战略性转移定价承诺策略与下游创新之间的交互影响研究

以一个按照MTO模式运作,并且面临交货期-价格敏感性需求的“供应商-制造商”供应链为研究对象,对该供应链中上游供应商的战略性转移定价承诺与下游制造商创新之间的交互作用,以及这种交互作用对最优的交货期设定、转移定价决策,以及渠道内各合作伙伴的行为取向所产生的影响进行了初步探讨.通过分析发现,战略性转移定价承诺与下游创新之间的交互作用不会影响到最优的承诺交货期设定,但是,供应商实行完全地转移定价承诺策略将会激励制造商进行更多的投资创新活动.最后通过赋值分析对前文的理论研究进行了证实/伪.     

面向网络营销企业的营销信号选择博弈分析

如何通过营销信号来降低电子市场逆向选择风险是影响网络营销企业业绩的重要因素.本文以两家企业垄断市场为例,建立了企业信号传递博弈模型.通过对分离均衡与混同均衡存在条件的分析,讨论了信号传递成本以及不同消费者群体所占比例对企业营销信号决策的影响.分析结果有助于网络营销企业在电子市场中选择营销信号.     

零售商竞争环境下分散式供应链的定价与交货期联合决策模型

考虑了由一个制造商和两个相互竞争的零售商组成的两阶段分散式供应链系统,建立了价格和时间双敏感需求下的供应链定价与交货期联合决策模型,并给出了基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链定价和承诺交货期的最优决策。随后,以集中式供应链的决策为基准,分析了分散式供应链决策的效率。最后,通过数值分析,研究了市场因素和营销渠道竞争因素对分散式供应链的决策效率及承诺交货期的影响。结果表明,供应链下游的渠道竞争有利于提高分散式供应链的决策效率和缩短承诺交货期,从而提高整个供应链的市场竞争力。     

响应时间不确定下的交货期相关定价研究

供应链企业生产和物流过程中的众多随机因素及信息不对称,带来供应链企业的市场订单响应时间的不确定性,引起实际交货期的延误,如何通过交货期相关定价有效地显示其市场响应能力对于供应链企业竞争来说是极其关键的。本文首先根据供应链企业自身和市场对供应链企业实际响应能力评估差异的分析,构建了时间敏感需求下的供应链企业交货期相关定价模型,并对模型的最优性进行了分析。通过数值算例,探讨了市场对供应链企业响应能力具有不同的评价概率时,供应链企业的交货期相关定价最优决策策略,进而分析了模型参数对最优决策的影响。分析结论可以为供应链企业竞争中的交货期相关定价决策提供有益的指导。     

大规模定制环境下定制产品与标准产品的定价与库存协调研究

研究了大规模定制环境下需求不确定、对价格敏感且可替代情况下的定制产品定价与标准产品库存量的协调问题.分析比较了在集成供应链情况下和在以大规模定制商为主导的供应链中的定价和库存策略,并提出一种基于收益共享的回购合约.研究结果表明,在以大规模定制商为主导的供应链中,定制产品的价格低于集成供应链情况下的价格,标准产品的库存低于集成供应链情况下的库存,供应链的整体利润要小于集成供应链的利润,基于收益共享的回购合约能够有效地协调大规模定制供应链.     

基于收益分成的多受让方两部技术转移定价策略研究

首先,从一般需求函数出发,得出两部技术转移定价法的一般解析表达式。然后,以线性需求函数为例,通过数值计算,对比分析了收益分成比例、最终产品价格、研发企业利润和受让方企业利润随着转让方和受让方股权比例的不同而变化的趋势。最后,分析得出,通过采用前期固定费用加后期收益分成的两部转移定价方法,不仅可以使研发企业的利润最优,同时还可以缓解技术受让方在单一定价方法下的一次性支出所带来的巨大资金压力和较高风险水平,并且将研发企业的利润与受让方的未来收益紧密联系,实现了双方的收益共享和风险共担。     

信息不对称下电子商务市场质量相关定价决策分析

由于电子商务市场中存在的信息不对称与质量不确定性，如何有效地显示质量信号对于从事网络营销的企业来说是极其关键的。本文首先构建n-分定价最优化模型。通过决策结构的转换将原有的n-分定价问题转化为两分定价问题。基于两分定价决策模型，讨论了质量相关定价适用的条件．指出在市场低估商品质量时。质量相关定价可以扩大市场份额、提高预期收益。本文进而分析了两分定价中．给定质量分界点状况下确定最优价格和最优折扣水平的策略以及确定最优质量分界点的策略。     

电信业务定价决策理论研究

价格竞争是研究定价的影响因素之一.国外多从定量的角度,以成本为基础,通过建模研究电信业务的定价,而国内则多从定性的角度研究电信业务定价的理念、方法.一般来说,在二部制价格模式下,电信业务的固定价格和消费流量价格将影响用户数量和消费流量,最终影响企业的运营收益.本文通过模型分析了二部制价格变化对用户数量、业务流量和考虑了技术升级的影响下的定价策略,从理论上指出了基于收益、规模和业务流量的定价方法,同时指出了根据客户的支付水平和企业发展的需要的定价策略,和细分市场方法.     

时间价格敏感型需求下的供应链决策模式研究

在定制产品的市场竞争中,需求不仅对价格敏感,对时间也十分敏感.本文以一个两阶段的供应链系统为背景,研究了分散决策和集中决策两种模式下的MTO供应链决策问题.分别分析了两种模式下的决策过程,进行了优化求解.并结合一个汽车行业定制供应链实例进行了数值分析,证明了对于时间价格敏感型需求下的供应链决策问题,集中决策模式能够实现更大的供应链整体收益.这些研究工作为供应链企业在时间价格敏感型市场上竞争提供了有效的决策工具和方法.     

基于制造商O2O模式选择的O2O供应链定价与网上交货期决策

以制造商主导的O2O供应链为背景,考虑市场需求受价格和网上交货期的影响,针对网上直销和网上代销两种O2O模式分别构建O2O供应链定价与网上交货期决策模型,研究渠道成员的最优策略并分析其性质。再通过数值算例分析了价格敏感型消费者情境和网上交货期敏感型消费者情境下消费者网上销售渠道偏好程度和佣金率对O2O供应链最优策略和利润的影响,并探讨了制造商O2O模式的选择问题。发现：消费者网上销售渠道偏好程度越高,越有利于制造商和O2O平台,但不利于线下门店;佣金率越高,越有利于线下门店和O2O平台,却不利于制造商。当消费者更关注网上交货期时,缩短网上交货期并不利于制造商;而当消费者更关注价格时,延长网上交货期是有利的。制造商的O2O模式选择主要受佣金率的影响,只有当佣金率处于较低范围时网上代销O2O模式是制造商的较优选择。     

价格、时间敏感需求下的供应链价格与交付期管理

本文以一个两阶段MTO供应链系统为背景.研究了当系统面临价格、时间敏感需求,且产品间具有替代性时的供应链价格与交付期决策问题.构建了相关决策模型并对模型的最优性进行了分析.通过数值算例,探讨了市场竞争环境变化对最优决策的影响.这些研究工作为供应链企业在价格、时间敏感市场上竞争提供了有益的理论指导.     

具有网络外部性的双寡头市场的动态定价策略

本文通过将消费者对网络大小的预期引入消费者的效用函数,刻画了消费者预期如何影响市场潜量。然后,通过微分对策,分析了在垄断竞争的市场结构中的厂商如何在考虑到消费者对今后的预期时,如何动态的决定自己的价格和相应的策略。结果表明,随着消费者对网络增长预期的增大,将导致更大的网络规模和更低的初始价格。寡头的利润受消费者对其产量的预期的影响。     

Dynamic Pricing and Lead‐Time Policies for Make‐to‐Order Systems*

Make‐to‐order firms use different approaches for managing their lead‐times and pricing in the face of changing market conditions. A particular firm's approach may be largely dictated by environmental constraints. For example, it makes little sense to carefully manage lead‐time if its effect on demand is muted, as it can be in situations where leadtime is difficult for the market to gauge or requires investment to estimate. Similarly, it can be impractical to change capacity and price. However, environmental constraints are likely to become less of an issue in the future with the expanding e‐business infrastructure, and this trend raises questions into how to manage effectively the marketing mix of price and lead‐time in a more “friction‐free” setting. We study a simple model of a make‐to‐order firm, and we examine policies for adjusting price and capacity in response to periodic and unpredictable shifts in how the market values price and lead‐time. Our analysis suggests that maintaining a fixed capacity while using lead‐time and/or price to absorb changes in the market will be most attractive when stability in throughput and profit are highly valued, but in volatile markets, this stability comes at a cost of low profits. From a pure profit maximization perspective, it is best to strive for a short and consistent lead‐times by adjusting both capacity and price in response to market changes.     

Linking aggregate production planning with marketing pricing decisions

In this paper, we link production planning decisions to marketing decisions that involve the price of product groups. The focus of this paper is the development of a closed-loop procedure for aggregate production planning and pricing. We seek to satisfy uncertain demand while minimizing total costs that include material, labour, and inventory holding costs. The procedure is useful for variable demand to update short-term aggregate plans.     

Ordering,Pricing, and Lead‐Time Quotation Under Lead‐Time and Demand Uncertainty

In this article, we study the newsvendor problem with endogenous setting of price and quoted lead‐time. This problem can be observed in situations where a firm orders semi‐finished product prior to the selling season and customizes the product in response to customer orders during the selling season. The total demand during the selling season and the lead‐time required for customization are uncertain. The demand for the product depends not only on the selling price but also on the quoted lead‐time. To set the quoted lead‐time, the firm has to carefully balance the benefit of increasing demand as the quoted lead‐time is reduced against the cost of increased tardiness. Our model enables the firm to determine the optimal selling price, quoted lead‐time, and order quantity simultaneously, and provides a new set of insights to managers.     

In‐Store Experiments to Determine the Impact of Price on Sales

This paper describes an experimentation methodology to measure how demand varies with price and the results of its application at a toy retailer. The same product is assigned different price‐points in different store panels and the resulting sales are used to estimate a demand curve. We use a variant of the k‐median problem to form store panels that control for differences between stores and produce results that are representative of the entire chain. We use the estimated demand curve to find a price that maximizes profit. Our experiment yielded the unexpected result that demand increases with price in some cases. We present likely reasons for this finding from our discussions with retail managers. Our methodology can be used to analyze the effect of several marketing and promotional levers employed in a retail store besides pricing.     

O2O模式下服务商的价格和时间决策

研究了拥有实体渠道的服务商是否应该开通O2O渠道和开通O2O渠道后服务商应该如何定价和确定服务水平的问题。首先,考虑实体渠道的等待时间对消费者效用的影响,构建了消费者渠道选择模型,得到了服务商具有定价权时服务商的渠道策略和定价策略,结果表明,消费者对实体店的等待时间的敏感度高于对价格的敏感度。其次,把价格作为常量,考虑等待时间对服务商成本的影响,研究了不具有定价权时服务商的渠道策略和服务水平策略,结果表明只有在O2O渠道价格较低和实体渠道的时间成本也较低时,服务商采用同时开通两个渠道的策略。     

非线性需求下具有网络外部性的二级歧视定价研究

研究了非线性需求函数条件下产品存在网络外部性时,垄断企业采用对需求区间分段定价的方法进行二级歧视定价的策略。首先分析了单阶段垄断企业二级价格歧视的静态定价策略,接着给出了在一个较长时期内垄断企业分两阶段进行二级歧视的动态定价策略。结果表明网络外部性不影响最优需求区间分段单调递增的性质,但价格随网络外部性的增强而相应提高,且第一阶段的价格高于第二阶段的贴现值。     

Coordinating Production and Marketing with Dynamic Transfer Prices

Decentralized decision making is a fact in the modern business world accompanied by extensive research that looks into its consequences for overall firm profits. We study the interactions of decentralized marketing and operations divisions in a corporation and explore their impact on overall firm profits in the case with and without coordination of the two decentralized units. We assume that the marketing department is responsible for the price that influences the demand (sales), and the operations department is responsible for the production rate. We allow for backlogging over time. We model the interdependence involving marketing and operations decisions as a non‐cooperative differential game, with the two divisions as strategically interacting players. We find that, without coordination, strategic interactions of marketing and production result in inefficiencies that can quantitatively be substantial. Next, we introduce a dynamic transfer pricing scheme as a coordination device and evaluate if it establishes efficient (first best and fully coordinated) outcomes. We show that if production and marketing play a game with pre‐commitment strategies, there exists a dynamic transfer price that efficiently (fully) coordinates decentralized decision making and hence results in Pareto‐efficient company profits. If the two decentralized divisions play a game without pre‐commitment, dynamic transfer prices can partially coordinate decentralized decision making but fail to fully eliminate overall inefficiencies arising from strategic interactions among decentralized divisions.