不对称信息下基于物流服务质量的供应链协调运作研究

物流运作中出现的货损货差是影响第三方物流企业服务质量的重要因素.在由制造商和第三方物流企业构成的供应链中,第三方物流企业可以采取措施、付出努力降低货损货差的产生,但其收益却由制造商与其共同享有,因而存在着对第三方物流企业激励不足的问题.本文构建博弈模型求出集中式供应链中第三方物流企业的最优努力水平,设计了分散式供应链中基于完全信息和不完全信息的供应链契约,最后用算例分析验证了模型结论.     

抵押、贷款合约与道德风险

由于事后不对称信息的存在,在信贷市场中道德风险问题经常发生,而使用抵押则普遍存在道德风险问题.通过将努力变量引入不对称信息条件下信贷市场道德风险模型,分析不同借款人努力变量的成本收益特征,给出不同成本收益特征下借款人的最佳行动选择和银行相应的最优信贷合约,信贷合约中的抵押被用来激励借款人提高努力,讨论努力变量连续时借贷双方如何选择行动和贷款合约,指出借款人最优努力区间,在这个区间内信贷市场可能达到均衡.     

双边激励与风险企业的股权结构配置

风险投资家为风险企业提供金融资本的同时,也为其提供了增殖服务,获得风险资本的风险企业的发展是一个风险企业家和风险投资家共同倾注努力的结果。然而,由于风险企业特殊的信息结构特征,导致风险企业家和风险投资家之间存在严重的委托—代理问题,双边激励是其中的一个主要的道德风险问题,而股权结构的安排有助于激励两者为风险企业倾注努力。本文将建立风险企业股权结构与双边激励问题的关系模型,从解决激励风险企业家、风险投资家为风险企业作出努力的双边激励问题出发,确定最优的风险企业股权结构。     

供应商-销售商联合促销报酬契约设计

在双边道德风险模型下,研究了供应链中联合产品促销的报酬契约设计。无道德风险条件下,供应商及销售商双方努力水平总是高于存在道德风险条件下双方的努力水平。同时,在道德风险条件下的报酬契约设计中,以供应商给予销售商的产品批发价格来实现双方收益的转移,根据可以观测的产品最终市场需求,从供应商视角出发。构造了双边道德风险下最优的报酬契约,契约中,双方最优的边际利润分配之比为各自的努力效率之比。     

双边道德风险条件下供应链的质量控制策略

运用委托代理理论方法探讨了双边道德风险条件下供应链的质量控制策略.在供应商的质量预防投入成本和销售商的质量评价投入成本均为不可观测的信息的情况下,供应商和销售商都可能会发生签约后的道德风险问题.为了减少由此产生的双边道德风险,将供应商提供不合格产品而销售商未能检测出时对供应商的惩罚,及销售商检测出供应商的产品有缺陷时对其施以的惩罚作为激励措施.在考虑了双方的收益目标后,建立了双边道德风险条件下的质量控制模型.运用进化规划算法对模型作了仿真计算.     

基于双边道德风险的多主体信息系统集成报酬机制设计

固定报酬契约模式下,委托方与原信息系统服务商存在双边道德风险,即委托方将项目风险转嫁给原信息系统服务商,而原信息系统服务商将系统调整责任推卸给其他原系统服务商,因此需要建立恰当的报酬机制以鼓励双方提高努力程度.供应链以及合作研发中基于有形的产品价格分配的报酬机制难以适用于信息系统集成过程.本文从知识积累的角度构建可变报酬机制模型,并通过双边道德风险模型演算,得到可变报酬机制下双方最优努力程度以及最优努力程度下的最优报酬.     

公共管理领域监察合谋防范机制

公共管理领域监察合谋行为极为常见,对其的分析不应只简单地考虑双边共谋,而应将监察者合谋可能性以及合谋防范纳入多层次代理完全合约框架中予以考虑.通过一个“政府/监察者/企业”三层次代理模型表明,事前的低成本、高效率惩罚机制对合谋防范合约的效率非常重要.纯粹依赖于支付防合谋激励报酬的合约安排难有效率,而纯粹依赖惩罚防范合谋的合约安排也只在某些条件下有效率.模型亦可考察政府在生产的社会利益和社会代价之间的权衡行为.     

考虑消费者配送时间敏感度的外卖平台盈利模式选择

平台盈利模式对平台竞争至关重要。本文在双边市场竞争模型中引入消费者配送时间敏感度,构建基于单边和双边收费策略下的接入费模式和两部制收费模式形成的四种盈利模式下的外卖平台、外卖商家和消费者博弈框架,揭示外卖平台最优盈利模式选择及临界条件。结果表明:外卖平台选择单边还是双边收费策略,取决于平台对商家的收费模式以及消费者市场竞争强度;外卖平台最优盈利模式取决于平台匹配能力、市场竞争强度、消费者配送时间敏感度、商家对消费者的网络外部性以及平台抽成比例。在平台匹配能力较弱且抽成比例较低时,单边收费策略下的接入费模式最优。在平台匹配能力较强或较弱但抽成比例较高时,若消费者市场竞争强度较高,单边收费策略下的两部制模式最优;若消费者市场竞争强度较低,双边收费策略下的两部制模式最优。     

双重信息不对称下销售渠道双目标混合激励模型

销售渠道在企业与消费者之间扮演着重要的桥梁作用,销售人员的销售能力和销售努力等信息均为其私有而不为企业所共知时,企业如何甄别其真实能力信息并对其销售努力实施有效激励是个重要问题.针对上述问题,给出了基于线性合约的双目标混合激励模型,通过模型求解得到并刻画了最优合约的3个特征.首先,为辨别高能力类型与普通能力类型这两种不...     

基于双边努力因素的网购供应链协调研究

本文考虑了由单个网络零售商和单个第三方物流企业（TPL）构成的二级网购供应链,在产品价格、双方努力水平同时影响市场需求的情况下,研究了基于双边努力因素的网购供应链协调问题。通过对网购供应链集中决策和分散决策下双方的最优解对比发现,两部定价契约不能实现网购供应链协调,提出采用双边努力成本共担契约对网购供应链进行协调,并与分散决策下网络零售商单边承担TPL努力成本进行对比,研究结果表明：努力成本分担系数的不同对双方的努力水平有显著影响,且双边努力成本共担契约不仅能实现双方努力水平的协调以及增加了产品的市场需求量,而且实现了网购供应链系统收益的帕累托改进。最后,通过算例验证了双边努力成本共担契约的有效性,并对相关参数的灵敏度进行了分析。     

基于惩罚机制的公——铁联运企业行为的协调

本文研究独立公路、铁路运输企业开展联合运输,独立制定运输计划,合理分配运能的协作问题。由于成本结构的不同,分散决策时,不同类型的分运人决策有Pareto改进的余地。考虑到需求的不确定性,运用博弈理论构建了两区段分运人企业衔接式联运的纵向博弈模型。结合集中一体化决策,分别分析了有第三方惩罚控制和无第三方惩罚控制时,分散决策的冲突行为及其变化特征。研究显示通过合理惩罚参数P_I^o和P_II^u的设计,可以使分散决策中的两企业的能力达到集中决策的效果,两企业的行为得到协调。论文进一步对惩罚机制的合理适用范围进行了探讨,发现对于分运人I,制定过高的惩罚反而会降低整体系统的最终能力。而对于分运人II,制定较高的惩罚则有助于抑制其运能供给不足的行为。最后,通过算例分析验证了相关结论的正确性。     

基于资金供应链价值视角的最优现金持有方案研究

内部资金的配置不当常常引发公司高层的控制权争夺而损害公司利益。在投资项目中如何设计包含预期投资收入和现金分红比例组合要素在内的最优现金持有方案以提升公司价值成为公司所有者和高管共同面临的问题。本文借鉴报童模型,以公司所有者为先行者,建立了两者之间的斯塔克伯格博弈模型,分析最优现金持有方案的设置及其对公司所有者和高管的影响。研究发现:风险中性的公司所有者总会接受高管内部参股投资,并设置行业现金分红比例以给予高管资金使用方便;最优现金持有方案下,高管总会倾向于选择内部参股而不选择外部投资;此时,公司所有者的收益和资金供应链的效率都会提高,而高管选择外部引资是否能提高收益则取决于已有的薪酬合同水平。研究结论既支持了内部资金市场的"收集有利信息"假说,同时也对公司所有者在控制权私利倾向较强的职业经理人市场中如何科学决策有着重要的借鉴意义。     

Fractional Price Matching Policies Arising from the Ocean Freight Service Industry

We consider a situation in which shippers (customers) can purchase ocean freight services either directly from a carrier (service provider)in advance or from the spot market just before the departure of an ocean liner. The price is known in the former case, while the spot price is uncertain ex‐ante in the latter case. Consequently, some shippers are reluctant to book directly from the carrier in advance unless the carrier is willing to “partially match” the realized spot price when it is lower than the regular price. This study is an initial attempt to examine if the carrier should bear some of the “price risk” by offering a “fractional” price matching contract that can be described as follows. The shipper pays the regular freight price in advance; however, the shipper will get a refund if the realized spot price is below the regular price, where the refund is a “fraction” of the difference between the regular price and the realized spot price. By modeling the dynamics between the carrier and the shippers as a sequential game, we show that the carrier can use the fractional price matching contract to generate a higher demand from the shippers compared to no price matching contract by increasing the “fraction” in equilibrium. However, as the carrier increases the “fraction,” the carrier should increase the regular price to compensate for bearing additional risk. By selecting the fractional price matching contract optimally, we show that the carrier can afford to offer this price matching mechanism without incurring revenue loss: the optimal fractional price matching contract is “revenue neutral.”     

Employment with Alternative Incentive Schemes when Effort is Not Verifiable

Abstract. This paper compares macroeconomic results related to efficiency wages, contracts with bonus and tournaments in a framework with unverifiable effort. When effort is fully observable, both contracts with bonus and tournaments, unlike efficiency wages, solve the incentive problem without generating involuntary unemployment. Only tournaments, however, allow attainment of the Pareto optimal employment level. If effort is not fully observable, previous results must, to some extent, be reconsidered. Contracts with bonus also produce involuntary unemployment, while tournaments, in addition to continuing to produce a higher level of employment, generate involuntary unemployment only if a shirker who is not caught has some probability of winning.     

MORAL HAZARD AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DYNAMICS

We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in the realized profit of the firm. All message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria (and no third parties) are considered. Within this class of contracts/equilibria, and regardless of who has the renegotiating bargaining power, debt and convertible debt maximize the entrepreneur's incentives to exert effort. These contracts are optimal if the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in renegotiation. If the investor has the bargaining power, the same is true unless debt induces excessive effort. In the latter case, a nondebt simple contract achieves efficiency—the noncontractibility of effort does not lower welfare. Thus, when the noncontractibility of effort matters, our results mirror typical capital structure dynamics: an early use of debt claims, followed by a switch to equity‐like claims. (JEL: D820, L140, O261)     

Options Contracts with Overbooking in the Air Cargo Industry

In today's world economy, which is marked by intensified international trade, air cargo acts as a key facilitator. However, cargo airlines continue to struggle to be profitable because of very high asset costs and substantial demand uncertainty. To improve upon this situation, we propose an options contract. Our model captures the main features of cargo trade between an airline and a freight forwarder and allows us to derive an optimal reservation policy. We then go on to analyze the impact of overbooking on the profit of the cargo capacity provider. The model is subsequently applied to real‐life booking data provided by a major cargo carrier. This enables us to compare current contractual arrangements with the ones proven optimal in the model. A numerical study provides insights about the impact of overbooking on contract parameters and profitability. Managerial insights to be drawn conclude this study.     

考虑追溯水平的食品厂商竞争决策研究

本文综合考虑食品市场竞争环境,消费者食品安全风险规避程度及食品追溯水平等因素建立了食品厂商的双寡头竞争博弈模型,探讨了食品的追溯水平与消费者风险规避程度对食品厂商价格、安全努力水平以及利润的影响。研究发现：食品厂商的最优价格和食品的安全努力水平随其食品追溯水平的提高而增加,随竞争厂商的食品追溯水平的提高而降低;厂商食品追溯水平较高时,其安全努力水平随消费者风险规避程度的增大而提高,其最优价格随高风险规避型消费者比例的增大而增加;而厂商食品追溯水平较低时,其安全努力水平随消费者风险规避程度的增大先增加而后下降,其最优价格随高风险规避型消费者比例的增大总是下降;随高风险规避型消费者比例的增大,各厂商的食品追溯水平对其决策的影响产生不同的变化。     

A Note on Air‐Cargo Capacity Contracts

Carriers (airlines) use medium‐term contracts to allot bulk cargo capacity to forwarders who deliver consolidated loads for each flight in the contractual period (season). Carriers also sell capacity to direct‐ship customers on each flight. We study capacity contracts between a carrier and a forwarder when certain parameters such as the forwarder's demand, operating cost to the carrier, margin, and reservation profit are its private information. We propose contracts in which the forwarder pays a lump sum in exchange for a guaranteed capacity allotment and receives a refund for each unit of unused capacity according to a pre‐announced refund rate. We obtain an upper bound on the informational rent paid by the carrier for a menu of arbitrary allotments and identify conditions under which it can eliminate the informational rent and induce the forwarder to choose the overall optimal capacity allotment (i.e., one that maximizes the combined profits of the carrier and the forwarder).     

Outsourcing vs. in-house production: a comparison of supply chain contracts with effort dependent demand

We analyze the effort and pricing decisions in a two facility supply chain in which one of the parties can exert costly effort to increase demand. We consider an outsourcing model in which the supplier makes the effort decision and an in-house production model in which the manufacturer decides on the effort level and we compare these two models with each other. We analyze and compare several contracts for decentralized supply chain models and we aim to find which contracts are best to use in different cases. We find the optimal contract parameters in each case and perform extensive computational testing to compare the efficiencies of these contracts. We also analyze the effect of the powers of the parties in the system and the effect of system parameters on the performances of the contracts and on the optimal values of the model variables such as price, effort and demand.