多任务委托代理模型下国企经理激励问题研究

运用多任务委托代理模型研究国企经理的最优激励合同后得出,若多工作任务努力的激励成本之间相互独立,那么激励相容条件下的各工作任务的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的,且最优业绩报酬是绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数;而如果多工作任务激励成本是相互依存的,那么在激励相容条件下,政治性活动和满足上级偏好的最优激励合同为"门槛型激励合同",即只有当国企经理所创造的业绩超过一定的"门槛值"时,对其的激励才是正向的,否则将是负向的.并且定量地给出了国企经理的"门槛型激励条件".     

基于双重声誉的国企经理长期激励最优组合研究

本文在委托-代理理论框架下,以委托人的目标（企业长期业绩的最大化）为立足点,研究国企经理人的各种行为特征和长期激励的最优组合,建立了国企经理人双重声誉激励和股票期权激励的组合模型。本文充分结合了我国国企经理人的特点,把政治声誉模型化,在股票期权报酬形式下,研究了双重声誉（政治声誉和市场声誉）对经理人的长期激励效果,即经理人声誉影响系数最优水平和分享利润比例最优水平。并在此基础上系统分析了经理人的行为选择特征、最优激励程度以及声誉影响系数的影响因素,为经理人的长期激励提出了参考建议。     

基于多任务委托代理的业主与承包商激励模型

基于多任务委托代理并结合工程项目特点,以拓展型Cobb-Douglas生产函数反映工期、成本和质量多任务努力投入情况下工程项目的产出,构建了业主与承包商激励模型.结果表明,承包商在工期、成本和质量任务上的最优努力水平与综合技术水平正相关,与各自任务的边际努力成本变化率负相关;业主对承包商的最优激励系数一方面受承包商自身因素影响,包括承包商的综合技术水平、绝对风险规避度以及边际努力成本变化率,另一方面取决于项目不同任务的重要性及所处环境的不确定性.研究结果有助于业主选择适当的激励强度并实现合理的风险分担.     

基于人力资本产权的知识型员工激励机制研究

分析了知识型员工的人力资本特征,利用多任务委托代理框架,建立了努力工作和努力学习双任务、业绩激励和产权激励共同作用的委托代理模型,讨论了产权激励与业绩激励的相互作用,分析了努力工作与努力学习行为.研究表明,产权激励可以促进知识型员工努力工作和努力学习,并优化业绩激励;员工拥有其创造的全部剩余收益时具有最优效率,但产权激励需与业绩激励匹配、且产权激励强度越大激励效果越好;作为长期激励的产权激励加强时,员工倾向于努力学习,作为短期激励的业绩激励加强时,员工倾向于努力工作;当缺少产权激励时,员工变得不好学习或倾向于加强外部学习.     

经理人激励的细分: 隐藏行动、努力成本和风险厌恶

本文研究经理人隐藏行动、努力成本和风险厌恶态度对经理人激励的影响.本文的研究基于标准委托人-代理人模型,但放松其关于经理人行动不能影响企业风险的假定,而采用更接近现实的假定--企业风险至少部分内生于经理人的行动.通过研究,本文将经理人激励明确细分类为努力增进激励(βeffort激励)和追求风险激励(βrisk激励)两类.为实现βeffort激励,经理人报酬只需是企业业绩的线性函数即可;但为实现βrisk激励,经理人报酬应是企业业绩的凸函数.     

预算报酬方案和线性报酬方案的一个比较分析

在代理理论的框架下 ,分析比较企业实务中最为常见的两种报酬方案 :预算报酬方案和线性报酬方案 .通过建立一个具体模型进行定量模拟分析 ,探讨影响企业报酬方案的激励成本的主要因素 .根据模拟的数值结果 ,具体描述了企业应该如何根据其业绩评价信息系统的质量来选择和设计报酬激励方案 ,以较低的成本达到预定的控制和激励目标     

经理激励问题的若干扩展研究

本文在建立包括经理努力程度、能力状态和环境变量的经理业绩与激励合同线性模型的基础上,进行两个方面的扩展,通过引入观测变量和假设努力程度与能力状况对业绩的贡献可分离,得出了计算结果并进行了分析.     

企业劳动契约的激励模型分析--一种发生在道德风险之前的逆向选择问题

分析了企业劳动契约的制定过程以及企业和员工之间的委托代理关系,企业在制定劳动契约时会面临发生在道德风险之前的逆向选择问题,将其与企业的人力资源管理实践相结合构造出相关模型,对这一委托代理模型的激励约束进行分析,认为企业作为委托人,在制定劳动契约时应该综合考虑代理人(员工)的外在机会效用水平、内生成本函数、效用偏好函数和努力水平等激励影响因素.     

公平偏好下的多任务目标与国企高管薪酬激励

通过将委托人和代理人公平偏好同时引入到多任务的委托代理模型中,研究国企高管和政府主管部门均具公平偏好下的国企高管最优薪酬机制。研究发现,在企业经营任务目标激励方面,当多任务成本函数为独立关系、互补关系或者替代性足够小的,国企委托人和代理人公平偏好将通过直接和间接的影响途径共同促进高管最优薪酬向公平工资回归,其中,间接影响表现为公平偏好先影响最优薪酬激励强度进而间接地影响总体薪酬水平;在此过程中,政府主管部门公平偏好和高管同情偏好对最优薪酬激励强度的影响,呈现出替代效应。在社会责任任务目标激励方面,显性薪酬激励不是有效的激励方式,因此政府应该借助于隐性激励方式来激励该任务目标的实现。研究还发现教育程度较高的高管具有更强的公平偏好心理。     

经理报酬激励方案的设计

经理报酬激励方案可以使股东和经理具有相同的利益,使经理努力提高企业的价值,实现企业财富最大化目标。经理报酬激励方案设计的好坏,是整个企业运行的关键。在简要论述了经理报酬激励的理论基础、激励方式之后,探讨了报酬激励方案设计时应考虑的因素、设计的原则和设计的具体内容。     

董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性

董事会治理是影响高管薪酬契约有效性的关键,已有研究主要从董事会结构层面展开,缺乏对董事会内部运作机制与高管薪酬契约有效性关系的具体分析。基于董事权威不平衡性的治理效应视角,系统考察了董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性的逻辑关系及其作用机理,得出了一些具有重要价值的结论,主要包括:1.董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节作用,且主要体现在业绩下滑的样本公司中,表明董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬契约的影响主要体现在公平性和风险匹配性方面。2.只有当最高层级董事身份为独立董事时,董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节效应。3.董事会非正式层级增强了高管薪酬的行业和地区薪酬敏感性,进一步验证了董事会非正式层级的社会公平效应。论文的研究为从微观运作层面理解董事会治理和高管薪酬契约有效性提供一种新的视角和结论,对于优化董事会治理和提高高管薪酬契约有效性等均具有重要借鉴意义。     

MANAGERIAL HEDGING AND PORTFOLIO MONITORING

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his compensation using financial markets and shareholders can monitor the manager's portfolio in order to keep him from hedging, but monitoring is costly. We find that the optimal incentive compensation and governance provisions have the following properties: (i) the manager's portfolio is monitored only when the firm performs poorly, (ii) the manager's compensation is more sensitive to firm performance when the cost of monitoring is higher or when hedging markets are more developed, and (iii) conditional on the firm's performance, the manager's compensation is lower when his portfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring. Moreover, the model suggests that the optimal level of portfolio monitoring is higher for managers of firms whose performance canbehedged more easily, such as larger firms and firms in more developed financial markets. (JEL: G30, D82)     

CEO Incentives,Takeover Protection and Corporate Innovation

This study examines the effects of CEO equity‐based compensation and anti‐takeover provisions on corporate innovation. Using a large sample of US firms over the period 1996–2014, we find that long‐term incentives have a stronger influence on innovation when combined with takeover threats. We also show that equity‐based compensation is more likely to spur innovation for small firms and firms in industries with high product market competition and innovation pressure. However, this effect is somewhat weaker in the presence of anti‐takeover provisions, suggesting that takeover protection encourages managerial shirking even when external competition is high. Finally, in addition to the existing evidence on the valuation effect of CEO equity‐based compensation, we identify innovation as an important channel through which managerial incentives can enhance firm value. Our results have potential implications for shareholders, managers and policymakers.     

管理决断权、高管薪酬与企业绩效的实证研究

本文从企业层面上研究了管理决断权对高管薪酬的影响及两者与企业绩效之间的权变关系。论文选取2002-2007年深沪两市上市公司作为研究样本,构建了管理决断权的多指标衡量体系,证明管理决断权对高管薪酬和企业绩效具有重要的决定作用,企业绩效好的情况下高管薪酬与管理决断权的联系更为紧密。同样,在高管理决断权情况下高管薪酬与企业绩效的挂钩更加紧密,但同时企业会面临监管难题。     

Do Compensation Consultants Drive Up CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Public Firms

Do compensation consultants drive up CEO pay for the benefit of managers, or do they design pay packages to benefit firm owners? Using a large sample of UK firms from the FTSE All‐Share Index over the 2003–2011 period, we show a positive correlation between the presence of compensation consultants and CEO pay. Importantly, isolating this effect is somewhat dependent on the endogenous selection of consultants and the statistical modelling strategy deployed. We find evidence that compensation consultants improve CEO compensation design when their expertise is of greater importance (e.g. during the post‐financial crisis period, or for firms that have particularly weak compensation policies). In addition, our findings show that compensation consultants increase CEO pay–performance sensitivity. The balance of evidence supports optimal contracting theory more than managerial power theory, but the authors caution the limits to this verification. We are careful to note that the more compelling evidence for the positive effect of pay consultants on CEOs is based on advanced methods (such as propensity score matching and difference‐in‐differences), and that more standard approaches (such as OLS and fixed effects) are unlikely to reveal the same level of causality of consultants on CEO pay.     

项目经理激励报酬机制与企业监督博弈分析

项目经理的投机行为可以通过监督或激励来缓解。本文建立了有关项目管理中的国有企业监督与项目经理行为之间的模型,并运用此模型分析了项目经理的激励机制、项目经理的行为和企业监督之间的关系,并为如何有效地避免项目经理的投机行为,改进当前激励报酬形式提供了一种分析工具。     

Board attributes and shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions: a survey of the literature

The question of whether a “good” corporate board structure can optimize performance and minimize conflicts between managers and shareholders has been widely debated. Because mergers and acquisitions represent major managerial investment decisions that are subject to board scrutiny, the effectiveness of a board’s structure is especially visible in the context of corporate acquisitions. With that in mind, in this paper, we examine the abundant literature in the fields of strategic management, economics, and finance in order to identify which board attributes contribute to the ability of corporate boards to create value through mergers and acquisitions. In particular, we discuss the impact of four board attributes: (1) board independence, (2) board size and director-specific attributes, (3) board ownership and compensation, (4) multiple directorships. As a result of our analysis, we conclude that the impact of board attributes on shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions is specific to each firm. Therefore, board regulations that do not reflect a firm’s specific needs may in fact hinder the creation of a board that is capable of responding effectively to the firm’s unique needs and circumstances.     

In Good Times but Not in Bad: The Role of Managerial Discretion in Moderating the Stakeholder Management and Financial Performance Relationship

We examine the role of managers in controlling the positive impact of stakeholder management (SM) on firm financial performance (FP) in the long term. We develop and test competing hypotheses on whether managers act as “good citizens” or engage in “self‐dealing” when allowed greater discretion. We test our assertions using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 806 U.S. public firms operating in 34 industries over 5 years (2005–2009). Our results indicate a nuanced influence of managerial discretion contexts on the SM‐FP relationship. We infer that given more latitude in decision making, as long as the “going is good” managers act as good citizens, but otherwise they revert to managerial self‐dealing. In light of our results, firms designing governance mechanisms to encourage managers to balance the needs of both shareholders and stakeholders must remain cognizant of contextual contingencies.     

Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure: an analysis of dual class firms

This study focuses on the association of voluntary compensation disclosure and ownership structure. It provides evidence that the detachment of control and cash flow rights in dual class share firms is associated with lower levels of compensation disclosure. This association is incremental to the level of managerial ownership and family ownership. The study attributes these disclosure results to the concealment of excess compensation in dual class share firms. Consistent with this explanation, the study finds that managers in dual class share firms earn higher compensation relative to their single class counterparts. An analysis within dual class firms also reveals that compensation disclosure is decreasing in managers’ voting control but increasing in their cash flow rights consistent with a private control benefits explanation. To examine these research questions, the study develops a contextual measure of compensation disclosure that attempts to capture firms’ economic bases for award of compensation.     

Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case*

In this article, we study how the operational decisions of a firm manager depend on her own incentives, the capital structure, and financial decisions in the context of the newsvendor framework. We establish a relationship between the firm’s cost of raising funds and the riskiness of the inventory decisions of the manager. We consider four types of managers, namely, profit, equity, firm value, and profit‐equity maximizers, and initially assume that they may raise funds to increase the inventory level only by issuing debt. We show that the shareholders are indifferent between the different types of managers when the coefficient of variation (CV) of demand is low. However, this is not the case when the CV of demand is high. Based on the demand and the firm’s specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, and bankruptcy costs, the shareholders might be better off with the manager whose compensation package is tied to the firm value as opposed to the equity value. We, then, extend our model by allowing the manager to raise the required funds by issuing both debt and equity. For this case we focus on the equity and firm value maximizer managers and show that our earlier results (for the debt only case) still hold subject to the cost of issuing equity. However the benefit of the firm value maximizer manager over the equity maximizer manager for shareholders is considerably less in this case compared to the case where the manager can only issue debt. The Board of Directors can take these factors into consideration when establishing/modifying the right incentive package for the managers. We also incorporate the notion of the asymmetric information to capture its impact on the board of directors’ decision about the managers’ incentive package.