优化我国政府债务管理的政策建议

基于欧债危机的现实,通过比较在政府债务规模、结构及政府债务管理体制和政策方面的差异,分析我国政府债务及其管理现状和存在问题,进而着重从政府债务规模的控制、负债结构的合理化、管理体制的的完善等角度提出优化我国政府债务管理,有效防范我国政府债务风险的总体思路与政策建议。     

浅析我国地方政府债务风险的危害及其规避

近年来我国地方政府债务问题从无到有,愈演愈烈,部分基层政府的“资不抵债”程度实际上已达到破产边缘。目前,地方政府债务的严峻形势已经引起了学术界的注意．本文着重探讨地方政府债务风险的现状及其成因,同时对此提出遏制地方政府债务风险的几个对策建议．     

市政收益债券:解决地方政府债务问题的重要途径

不断增加的地方政府债务是我国进一步深化改革过程中难以回避的一个现实问题 ,也是影响我国经济长期持续发展的重大隐患之一。必须及早从体制和机制上扭转债务规模不断扩张的趋势 ,将债务风险锁定在可控范围内。为此 ,要根据经常性债务与建设性债务分类治理、债务存量和增量分流解决的思路 ,有针对性地采取相应措施加以解决。县乡两级政府债务以经常性债务为主 ,通过调整事权财权、划分支出结构、控制经费开支等方法基本上可以解决。省市两级以建设性债务为主 ,难以通过增收节支方法得以解决 ,必须开辟新的替代性融资渠道 ,其中发行地方市政债券应该也可以成为一个可供选择的新途径。未来一段时间将是我国债券市场大发展的时期 ,根据地方经济发展尤其是市政建设的客观需要 ,应该积极探索发展地方债券。收益债券有利于减轻地方政府财政压力和债务负担 ,且由于其特殊性 ,存在以某种变通方式突破的理论依据和现实可能 ,应该从收益债券起步、以企业债券为突破口 ,循序渐进发展地方债券 ,为分流地方政府债务负担、加快地方市政建设提供规范的融资渠道。     

我国地方政府债务风险化解之策

正如何缓解当前地方债务压力?如何遏制未来地方举债冲动?当前,我国地方政府债务规模相当庞大,并呈现不断膨胀之势,已成为宏观经济运行中的突出问题。由于地方债务的积累严重影响了经济可持续发展,因此必须采取有效措施,防范和化解地方政府的债务风险。我国地方政府债务的风险评估及其表现据最新审计署公布的报告显示,截至2013年6月底,地方政府性债务规模余额178908.66亿元,其中,政府负有偿还责任的债务占60.85%,政府或有债务(包括政府负有担保责任的债务和政府可能承担一定救助责     

高校债务风险的成因及防范的探讨

我国高校从1999年开始扩招后,高等教育实现了跨越式的发展。高校也抓住此次扩招的契机,扩大高校办学规模,改善办学条件,并背上了巨额的债务。债务风险随着债务的快速积累而凸现,成为社会和政府重点关注和解决的问题之一。扩大基本建设、政府投入严重不足、高校收入单一以及高校间激烈竞争等是高校负债的主要诱因。强化政府责任、确立财务风险预警、发挥高校自身优势和拓宽公共筹资渠道等措施是化解高校债务风险的有效保证。     

浅析地方政府债务政策历次变革对银行业的影响

近年来,政府债务风险引起各界广泛关注,中央陆续下发政策文件对政府债务实施管控。作为政府债务资金主要来源,银行业首当其冲受到影响。国务院《关于加强地方政府性债务管理的意见》出台以后,中央一方面进行政府债务置换,缓解还款压力,一方面推行"PPP"模式,引入社会资本。这一系列新举措在冲击银行传统业务、缩减综合收益的同时,缓解了银行贷款风险,优化资源配置。事实上,政府债务政策的变革与金融业发展紧密相关,历次政府债务政策的转向直接影响银行业务发展。银行系统应紧跟中央政策,积极应对每次变革带来的机遇与挑战。     

举债权放松能否缓解地方政府债务风险?

为防范和化解地方政府债务风险，我国深入推进地方政府债券发行管理改革，并自2015年起全面实施地方政府债券“自发自还”政策，自此我国地方政府举债权得到实质放松.为评估该政策取得的实际效果，本文在测得2009年—2019年全国30省、市、自治区包含除西藏、中国香港、中国澳门和中国台湾外的中国所有省级行政区.债务规模数据的基础上，借助机器学习方法和广义倍差法考察了举债权放松对地方政府债务风险的影响.并使用2012年—2017年关于城投债发行的微观数据，进一步剖析政策实施对以城投债、城投平台为代表的隐性债务及其发行主体的影响.实证结果表明：从省份层面来看，放开地方政府举债权在总体上有助于缓解地方政府债务风险，但缓解程度在不同财政透明度的地方政府中存在异质性.从微观城投债券层面来看，政策实施后城投债隐性担保强度有所减缓，城投债发行更趋市场化.本研究有助于决策部门评估放松地方政府举债权的实际政策效果，并对进一步推进地方政府债券管理改革具有一定的参考意义.     

我国地方政府债务风险防控探析

地方政府债务作为地方政府筹措建设发展资金的一种重要方式，在推动地方经济社会加快发展中发挥了极为重要的作用，尤其是在加快完善城乡基础设施、满足社会公共需求、改善人民生活、减轻企业与个人税负等方面收到明显成效。同时，伴随经济的高速成长，一些地方政府债务出现了规模过大、增速过快、偿还能力减弱、风险增大等问题。     

新理论@新观点

胡舒立:应约束地方政府为债务违约任意埋单中央政府应有比较明确的执政目标,控制地方债务的总量,并通过行政手段约束地方政府为地方企业债市违约埋单的行为,使市场出现真实的少量市场性风险事件,理顺市场风险溢价和利率架构。当前要重点做好控制总的债务盘子、考核地方政府的债务结构和偿债能力,     

分类管控下的债务风险与风险传染网络研究

防范化解重大风险,守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线是我国经济工作的重心之一。本文针对部门债务,从债务口径、债务结构和偿付风险3个层次深入研究了实体经济债务风险的关键问题,提出了分类管控我国债务风险的理论模型。从部门间债务的比较分析中,本文发现非金融企业债务在实体经济债务中具有极高的系统重要性,针对这一特点,我们构建了双层交易对手方风险传染网络模型。以江苏省和山东省产业债发行人担保网为样本,基于该模型研究了区域非金融企业间债务风险传染结构,并根据综合节点度与对外风险敞口两类指标识别出若干核心风险传染节点。研究发现我国非金融企业部门内的债务间存在较强关联性,是潜在的区域系统性风险源。本文认为,我国当前的宏观债务问题存在国情特殊性,应尽快建立符合中国国情的债务风险和压力分析评估体系,为防范金融风险提供分类施策工具。     

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. The underlying economy is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and increases in public production. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. Policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts. With the available policies, it is possible for the government to completely eliminate unemployment in the long run. However, with political decision making, the economy always has unemployment. Unemployment is higher when the private sector experiences negative shocks. When these shocks occur, the government employs debt‐financed fiscal stimulus plans which involve both tax cuts and public production increases. When the private sector is healthy, the government contracts debt until it reaches a floor level. Unemployment levels are weakly increasing in the economy's debt level, strictly so when the private sector experiences negative shocks. Conditional on the level of workers employed, the mix of public and private output is distorted.     

THE MYSTERY OF THE PRINTING PRESS: MONETARY POLICY AND SELF‐FULFILLING DEBT CRISES

We study the conditions under which unconventional (balance sheet) monetary policy can rule out self‐fulfilling sovereign default in a model with optimizing but discretionary fiscal and monetary policymakers. When purchasing sovereign debt, the central bank effectively swaps risky government paper for monetary liabilities only exposed to inflation risk, thus yielding a lower interest rate. As central bank purchases reduce the (ex ante) costs of debt, we characterize a critical threshold beyond which, absent fundamental fiscal stress, the government strictly prefers primary surplus adjustment to default. Because default may still occur for fundamental reasons, however, the central bank faces the risk of losses on sovereign debt holdings, which may generate inefficient inflation. We show that these losses do not necessarily undermine the credibility of a backstop, nor the monetary authorities' ability to pursue its inflation objectives. Backstops are credible if either the central bank enjoys fiscal backing or fiscal authorities are sufficiently averse to inflation. (JEL: E58, E63, H63)     

现阶段我国政府债务“警戒线”的反思及债务风险的防范

通常人们依据债务规模的“警戒线”来衡量政府债务风险 ,认为我国政府债务风险已经较高。本文对此作了探讨并得出结论：前面的结论实际上很难成立 ,我国积极财政政策还有较大的空间。我国债务风险主要在于经济增长对债务资金可能形成的持久依赖。防范债务风险的根本措施是坚持深化改革、促进结构调整 ,主要依靠民间投资和消费拉动经济增长。国债资金应该用于支持体制改革和结构调整。随着积极财政政策在我国的运用 ,对我国政府债务风险的讨论也越来越多。一般对债务风险的判断都是基于国债负担率、赤字率、债务依存度、偿债率这样一些指标。…     

积极财政政策:评价与展望

一、引言为应对亚洲金融危机和扩大内需 ,中国政府从１９９８年开始实行积极的财政政策。其主要特征是增加赤字 ,增发国债 ,扩大公共投资。１９９８～２００１年分别发行１０００亿元、１１００亿元、１５００亿元和１５００亿元 ,共计５１００亿元长期建设国债 ,用于基础设施建设和技术改造贴息 (见表１)。虽然最初声称它只是特殊条件下采取的一种短期政策 ,但２００２年决定继续实施 ,这样积极财政政策实行已有５年 ,事实上成为一种中期政策 ,短期政策出现中长期化倾向。对此 ,国内外有两类代表性的观点：一种是主张继续执行积极的财政政…     

SOVEREIGNS VERSUS BANKS: CREDIT,CRISES, AND CONSEQUENCES

Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One interpretation speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policy. However, the two may interact in important and understudied ways. This paper examines the co‐evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries from 1870 to 2012. We find that in advanced economies financial crises are not preceded by public debt build‐ups nor are they more likely when public debt is high. However, history shows that high levels of public debt tend to exacerbate the effects of private sector deleveraging after financial crises. The economic costs of financial crises rise substantially if large private sector credit booms are unwound at times when the public sector has little capacity to pursue macroeconomic and financial stabilization.     

Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico‐Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

This paper proposes a dynamic politico‐economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose fiscal policy through repeated elections. The presence of young voters induces fiscal discipline, that is, low taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the voting game in each economy, as well as the stationary equilibrium debt distribution and interest rate of the world economy. The equilibrium can reproduce some salient features of fiscal policy in modern economies.     

金融危机对金融机构的冲击及政府救助分析

使用基于非对称双指数分布的跳-扩散模型,以资产治理结构理论为框架对金融危机爆发前后以及危机中政府救助前后的债务平均到期时间、冲击到来频率以及违约资产损失率进行设定,从而对金融机构债务/资产比率在不同情况下的变化趋势进行数值模拟,以此分析金融危机对金融机构的冲击以及政府救助金融机构的效果.模拟分析结果发现,金融危机中金融机构的脆弱性主要来自债务/资产比率过高、中短期债务过多以及资产质量过低;政府对危机中金融机构的救助措施以低频大幅注资辅以购买短期债务和劣质资产最为有效.     

THE POLITICAL COLOR OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that yields testable implications about the fiscal policy run by governments of different political color. Successive generations of voters choose taxation, expenditure, and government debt through repeated elections. Voters are heterogeneous by age and by the intensity of their preferences for public good provision. The political equilibrium switches stochastically between left‐ (pro‐public goods) and right‐leaning (pro‐private consumption) governments. A shift to the left (right) is associated with a fall (increase) in government debt, an increase (fall) in taxation, and an increase (fall) in government expenditures. However, left‐leaning governments engage in more debt accumulation during recessions. These predictions are shown to be consistent with the time‐series evidence for the United States in the postwar period, and also with the evidence for a panel of OECD countries. (JEL: D72, E62, H41, H62, H63)     

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Persistent Shocks

This paper studies the optimal level of discretion in policymaking. We consider a fiscal policy model where the government has time‐inconsistent preferences with a present bias toward public spending. The government chooses a fiscal rule to trade off its desire to commit to not overspend against its desire to have flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. We analyze the optimal fiscal rule when the shocks are persistent. Unlike under independent and identically distributed shocks, we show that the ex ante optimal rule is not sequentially optimal, as it provides dynamic incentives. The ex ante optimal rule exhibits history dependence, with high shocks leading to an erosion of future fiscal discipline compared to low shocks, which lead to the reinstatement of discipline. The implied policy distortions oscillate over time given a sequence of high shocks, and can force the government to accumulate maximal debt and become immiserated in the long run.