设计有效的经营者持股激励机制——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

本文从企业财务控制系统设计的角度对上市公司经营者持股问题进行了实证研究。通过考察实施经营者持股激励制度的我国A股上市公司2002年到2004年的业绩,本文发现,经营者持股金额与经营者年薪金额的比例是衡量持股激励强度的有效指标,该指标与股票报酬率呈线性正相关关系,与会计利润指标没有正相关关系。在上述公司中,董事长和总经理持股数量多的、高成长性的公司提高(长期)股票报酬率的效果更加明显。同时,本文的实证结果说明:如果持股数量能对经营者(特别是董事长和总经理)的个人利益有充分影响,经营者持股激励制度会以较低的成本达到较好的效果(公司股票报酬率显著较高)。     

上市公司股权激励机制研究

作为一种长期激励机制,股票期权制度于20世纪70年代起源于美国,90年代以来在各发达国家得到了广泛的推行。据统计,《财富》排名前1000家的美国公司中已有90%实施了股票期权制度。股票期权占企业高级管理人员和技术人员年收入的比重也越来越高。近年来,我国不少城市也开始了在企业中建立股票期权制度的探索。先后出台了有关股票期权的实施办法,并积极进行试点。国内很多上市公司也已开始试行股票期权制度。但是,实践中很多企业实施的内部职工持股方案和经营者持股方案等各种股权激励做法与西方国家规范的股票期权方案相去甚远。为促进规范的股票期权制度在我国的推行,笔者参考美国国内税务法和香港联交所《上市公司》中关于股票期权制度的规定,并结合我国现行法律与政策环境,做初步的探讨。     

经理人控制对高级管理人员报酬制定影响的实证研究

以近两年一直实行年薪制的 155 家上市公司 2002年～2003 年数据为样本,对经理权利论在金额最高的前三名高管人员现金报酬制定过程中的适用性进行了检验.研究发现,高级管理人员年薪并不受经理控制力的影响,不同股权结构上市公司在制定年薪时并没有明显不同;上一年的年薪总额对于确定高管人员当年的年薪起着至关重要的作用,在决定年薪增减时,公司主要以净资产收益率的变动为参考标准,独立董事对年薪的不合理变动能起到遏制作用.     

我国企业经营者股票期权激励机制探究

实现企业经营者股票期权激励的目标在于统一经营者与股东利益,解决委托代理问题。通过实施股票期权激励对经营者进行长期激励,进一步完善薪酬制度,对吸引和挽留优秀人才起到了重要作用。近年来,股权激励逐渐正在逐渐成为上市公司对高管团队进行长期激励和约束旳主要手段,这种方式也越来越受到理论界与企业界的重视。然而由于现实环境的制约因素,我国企业在推行股票期权激励机制过程中海存在一些障碍,亟待解决。本文从经营者股票期权激励制度的意义着手,分析了当前我国企业我国企业推行经营者股票期权激励制度存在的主要问题,并提出了相应的解决策略。     

电子与通讯行业技术效率的影响因素分析

本文以电子与通讯行业内71家企业为样本,采用数据包络法对2010-2012年,电子与通讯行业的技术效率进行测算,并应用加权最小二乘法对研发强度、研发技术人员比、前十大股东持股比例、总资产周转率、净资产收益率、市场占有率和销售费用增长率7个指标进行回归分析;结果表明:尽管电子与通讯行业技术效率逐年递增;但是总体值不是太高,并且7个解释变量中,研发强度、研发技术人员比、前十大股东持股比例、总资产周转率和市场占有率与技术效率显著正相关;净资产收益率相关性不明显,而销售费用与技术效率负相关。企业应该以市场为导向,增强自身技术创新和组织创新实力,国家应该进一步鼓励业内企业并购重组,减少行业内产能过剩。     

薪酬激励机制中经济增加值的作用研究

我国企业目前实行的薪酬激励制度,主要有两种:以传统的财务指标为基础的奖金激励机制和日益盛行的股票期权制度。传统的奖金激励制度是根据企业的经营业绩对管理者进行评价,并以预期业绩目标作为管理者薪酬分配的核心,在年终采用诸如净利润、每股收益、净资产收益率等指标进行业绩评价的基础上,根据目标完成情况来确定管理者的薪酬分配系数。但是这种薪酬激励制度存在不少弊端,例如净利润、每股收益、     

经理报酬棘轮效应与相对业绩评价模型的选择

通过对上市公司总经理报酬与公司业绩关系的实证检验,发现净资产收益率和股票回报率对报酬有显著的正向影响,但报酬与业绩间不敏感.导致报酬与业绩间缺乏敏感性的原因之一是报酬棘轮效应的存在.检验了报酬棘轮效应的存在与方式,发现基于同行业同规模企业加总股票回报业绩的报酬棘轮效应存在,运用基于同行业同规模企业加总股票回报业绩作为参照业绩的相对业绩评价模型,可以避免棘轮效应的影响,提高报酬契约激励效率.     

上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效

我国现有的股权划分方法难以追寻上市公司的终极控制股东,不利于对上市公司的相关研究,运用终极产权论对上市公司的控股主体进行分类,通过追踪上市公司终极控制股东,发现中国 72.06%的上市公司最终是由政府控制的,但是呈明显的下降趋势;非政府控制的上市公司达到 20.64%,有明显的上升趋势;有 92家(7.30%)上市公司的终极控制股东无法识别.研究还发现全体样本的平均净资产收益率为 4.70%,不同终极控制股东控制的上市公司的净资产收益率没有显著差异.     

上市公司审计费用率影响因素实证研究

本文运用回归分析技术对2002年我国证券市场A股年报审计费用率进行了实证研究。结果表明:影响年报审计费用率的因素有两类,一是上市公司的规模、处于微利区间的净资产收益率和处于保配区间的净资产收益率等直接影响因素,二是反映上市公司某些特征的流动比率、净资产收益率、应收账款在总资产中的比重等间接影响因素;资产负债率则表现为既直接与审计费用率相关,又通过资产规模间接与审计费用率相关;没有发现会计师事务所的规模、存货在总资产的比重对审计费用率的影响。     

增长期权创造视角下高管股权激励的效果检验

 高管股权激励的目的是企业价值的持续增长，价值增长的关键在于管理者对增长机会的把握和创造。作为企业创造增长期权的一种重要手段，R&D投资通过改变资产相对构成而对股票风险收益特征具有动态影响，因此资本市场对R&D投资的理性定价可以为高管股权激励的增长期权创造效果提供新的检验视角。        以2007年至2015年沪深两市2 294家非金融类A股上市公司为样本，利用Fama-MacBeth截面回归，发现R&D投资和股票预期收益率具有正向关系。在此基础上，通过是否实施和实施前后等不同子样本中R&D投资与股票预期收益率关系的比较，从增长期权创造的视角考察高管持股的2 053家企业和实施或有股权激励的657投资对股票预期收益率的正向影响，两种股权激励方式有助于企业通过R&D创造增长期权。进一步，利用倾向匹配得分法进行样本选择，利用双重差分模型进行回归，控制内生性问题，稳健性检验结果依然表明，股权激励对R&D投资与股票预期收益率关系具有显著的正向调节作用。        整体而言，实证结果不仅提供了支持利益趋同假说观点的证据，还从企业创新和资本市场的互动关系为股权激励的效果提供了新的检验视角。研究结论的现实指导意义在于，一个长期、有效的高管激励政策应强调高管通过创新投资进行增长期权的创造，企业也应根据资本市场对高管创新活动的效果评价了解和调整激励政策。     

Narcissistic CEOs and executive compensation

Narcissism is characterized by traits such as dominance, self-confidence, a sense of entitlement, grandiosity, and low empathy. There is growing evidence that individuals with these characteristics often emerge as leaders, and that narcissistic CEOs may make more impulsive and risky decisions. We suggest that these tendencies may also affect how compensation is allocated among top management teams. Using employee ratings of personality for the CEOs of 32 prominent high-technology firms, we investigate whether more narcissistic CEOs have compensation packages that are systematically different from their less narcissistic peers, and specifically whether these differences increase the longer the CEO stays with the firm. As predicted, we find that more narcissistic CEOs who have been with their firm longer receive more total direct compensation (salary, bonus, and stock options), have more money in their total shareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher) compensation and the other members of their team.     

Countermove: how CEOs respond to post-acquisition compensation adjustments

Following poorly performing acquisitions, the board of directors often redesigns the CEO’s annual compensation package to include less risk-encouraging stock options and more risk-discouraging restricted stock. This study explores the emerging area of post-acquisition compensation management and proposes that CEOs can indirectly, but effectively, defend against compensation rebalancing. Specifically, we find that CEOs may counteract the effects of compensation rebalancing by delaying the exercise of existing stock option holdings. Fortunately, this insight also offers valuable implications including the ability of the board to limit the CEO’s defense by adjusting stock option exercise windows.     

中国证券投资基金的羊群行为分析

根据投资基金中报和年报中的投资明细数据,采用文献[1]和文献[2]的检验方法,从不同角度实证检验了中国投资基金的羊群效应,发现中国投资基金的羊群效应高于美国互助基金的羊群效应,中国投资基金并未表现出对大盘股、小盘股、新股以及信息技术行业样本股票的特别偏好。投资基金的交易以买为主。投资基金的投资重心有从小盘股向大盘股转变的趋势,这将有利于整个证券市场的稳定。投资基金的交易行为与股市走势密切相关。     

Hedging and accounting-based RPE contracts for powerful CEOs

Several firms prohibit their CEOs from trading in the stock of peer firms. This is puzzling since hedging by the CEO through private trading in the capital market can reduce the CEO’s exposure to systematic compensation risk. When the CEO’s incentive contract comprises relative performance evaluation, we find that the firm might want to disallow private hedging even though there are no technological interdependencies or strategic interactions to peer firms. In the analysis, we highlight two frequently observed characteristics of incentive contracts. First, the use of accounting benchmarks is widespread in compensation contracts for CEOs. Second, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that powerful CEOs have influence on the process of designing their own compensation. We find that in the presence of a powerful CEO, the firm can benefit from disallowing private hedging. In particular, the firm’s decision to allow or to disallow private hedging depends on the characteristics of the accounting benchmarks and the characteristics of the peer firms.     

Dividend yield and stability versus performance on the German stock market: a descriptive study

It is often examined in the literature whether the dividend yields of stocks correlate with their total returns. This paper analyzes the effect of dividend yield on return as well as on risk and on performance of stocks and stock portfolios on the German market. Not only the influence of dividend yield but also of dividend stability is subject to our analysis. Furthermore, tax aspects are considered. However, this study should rather be seen as an empirical analysis of the influence of dividends as a capital market anomaly than a theoretical based validation approach. Our data set comprises daily adjusted stock prices and dividend payment data from the German capital market over the period 3 January 2000–31 July 2008. This period was characterized by a high volatility of the stock market. In addition to the existing literature examining mainly the long-term influence of dividend yields, we also want to find out whether stocks with high and stable dividend payments are able to reduce the risk of a stock investment in short time periods characterized by extreme conditions. We use blue chips (DAX), stocks of medium-sized companies (MDAX), and stocks of technology firms (TecDAX). Our findings suggest that stock performance generally improves with an increasing dividend yield, where this result is actually based on risk reduction instead of a higher return. However, this risk reduction diminishes with an increasing degree of diversification.     

Undermining incentives: CEO reactions to compensation rebalancing

Directors commonly “punish” CEOs for overly risky behavior by rebalancing their compensation to include more restricted stock and fewer stock options. This paper extends the behavioral-agency model to describe how CEOs will manage their holdings of stock and stock options in response to this form of compensation rebalancing. In doing so, it finds that CEOs respond by selling existing stock holdings and accumulating option holdings. This behavior achieves the opposite incentive structure that such rebalancing intends to create, raising questions about the effectiveness of compensation rebalancing in reducing risky decision making.     

MULTISTAGE SAFETY STOCK PLANNING WITH ITEM DEMANDS CORRELATED ACROSS PRODUCTS AND THROUGH TIME

Determining safety stocks in multistage manufacturing systems with serial or divergent structures, where end-item demands are allowed to be correlated both between products as well as in time, is my focus. I show that these types of correlation have contrary effects on the distribution of safety stocks over the manufacturing stages and that neglecting the correlation of demand can lead to significant deviation from the optimal buffer policy. Using base-stock control and assuming total reliability for internal supplies, I present a procedure for integrated multilevel safety stock optimization that can be applied to arbitrary serial and divergent systems even when demand is jointly cross-product and cross-time correlated. As I demonstrate in an example for autocorrelated demands of a moving average type, there are specific solution properties that drastically reduce the computational effort for safety stock planning. Safety stocks determined in that way can be used as an appropriate protection against demand uncertainties in material requirements planning systems.     

基金交易行为与市场波动——基于小波与互谱分析的数据挖掘

本文选取2007～2009年基金十大重仓股数据进行小波分析,研究重仓股在不同阶段波动率的特征———微观层面基金行为对这种波动率的直接动量冲击的影响以及金融市场层面沪深300指数对此波动率的联动性的影响。实证结果发现,基金增仓和持股可以减小股票波动率,但减仓会加大股票波动率,呈现出非对称稳定市场的特性。在金融市场层面分析上,论文应用溢出效应检验互谱分析方法,发现这种波动率主要是由基金持股组合调整造成的,市场波动对个股波动率影响不大,即股票波动率主要是由基金交易行为造成所引致。     

股票名称与股票价格非理性联动——中国A股市场的研究

本文利用中国A股市场中独特的配对股票样本对股票价格间的"非理性联动"现象进行了研究,并探讨了导致这种非理性联动的原因。本文发现:(1)仅名称相似,但没有其他相关性的配对股票收益率之间存在很高的正相关性;(2)比较名称变更前后股票收益率相关性的变化发现,名称变更对股票之间的联动性具有显著影响;(3)与机构投资者相比,个人投资者更容易对名称相似的配对股票产生混淆;另外,投资者情绪变化幅度越大,配对股票之间的联动性越高,说明投资者情绪变化对配对股票之间的联动起到了放大作用;除此以外,对配对股票来说,如果一只股票价格变动反映的是"坏消息"("好消息"),则该股票收益率对另一只股票的收益率具有更高(低)的解释力,意味着投资者由于损失厌恶而对"坏消息"的反应程度要大于对"好消息"的反应程度。     

中国证券投资基金羊群行为的进一步研究

根据投资基金中报和年报中的投资明细数据,采用文献[1]的检验方法,对模型进行了更加切合实际的扩展,实证检验了中国投资基金的羊群效应,发现中国投资基金在只买不卖方面的羊群效应高于美国互助基金相应的羊群效应,在既买又卖和只卖不买方面并不高于美国互助基金的买的羊群效应。中国投资基金对各种股本组合、信息技术股票和新股的只买不卖交易中存在比较明显的趋同性。在其他两种交易行为中不存在这种现象。投资基金的投资重心是中、大盘股,这将有利于整个证券市场的稳定。投资基金的投资行为与大盘的走势密切相关。