CEO Duality,Agency Costs,and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency

This study examines the impact of CEO duality on firms’ internal capital allocation efficiency. We observe that when the CEO is also chair of the board, diversified firms make inefficient investments, as they allocate more capital to business segments with relatively low growth opportunities over segments with high growth opportunities. The adverse impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency prevails only among firms that face high agency problems, as captured by high free cash flows, staggered board structure and low board independence. Depending on the severity of the agency problem, CEO duality is associated with a decrease in industry‐adjusted investment in high‐growth segments of 1% to 2.1% over the following year, relative to that in low‐growth segments. However, CEOs’ equity‐based compensation curbs the negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation efficiency. Overall, the findings of this study offer strong support for the agency theory and postulate the internal capital allocation policy as an important channel through which CEO duality lowers firm value in diversified firms.     

A Multi‐theory Perspective of Board Leadership Structure: What Does the Egyptian Corporate Governance Context Tell Us?

Much of the existing research in corporate governance has been directed at examining the consequences of board leadership structure on various organizational issues, with little to say about the determinants of this structure. By exploring either agency theory or stewardship theory, researchers provide contested conclusions regarding board leadership structure. The underlying premise of both theories is that ‘one universal structure fits all’. However, the main argument of this paper is that the appropriate board leadership structure varies with some contextual variables and certain actors in a given environment. Econometric analysis demonstrates that board leadership structure varies with firm size, age and ownership structure. The implication of this result is that the assertion of both agency theory (CEO non‐duality structure) and stewardship theory (CEO duality structure) may be valid under certain conditions. Thus, existing theories might need to be treated as complementary viewpoints, each of which draws upon a part of the whole picture, because depending on just one single perspective is more likely to result in misleading conclusions about the structure as a whole.     

CEO and Chairperson characteristics and firm performance

This paper focuses on the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairperson characteristics and firm performance. Specifically, the study examines the association between the characteristics of the CEO and the Chairperson of the board and firm performance. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms, the evidence found suggests that demographic and experience-related characteristics may be associated with the market valuation and financial performance of the firm. In particular, the reported results indicate a positive relationship between the presence of female CEOs or Chairs and firm performance, thus suggesting that gender-based differences may affect the CEO’s/Chairperson’s success. Moreover, the findings concerning the age of the CEO or Chair are mixed, while their experience and quality appear positively related to firm performance. Interestingly, a CEO or Chairperson holding multiple board seats is negatively associated with firm performance, whereas CEO duality has a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q and the return on assets (ROA) of the firm.     

The double-edged sword of CEO/chairperson duality in corporatized state-owned firms: evidence from top management turnover in China

This study examines how board leadership structure (CEO duality) affects the corporate governance of corporatized state-owned firms where the state shareholders use these firms to serve both profit and non-profit objectives. We propose that CEO duality will generate a positive (negative) significant impact on the firms’ corporate governance when state owners tend to monitor their CEOs on the basis of profit (non-profit) considerations. We test our hypotheses by examining the relations between CEO duality and CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies that are ultimately controlled by central or local governments. We find that CEO duality is negatively related to turnover in marginal profit-making firms where turnover would be value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality is detrimental to these firms’ corporate governance because it entrenches relatively poorly performing CEOs. Duality is also negatively related to turnover in high-profitability firms where turnover would be non-value-enhancing. This suggests that CEO duality might positively contribute to the corporate governance of these firms by reducing the occurrence of non-value enhancing turnover. Overall, our study suggests that CEO duality is a double-edged sword in corporatized state-owned firms.     

CEO characteristics and firm valuation: a quantile regression analysis

This study investigates the effects of three highly-visible CEO characteristics on firm valuation. Using a sample of 2702 observations for Australian firms over the period 2001–2011, we find that CEO age is uniformly associated with lower firm valuation. CEO tenure is also associated with lower valuation, but more significantly so in the higher quantiles of firm valuation, that is for firms with high-growth opportunities. In contrast, CEO duality is found to be beneficial only for firms with high-growth opportunities. Overall, the study highlights the contingent relationship between CEO characteristics and firm valuation.     

The cost of CEO duality: Evidence from French leadership compensation

This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between board leadership structures and executive compensation. According to agency theory, the combined position of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (COB) entails greater compensation for the CEO in order to reduce conflicts of interest. In the literature, combined board structure is generally considered to generate additional costs for companies. However, the choice of two separate structures implies the payment of incentive compensation for the COB in addition to that defined for the CEO. This paper investigates the financial cost of duality when compensation packages are set for both leaders. Our results suggest that although combined board structure is associated with higher incentive compensation for the CEO, the overall compensation cost to the company is no higher when the chairperson's compensation is considered.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure

Recent corporate scandals have led to renewed campaigns for governance reforms, including calls for the separation of CEO and chairman positions. This paper argues that this trend ignores the possibility that differences in firm characteristics determine the appropriateness of separating or combining the two positions. I propose and test hypotheses on the determinants of leadership structure using a sample of 1,883 firms. I find that organizational complexity, CEO reputation, and managerial ownership increase the probability of CEO duality. I also find that whether CEO duality benefits or hurts the firm is contingent on firm and CEO characteristics. These results suggest that firms do consider the costs and benefits of alternative leadership structures, and that requiring all firms to separate CEO and chairman duties may be counterproductive.

CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating roles of other executives and blockholding outside directors

This study examines how the effect of CEO duality on firm performance is affected by two internal governance forces – namely other executives in the top management team and blockholding outside directors. Results based on a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. computer industry were consistent with my hypotheses. Specifically, I found that the effect of CEO duality was negative when the CEO had dominant power relative to other executives and when the board had a blockholding outside director, but was nonsignificant otherwise. This study enriches our understanding of the effect of CEO duality, and helps reinforce the call for the nonduality structure as the default choice and put the burden of proof on those who wish to justify otherwise on special grounds.     

CEO burnout,managerial discretion,and firm performance: The role of CEO locus of control,structural power,and organizational factors

Despite the possibility of burnout resulting from dynamics in firms' upper echelons, little if any work has focused on chief executive officer's (CEO's) burnout and firm performance. Drawing on managerial discretion theory, this article analyzes the influence of CEO burnout on firm performance and the moderating roles of the individual (CEO locus of control), structural power (CEO duality and CEO tenure), and organizational characteristics (size, age, and resource availability) related to managerial discretion. Using a sample of 156 CEOs in Swedish firms, we find a negative association between CEOs who report higher burnout and firm performance. Our results confirm that CEO duality and resource availability ameliorate and firm size exacerbates the negative association between CEO burnout and firm performance. Contrary to our expectations, CEO locus of control, CEO tenure, and firm age do not influence this relationship. We discuss the implications of our research for upper echelons theory and strategic leadership theory.     

Agency conflicts,executive compensation regulations and CEO pay-performance sensitivity: evidence from Sweden

Based on a unique country set up with concentrated ownership of firms, strong representation of major shareholders on boards and one of the highest percentages of firms with dual-class shares worldwide I study CEO pay-performance sensitivity in Swedish listed firms in the years 2001–2013. Focusing on Type II agency conflict, I find that that pay-performance sensitivity in family-controlled firms with family CEOs is significantly lower than in other types of firms, and that dual-class firms have significantly lower sensitivity of pay to accounting performance than non-dual-class firms. The results suggest that in firms with type II agency conflicts compensation practices may be driven either by family ties or by the power preferences of the controlling shareholder that uses compensation to align CEO’s interest with his/her will rather than with financial performance. The study also documents that the link between CEO pay and performance disappears in the 2010–2013 period following the implementation of the European Recommendations regarding executive compensation. This finding is in contrast to the stipulated goal of the European Commission, ‘to ensure pay for performance’ (European Commission 2009).     

为什么CEO解职如此罕见? 一种基于前景理论的解释

基于前景理论和公司行为理论,本研究将商业风险、所有权集中度及CEO解职后的继任来源整合于同一框架。基于中国上市公司数据所进行的大样本实证分析表明,商业风险、CEO与董事长兼任、所有权集中度与CEO解职率正相关,所有权集中度负向调节商业风险对CEO解职关系。但针对CEO解职后不同继任来源的分析显示,这种调节作用尽管在两类CEO解职中仍然得到保持,但其它所考察变量在外部继任型解职中则有着明显不同。这些发现,进一步加深了对高所有权集中度情境下,CEO解职这一极为重要的战略决策过程的理解。     

Board characteristics effects on performance in family and non-family business: a multi-theoretical approach

This paper examines the role of the board of directors in influencing the value of Italian listed firms from 2003 to 2013. In particular, employing agency, stewardship and resource dependence theories, the study aims to compare board characteristics in family and non-family firms and define the theory that best applies to family firms. Empirical results show that the presence of CEO duality and busy directors has a positive effect on the value of family firms, while gender diversity has a negative impact on the value when a member of the family leads a family firm. Conversely, the size of the board positively affects the value of non-family firms. Our main findings suggest the prevalence, in family firms, of the benefits of the board structure argued by stewardship and resource dependence theories rather than the disadvantages expected from agency theory.     

CEO self-discipline in power use: A key moderator for the effect of CEO power

The effect of CEO power depends ultimately on how it is used (i.e., a CEO’s approach to power use), which may vary from one CEO to another. Notwithstanding extensive research on the effect of CEO power on organizational outcomes, researchers have thus far paid very limited attention to how the effect depends on individual differences. In this study I propose a new construct of CEO self-discipline in power use—defined as a CEO’s appeared conformance to the prescribed leadership norms (in particular, norms regarding how leaders should use their power)—and examine how it moderates the effect of CEO power. With a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. computer hardware and software industries, I found that CEO self-discipline in power use weakened the positive effect of CEO power on performance extremeness and improved the effect of CEO power on firm performance.     

Board of director efficacy and firm performance variability

While academic researchers continue to debate the effect of board independence in increasing performance, its efficacy could also be reflected in whether firm performance is made more stable. Board governance activities are a constellation of actions aimed at managing agency costs and ensuring the viability of a company over time. The efficacy of such actions would, therefore, be reflected in a distal outcome, specifically, in lower firm performance variability. Boards that can control agency costs and limit both underinvestment and overinvestment would reduce a firm's deviation from its mean performance trajectory. Using a longitudinal sample of publicly traded companies in the United States, we find that board stability, board resource provision, and CEO influence are negatively associated with performance variability. Board independence is not associated with performance variability. With increasing board independence, greater board stability and greater CEO influence are negatively associated with performance variability, however, greater board resource provision is not associated with performance variability.     

Headquarters′ monitoring mechanisms,subsidiaries’ financial slack,and the contingent role of subsidiaries′ external embeddedness

Within MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries financial slack, i.e., uncommitted financial resources in excess of those needed for current operations, may incur costs for headquarters. These costs may emanate from subsidiaries' decision to forego investment opportunities and stockpile cash instead, which, in turn, may lead to fewer resources being available for redistribution within the organization. From an agency theory perspective, headquarters can minimize these costs through monitoring mechanisms. While agency theory is considered theoretically appropriate for the study of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, it reflects a rather undersocialized manifestation of human behaviour, which in turn limits its applicability. In this paper, we attempt to address this limitation by suggesting and empirically exploring that the effect of monitoring mechanisms is dependent (1) on the different types of monitoring used, and (2) on subsidiaries' external embeddedness. Drawing on empirical evidence from 94 subsidiaries of foreign multinationals operating in Greece, we provide some initial evidence on the differential impact of monitoring through expatriates and monitoring through bureaucratic processes. Most importantly, we show that subsidiaries' structural embeddedness moderates both associations. In doing so, we reveal that whether subsidiaries behave opportunistically or as good citizens is partially determined by the social context in which they are embedded. An unexpected finding concerns the positive effect of the origin of the CEO on subsidiaries' financial slack for expatriates compared to local managers. This finding underscores the importance of the CEO identity, and highlights the need for future research exploring its effect on subsidiaries' performance.     

Does Board Ethnic Diversity Impact Board Monitoring Outcomes?

This study investigates whether board ethnic diversity is associated with stronger board monitoring outcomes. We explore a range of outcomes – CEO compensation, accounting misstatements, CEO turnover–performance sensitivity and acquisition performance – but find no evidence to support this. We also find no evidence that board ethnic diversity improves overall firm performance, even for those firms with higher agency problems. Our results are robust across different methodologies and have important practical implications, by informing the current public policy debate on board ethnic diversity.     

A juggling act: CEO polychronicity and firm innovation

This study examines a unique CEO temporal characteristic—polychronicity (the extent to which CEOs prefer to engage in multiple projects simultaneously and believe that this is the best way of doing things). I propose that CEO polychronicity is a double-edged sword for firm innovation and that this relationship is contingent on the environmental and organizational contexts. Specifically, CEO polychronicity is positively related to firm innovation when firms operate in more dynamic environments, are relatively large and have poor past performance, but is negatively related to firm innovation when firms operate in less dynamic environments, are relatively small and have good past performance. Results based on survey data from 111 Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) largely support my hypotheses. This study makes contributions by being an initial attempt to examine CEO polychronicity and by identifying essential boundary conditions of the effect of CEO polychronicity on firm innovation.     

Boards in microfinance institutions: how do stakeholders matter?

Microfinance Institutions provide financial services to poor people. Governance of these organizations is important so that they can operate efficiently and sustainably. This study analyzes the influence of stakeholders (donors, employees, customers, and creditors), on board structure (board size and CEO duality), and on organizational performance. We use a global data set of 379 microfinance institutions from 73 countries, collected from rating organizations. Supported by stakeholder theory, agency theory and resource dependence theory, we find stakeholders to be important and have various influences on microfinance institutions. We find donors to be associated with small boards, non-duality and better performance. Employees are associated with large boards, while customers are associated with duality and good financial performance. Creditors opt for duality and better social performance. Implications and areas for future research are discussed.     

An exploration of ‘sticky’ inventory management in the manufacturing industry

Traditional models examining relationships between firm resources and revenues assume that the many expenses and asset holdings change in proportion to changes in demand. However, research has found that for many costs and assets assumed to be variable, the magnitude of a change in a cost or asset in proportion to a change in revenue is smaller during periods when revenue decreases compared to the change in the cost or asset when revenue increases. Costs and assets which behave in this manner have been denoted as ‘sticky’ costs or assets. This study examines if inventory in the manufacturing industry is managed in a ‘sticky’ manner and what implications inventory stickiness has on firm performance. Utilising firm panel data over a 25-year time window we find that inventory stickiness does exist amongst manufacturers and that it has negative implications for firm performance.