around the product, the duopoly takes into account not only the marginal cost, but also the company's position in the market, and therefore does not necessarily consider the interests of both sides to take on a consistent technology innovation strategy.
Keywords:bounded rationality  evolutionary game  technological innovation  oligopoly
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