Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity |
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Authors: | Itai Ashlagi Shigehiro Serizawa |
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Institution: | 1.Sloan School of Management,Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge,USA;2.Institute of Social and Economic Research,Osaka University,Ibaraki,Japan |
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Abstract: | We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives
at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number
of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from
the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is
the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality. |
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Keywords: | |
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