Should Cities Invest in Sheltering‐in‐Place Measures Against Chlorine Truck Attacks by Terrorists?

After an intentional release of chlorine in an office district, public responses such as sheltering‐in‐place could save many lives if rapid enough. However, previous work does not estimate how fast and effective such responses would be for several possible investments in attack detection, public alert, and building ventilation, nor whether such measures would be cost effective. We estimate public response times with investment options in place, and resulting changes in fatalities as well as system costs, including false alarm costs, and cost effectiveness in terms of cost per net death avoided. The measures do have life‐saving potential, especially if all response times are at or near the lower limits of the ranges assumed in this article. However, due to uncertainties, it is not clear that responses would be rapid enough to save many people. In some cases total fatalities would increase, since sheltering after chlorine vapor has already entered buildings can increase occupants’ chlorine exposure. None of the options considered have median cost per statistical life saved meeting a cost‐effectiveness threshold of $6.5 million across all of the chlorine exposure dose‐response and ingress‐delay models considered here, even if there were one attack per year in the area covered by the system. Given these and other issues discussed in this article, at this point investments to improve sheltering‐in‐place capability appear not to be robust strategies for reducing fatalities from chlorine attack in an office district.     

The chasm: what can be done, and what should be done

The case study of growth hormone in short-stature children offers an example of the high cost of bioengineered therapies and the attendant ethical concerns. Despite uncertainties as to its efficacy, it is estimated that the annual U.S. expenditure for growth hormone, which costs about $20,000 per year for a 30 kg child, exceeds $375 million dollars. Ultimately, at this point in its evolution, the use of GH therapy illustrates the dilemma commonly created by new medical technology--the chasm between what can be done and what should be done. Unfortunately, the knowledge of what can be done precedes the understanding of what should be done.     

A Decision Framework for Managing Risk to Airports from Terrorist Attack

This article presents an asset‐level security risk management framework to assist stakeholders of critical assets with allocating limited budgets for enhancing their safety and security against terrorist attack. The proposed framework models the security system of an asset, considers various threat scenarios, and models the sequential decision framework of attackers during the attack. Its novel contributions are the introduction of the notion of partial neutralization of attackers by defenders, estimation of total loss from successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful actions of attackers at various stages of an attack, and inclusion of the effects of these losses on the choices made by terrorists at various stages of the attack. The application of the proposed method is demonstrated in an example dealing with security risk management of a U.S. commercial airport, in which a set of plausible threat scenarios and risk mitigation options are considered. It is found that a combination of providing blast‐resistant cargo containers and a video surveillance system on the airport perimeter fence is the best option based on minimum expected life‐cycle cost considering a 10‐year service period.     

Assessing the Benefits and Costs of Homeland Security Research: A Risk-Informed Methodology with Applications for the U.S. Coast Guard

This article describes a methodology for risk-informed benefit–cost analyses of homeland security research products. The methodology is field-tested with 10 research products developed for the U.S. Coast Guard. Risk-informed benefit–cost analysis is a tool for risk management that integrates elements of risk analysis, decision analysis, and benefit–cost analysis. The cost analysis methodology includes a full-cost accounting of research projects, starting with initial fundamental research costs and extending to the costs of implementation of the research products and, where applicable, training, maintenance, and upgrade costs. The benefits analysis methodology is driven by changes in costs and risks leading to five alternative models: cost savings at the same level of security, increased security at the same cost, signal detection improvements, risk reduction by deterrence, and value of information. The U.S. Coast Guard staff selected 10 research projects to test and generalize the methodology. Examples include tools to improve the detection of explosives, reduce the costs of harbor patrols, and provide better predictions of hurricane wind speeds and floods. Benefits models and estimates varied by research project and many input parameters of the benefit estimates were highly uncertain, so risk analysis for sensitivity testing and simulation was important. Aggregating across the 10 research products, we found an overall median net present value of about $385 million, with a range from $54 million (5th percentile) to $877 million (95th percentile). Lessons learned are provided for future applications.     

Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks

A quantitative probabilistic/systems analysis model is described which is useful for allocating resources to safeguard valuable documents or materials in either a fixed-site facility or a moving convoy against an overt terrorist attack. The model is also useful for ranking the sensitive areas at a site according to their survivability of a given hypothesized terrorist attempt. To compare various defense strategies and security configurations, the probability of a successful terrorist activity is computed based on event tree models of the site/security configuration. This calculation incorporates a realistic engagement model (in the event a guard force engages the terrorists prior to completion of their objective) and information on barrier penetration times (for example, distribution of the time to defeat a chain link fence or vault door, traverse an open area, and so forth). Two security analyses are described to illustrate the methodology. One example considers a terrorist attack on a convoy transporting a missile from a storage to a launch facility. The second example involves an attack on a munitions storage facility.     

The Cost of Compensating Asbestos Victims Under the Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1983

The potentially huge financial liability due to asbestos product suits and the resulting filings for reorganization in bankruptcy by Manville, UNR Industries, Inc., and Amatex, has become a major public policy concern. In response to the problem several bills have been introduced in the Congress to provide compensation for asbestos (and other occupational disease) victims. This paper estimates the cost of compensating asbestos victims under the provisions of the "Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1983," introduced by Congressman George Miller. Utilizing fatality projections from studies by Enterline, Selikoff, and Walker, and assumptions regarding likely claims filing and success rates, duration and degree of disability, and medical expenses, first year costs for this legislation are estimated to range from a low of $131 million to a high of $ billion. Present value cost estimates at a 2% real discount rate range from $3 billion to $56 billion. The paper also estimates the impact of possible modifications to the compensation provisions of the legislation. Reducing medical payments by the amount received from medicare would lower costs by 3-4%. Providing survivors with a 3-year lump sum benefit rather than a 5-year lump sum payment would save 20-25% as would offsetting the 5-year lump sum by expected social security old age and disability benefits. Combining all of these changes would reduce costs by almost 50%.     

Optimal Resource Allocation for Defense of Targets Based on Differing Measures of Attractiveness

This article describes the results of applying a rigorous computational model to the problem of the optimal defensive resource allocation among potential terrorist targets. In particular, our study explores how the optimal budget allocation depends on the cost effectiveness of security investments, the defender's valuations of the various targets, and the extent of the defender's uncertainty about the attacker's target valuations. We use expected property damage, expected fatalities, and two metrics of critical infrastructure (airports and bridges) as our measures of target attractiveness. Our results show that the cost effectiveness of security investment has a large impact on the optimal budget allocation. Also, different measures of target attractiveness yield different optimal budget allocations, emphasizing the importance of developing more realistic terrorist objective functions for use in budget allocation decisions for homeland security.     

Cost of Equity in Homeland Security Resource Allocation in the Face of a Strategic Attacker

Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent in homeland security since September 11, 2001. Many mathematical models have been developed to study strategic interactions between governments (defenders) and terrorists (attackers). However, few studies have considered the tradeoff between equity and efficiency in homeland security resource allocation. In this article, we fill this gap by developing a novel model in which a government allocates defensive resources among multiple potential targets, while reserving a portion of defensive resources (represented by the equity coefficient) for equal distribution (according to geographical areas, population, density, etc.). Such a way to model equity is one of many alternatives, but was directly inspired by homeland security resource allocation practice. The government is faced with a strategic terrorist (adaptive adversary) whose attack probabilities are endogenously determined in the model. We study the effect of the equity coefficient on the optimal defensive resource allocations and the corresponding expected loss. We find that the cost of equity (in terms of increased expected loss) increases convexly in the equity coefficient. Furthermore, such cost is lower when: (a) government uses per‐valuation equity; (b) the cost‐effectiveness coefficient of defense increases; and (c) the total defense budget increases. Our model, results, and insights could be used to assist policy making.     

Altruistic and Private Values For Saving Lives With an Oyster Consumption Safety Program

We use data from an Internet-based survey and estimate the benefits of an oyster consumption safety policy with the contingent valuation method. In addition to providing a context-specific estimate of willingness-to-pay for oyster safety, we consider an important issue in the contingent valuation mortality risk reduction literature. A number of studies find that willingness-to-pay for mortality risk reduction is not sensitive to the scope of the risk change. We present the scope test as a difference in the number of lives saved by the program, instead of small changes in risk, and find that referendum votes are responsive to scope. A third feature of this article is that we identify those at-risk respondents who would most benefit from the policy and decompose willingness-to-pay into use values and altruistic nonuse values. We find that willingness-to-pay per life saved ranges from $3.95 million to $7.69 million for the private good of lives saved when the respondent is at risk (i.e., use values). Willingness-to-pay per life saved including both use and altruistic nonuse values ranges from $6.89 million to $12.87 million.     

Using Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Modeling for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis: Application to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative in the Land Environment

This article presents a framework for using probabilistic terrorism risk modeling in regulatory analysis. We demonstrate the framework with an example application involving a regulation under consideration, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for the Land Environment, (WHTI‐L). First, we estimate annualized loss from terrorist attacks with the Risk Management Solutions (RMS) Probabilistic Terrorism Model. We then estimate the critical risk reduction, which is the risk‐reducing effectiveness of WHTI‐L needed for its benefit, in terms of reduced terrorism loss in the United States, to exceed its cost. Our analysis indicates that the critical risk reduction depends strongly not only on uncertainties in the terrorism risk level, but also on uncertainty in the cost of regulation and how casualties are monetized. For a terrorism risk level based on the RMS standard risk estimate, the baseline regulatory cost estimate for WHTI‐L, and a range of casualty cost estimates based on the willingness‐to‐pay approach, our estimate for the expected annualized loss from terrorism ranges from $2.7 billion to $5.2 billion. For this range in annualized loss, the critical risk reduction for WHTI‐L ranges from 7% to 13%. Basing results on a lower risk level that results in halving the annualized terrorism loss would double the critical risk reduction (14–26%), and basing the results on a higher risk level that results in a doubling of the annualized terrorism loss would cut the critical risk reduction in half (3.5–6.6%). Ideally, decisions about terrorism security regulations and policies would be informed by true benefit‐cost analyses in which the estimated benefits are compared to costs. Such analyses for terrorism security efforts face substantial impediments stemming from the great uncertainty in the terrorist threat and the very low recurrence interval for large attacks. Several approaches can be used to estimate how a terrorism security program or regulation reduces the distribution of risks it is intended to manage. But, continued research to develop additional tools and data is necessary to support application of these approaches. These include refinement of models and simulations, engagement of subject matter experts, implementation of program evaluation, and estimating the costs of casualties from terrorism events.     

Veteran's health care: time for a change?

The Department of Veterans Affairs' mission is "to care for him who are shall have borne the battle for his widow and orphan." The Veterans Health Administration comprises 172 hospitals that are the hub of the health care delivery system. It is the largest provider of graduate medical education, and one of the major research organizations in the United States. The medical care budget exceeds $17 billion annually. Most of the persons cared for are not legally entitled to this health care based on service connected disability. The utilization of acute care hospital beds appears excessive when compared to that obtainable with managed care for Medicare or commercial insurance beneficiaries--the cost per member per month is three times higher. There may also be exploitation of the Veterans Administration hospitals by university medical schools. The Veterans Health Administration is a very expensive way to deliver care to entitled service connected veterans. Therefore, it is suggested that privatization be considered as an alternative vehicle for delivering health care.     

A Macro-Economic Framework for Evaluation of Cyber Security Risks Related to Protection of Intellectual Property

The article is based on the premise that, from a macro-economic viewpoint, cyber attacks with long-lasting effects are the most economically significant, and as a result require more attention than attacks with short-lasting effects that have historically been more represented in literature. In particular, the article deals with evaluation of cyber security risks related to one type of attack with long-lasting effects, namely, theft of intellectual property (IP) by foreign perpetrators. An International Consequence Analysis Framework is presented to determine (1) the potential macro-economic consequences of cyber attacks that result in stolen IP from companies in the United States, and (2) the likely sources of such attacks. The framework presented focuses on IP theft that enables foreign companies to make economic gains that would have otherwise benefited the U.S. economy. Initial results are presented.     

A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Alternative Device Configurations for Aviation-Checked Baggage Security Screening

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have resulted in dramatic changes in aviation security. As of early 2003, an estimated 1,100 explosive detection systems (EDS) and 6,000 explosive trace detection machines (ETD) have been deployed to ensure 100% checked baggage screening at all commercial airports throughout the United States. The prohibitive costs associated with deploying and operating such devices is a serious issue for the Transportation Security Administration. This article evaluates the cost effectiveness of the explosive detection technologies currently deployed to screen checked baggage as well as new technologies that could be used in the future. Both single-device and two-device systems are considered. In particular, the expected annual direct cost of using these devices for 100% checked baggage screening under various scenarios is obtained and the tradeoffs between using single- and two-device strategies are studied. The expected number of successful threats under the different checked baggage screening scenarios with 100% checked baggage screening is also obtained. Lastly, a risk-based screening strategy proposed in the literature is analyzed. The results reported suggest that for the existing security setup, with current device costs and probability parameters, single-device systems are less costly and have fewer expected number of successful threats than two-device systems due to the way the second device affects the alarm or clear decision. The risk-based approach is found to have the potential to significantly improve security. The cost model introduced provides an effective tool for the execution of cost-benefit analyses of alternative device configurations for aviation-checked baggage security screening.     

Security of Separated Data in Cloud Systems with Competing Attack Detection and Data Theft Processes

Empowered by virtualization technology, service requests from cloud users can be honored through creating and running virtual machines. Virtual machines established for different users may be allocated to the same physical server, making the cloud vulnerable to co‐residence attacks where a malicious attacker can steal a user's data through co‐residing their virtual machines on the same server. For protecting data against the theft, the data partition technique is applied to divide the user's data into multiple blocks with each being handled by a separate virtual machine. Moreover, early warning agents (EWAs) are deployed to possibly detect and prevent co‐residence attacks at a nascent stage. This article models and analyzes the attack success probability (complement of data security) in cloud systems subject to competing attack detection process (by EWAs) and data theft process (by co‐residence attackers). Based on the suggested probabilistic model, the optimal data partition and protection policy is determined with the objective of minimizing the user's cost subject to providing a desired level of data security. Examples are presented to illustrate effects of different model parameters (attack rate, number of cloud servers, number of data blocks, attack detection time, and data theft time distribution parameters) on the attack success probability and optimization solutions.     

Cyber Risk Management for Critical Infrastructure: A Risk Analysis Model and Three Case Studies

Managing cyber security in an organization involves allocating the protection budget across a spectrum of possible options. This requires assessing the benefits and the costs of these options. The risk analyses presented here are statistical when relevant data are available, and system‐based for high‐consequence events that have not happened yet. This article presents, first, a general probabilistic risk analysis framework for cyber security in an organization to be specified. It then describes three examples of forward‐looking analyses motivated by recent cyber attacks. The first one is the statistical analysis of an actual database, extended at the upper end of the loss distribution by a Bayesian analysis of possible, high‐consequence attack scenarios that may happen in the future. The second is a systems analysis of cyber risks for a smart, connected electric grid, showing that there is an optimal level of connectivity. The third is an analysis of sequential decisions to upgrade the software of an existing cyber security system or to adopt a new one to stay ahead of adversaries trying to find their way in. The results are distributions of losses to cyber attacks, with and without some considered countermeasures in support of risk management decisions based both on past data and anticipated incidents.     

Reducing the Risk of Injury from Table Saw Use: The Potential Benefits and Costs of Automatic Protection

The use of table saws in the United States is associated with approximately 28,000 emergency department (ED) visits and 2,000 cases of finger amputation per year. This article provides a quantitative estimate of the economic benefits of automatic protection systems that could be designed into new table saw products. Benefits are defined as reduced health‐care costs, enhanced production at work, and diminished pain and suffering. The present value of the benefits of automatic protection over the life of the table saw are interpreted as the switch‐point cost value, the maximum investment in automatic protection that can be justified by benefit‐cost comparison. Using two alternative methods for monetizing pain and suffering, the study finds switch‐point cost values of $753 and $561 per saw. These point estimates are sensitive to the values of inputs, especially the average cost of injury. The various switch‐point cost values are substantially higher than rough estimates of the incremental cost of automatic protection systems. Uncertainties and future research needs are discussed.     

Health care costs tied to many issues

Although, in 1990, the United States spent about $750 billion (12.2 percent of the Gross National Product) on health care, 31-37 million people in this country are uninsured. Another 4 million people are thought to be underinsured. We have one of the highest infant mortality rates among developed industrialized nations and rank 19th in health care and well-being among those nations. Our life expectancy is lower than those of some third-world countries. The United States and South Africa are the only two industrialized nations without a national health care policy. In spite of these statistics, U.S. health care costs continue to rise and, by the year 2000, are expected to reach $1.5 trillion (15 to 17.5 percent of the GNP. Per capita spending on health care will reach $5,515 by the year 2000, compared with $2,425 in 1990 and $1,016 in 1980.     

Risk-Based Environmental Remediation: Bayesian Monte Carlo Analysis and the Expected Value of Sample Information

A methodology that simulates outcomes from future data collection programs, utilizes Bayesian Monte Carlo analysis to predict the resulting reduction in uncertainty in an environmental fate-and-transport model, and estimates the expected value of this reduction in uncertainty to a risk-based environmental remediation decision is illustrated considering polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) sediment contamination and uptake by winter flounder in New Bedford Harbor, MA. The expected value of sample information (EVSI), the difference between the expected loss of the optimal decision based on the prior uncertainty analysis and the expected loss of the optimal decision from an updated information state, is calculated for several sampling plan. For the illustrative application we have posed, the EVSI for a sampling plan of two data points is $9.4 million, for five data points is $10.4 million, and for ten data points is $11.5 million. The EVSI for sampling plans involving larger numbers of data points is bounded by the expected value of perfect information, $15.6 million. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine the effect of selected model structure and parametric assumptions on the optimal decision and the EVSI. The optimal decision (total area to be dredged) is sensitive to the assumption of linearity between PCB sediment concentration and flounder PCB body burden and to the assumed relationship between area dredged and the harbor-wide average sediment PCB concentration; these assumptions also have a moderate impact on the computed EVSI. The EVSI is most sensitive to the unit cost of remediation and rather insensitive to the penalty cost associated with under-remediation.     

A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

This article analyzes possible terrorist attacks on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach using a radiological dispersal device (RDD, also known as a "dirty bomb") to shut down port operations and cause substantial economic and psychological impacts. The analysis is an exploratory investigation of a combination of several risk analysis tools, including scenario generation and pruning, project risk analysis, direct consequence modeling, and indirect economic impact assessment. We examined 36 attack scenarios and reduced them to two plausible or likely scenarios using qualitative judgments. For these two scenarios, we conducted a project risk analysis to understand the tasks terrorists need to perform to carry out the attacks and to determine the likelihood of the project's success. The consequences of a successful attack are described in terms of a radiological plume model and resulting human health and economic impacts. Initial findings suggest that the chances of a successful dirty bomb attack are about 10-40% and that high radiological doses are confined to a relatively small area, limiting health effects to tens or at most hundreds of latent cancers, even with a major release. However, the economic consequences from a shutdown of the harbors due to the contamination could result in significant losses in the tens of billions of dollars, including the decontamination costs and the indirect economic impacts due to the port shutdown. The implications for countering a dirty bomb attack, including the protection of the radiological sources and intercepting an ongoing dirty bomb attack are discussed.     

Setup Time Reduction for Electronics Assembly: Combining Simple (SMED) and IT‐Based Methods

As much as 50% of effective capacity can be lost to setups in printed circuit board assembly. Shigeo Shingo showed that radical reductions in setup times are possible in metal fabrication using an approach he called “Single Minute Exchange of Dies” (SMED). We applied SMED to setups of high speed circuit board assembly tools. Its key concepts were valid in this very different industry, but while SMED typically emphasizes process simplification, we had to add modern information technology tools including wireless terminals, barcodes, and a relational database. These tools shield operators from the inherent complexity of managing thousands of unique parts and feeders. The economic value of setup reduction is rarely calculated. We estimate a reduction of key setup times by more than 80%, and direct benefits of $1.8 million per year. Total cost of the changes was approximately $350,000.