Terrorism Risk Assessment,Recollection Bias,and Public Support for Counterterrorism Policy and Spending

Recollection bias (RB) refers to the phenomenon whereby after an adverse event people report that their risk assessment about a similar future event is presently no higher than their recollection of their pre‐event risk assessment. While previous research has outlined this theoretical construct and generated important empirical findings, there were some limitations. We design and employ a new national representative survey to address these limitations in this study. We examine the existence and persistence of RB among the general public in the context of a number of domestic and international terrorist attacks. We further examine the socioeconomic and political base of RB and the influences of RB on a wide range of citizens’ counterterrorism policy preferences. Our data analyses reveal strong evidence showing the occurrence of RB and its persistence across various forms of terrorism risk. With regard to the socioeconomic and political base, we find that females, older people, political conservatives, and Republicans are less likely to be subject to RB. For the effects of RB on public counterterrorism policy preferences, our analyses demonstrate that this bias significantly dampens public support for a wide range of preventive policy measures and government anti‐terrorism spending. Overall, our study, based on a national representative sample and an extended survey design, provides robust evidence of RB in terrorism risk assessment, and adds further evidence to support the idea that RB is likely a generalizable phenomenon. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed in the conclusion.     

Relative Risk Perception for Terrorism: Implications for Preparedness and Risk Communication

Terrorism presents a significant risk that is often approached at public policy, infrastructure, or emergency management level. Public perceptions of the likelihood of terrorist events, and how this may relate to individual preparedness, are not always extensively examined. The tendency to think that negative events are less likely to happen to oneself than to the average person is known as optimism bias. Optimism bias is relevant to perceptions of terrorism, because it is thought to be related to a reduction in precaution use. Using an online survey of 164 participants, this study aimed to determine whether Sydney residents thought they had a lower likelihood of experiencing terrorist events than other Australians. Significant optimism bias was observed for witnessing terrorist events, but not for personally experiencing terrorist events. In addition, Sydney residents tended to think that terrorist attacks were more likely to occur in Sydney than another major Australian city in the next five years. At the same time, household and workplace preparedness for terrorism was quite low, as was awareness of emergency strategies in the central business district. Perceptions of high likelihood of terrorism happening in one's own city, yet low preparedness present a challenge for risk communication and emergency management strategies. The diversity of possible terrorist targets, and the simple plans that can moderate the effects of a disaster may need to be emphasized in future anti‐terrorism initiatives.     

Cross‐Cultural Differences in Risk Perceptions of Disasters

Public risk perceptions of mass disasters carry considerable influences, both psychologically and economically, despite their oft‐times imprecise nature. Prior research has identified the presence of an optimistic bias that affects risk perception, but there is a dearth of literature examining how these perceptions differ among cultures—particularly with regard to mass disasters. The present study explores differences among Japanese, Argentinean, and North American mental health workers in their rates of the optimistic bias in risk perceptions as contrasted between natural disasters and terrorist events. The results indicate a significant difference among cultures in levels of perceived risk that do not correspond to actual exposure rates. Japanese groups had the highest risk perceptions for both types of hazards and North Americans and Argentineans had the lowest risk perceptions for terrorism. Additionally, participants across all cultures rated risk to self as lower than risk to others (optimistic bias) across all disaster types. These findings suggest that cultural factors may have a greater influence on risk perception than social exposure, and that the belief that one is more immune to disasters compared to others may be a cross‐cultural phenomenon.     

Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), considerable efforts have been made to estimate the risks of terrorism and the cost effectiveness of security policies to reduce these risks. DHS, industry, and the academic risk analysis communities have all invested heavily in the development of tools and approaches that can assist decisionmakers in effectively allocating limited resources across the vast array of potential investments that could mitigate risks from terrorism and other threats to the homeland. Decisionmakers demand models, analyses, and decision support that are useful for this task and based on the state of the art. Since terrorism risk analysis is new, no single method is likely to meet this challenge. In this article we explore a number of existing and potential approaches for terrorism risk analysis, focusing particularly on recent discussions regarding the applicability of probabilistic and decision analytic approaches to bioterrorism risks and the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment methodology used by the DHS and criticized by the National Academies and others.     

Communicating with the Public About Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks: Results from a Survey Experiment on Factors Influencing Intention to “Run,Hide, Tell” in the United Kingdom and Denmark

Effective risk communication is an integral part of responding to terrorism, but until recently, there has been very little pre‐event communication in a European context to provide advice to the public on how to protect themselves during an attack. Following terrorist attacks involving mass shootings in Paris, France, in November 2015, the U.K. National Police Chiefs’ Council released a Stay Safe film and leaflet that advises the public to “run,” “hide,” and “tell” in the event of a firearms or weapons attack. However, other countries, including Denmark, do not provide preparedness information of this kind, in large part because of concern about scaring the public. In this survey experiment, 3,003 U.K. and Danish participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: no information, a leaflet intervention, and a film intervention to examine the impact of “Run, Hide, Tell” advice on perceptions about terrorism, the security services, and intended responses to a hypothetical terrorist firearms attack. Results demonstrate important benefits of pre‐event communication in relation to enhancing trust, encouraging protective health behaviors, and discouraging potentially dangerous actions. However, these findings also suggest that future communications should address perceived response costs and target specific problem behaviors. Cross‐national similarities in response suggest this advice is suitable for adaptation in other countries.     

Personal Values, Beliefs, and Ecological Risk Perception

A mail survey on ecological risk perception was administered in the summer of 2002 to a randomized sample of the lay public and to selected risk professionals at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). The ranking of 24 ecological risk items, from global climate change to commercial fishing, reveals that the lay public is more concerned about low-probability, high-consequence risks whereas the risk professionals are more concerned about risks that pose long-term, ecosystem-level impacts. To test the explanatory power of the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory for risk perception, respondents were questioned about their personal values, spiritual beliefs, and worldviews. The most consistent predictors of the risk rankings are belief in the new ecological paradigm (NEP) and Schwartz's altruism. The NEP and Schwartz's altruism explain from 19% to 46% of the variance in the risk rankings. Religious beliefs account for less than 6% of the variance and do not show a consistent pattern in predicting risk perception although religious fundamentalists are generally less concerned about the risk items. While not exerting as strong an impact, social-structural variables do have some influence on risk perception. Ethnicities show no effect on the risk scales but the more educated and financially well-off are less concerned about the risk items. Political leanings have no direct influence on risk rankings, but indirectly affect rankings through the NEP. These results reveal that the VBN theory is a plausible explanation for the differences measured in the respondents' perception of ecological risk.     

Flu,Risks, and Videotape: Escalating Fear and Avoidance

While extensive risk perception research has focused on emotions, cognitions, and behavior at static points in time, less attention has been paid to how these variables might change over time. This study assesses how negative affect, threat beliefs, perceived risk, and intended avoidance behavior change over the course of an escalating biological disaster. A scenario simulation methodology was used that presents respondents with a video simulation of a 15‐day series of local news reports to immerse respondents in the developing details of the disaster. Systemic manipulation of the virus's causal origin (terrorist attack, medical lab accident, unknown) and the respondent's proximity to the virus (local vs. opposite coast) allowed us to investigate the dynamics of public response. The unfolding scenario was presented in discrete episodes, allowing responses to be tracked over the episodes. The sample includes 600 respondents equally split by sex and by location, with half in the Washington, DC area, and half in the Los Angeles area. The results showed respondents’ reactions to the flu epidemic increased as the disaster escalated. More importantly, there was considerable consistency across respondents’ emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses to the epidemic over the episodes. In addition, the reactions of respondents proximally closer to the epidemic increased more rapidly and with greater intensity than their distant counterparts. Finally, as the flu epidemic escalated, both terrorist and accidental flu releases were perceived as being less risky and were less likely to lead to avoidance behavior compared to the unknown flu release.     

Benchmark Analysis for Quantifying Urban Vulnerability to Terrorist Incidents

We describe a quantitative methodology to characterize the vulnerability of U.S. urban centers to terrorist attack, using a place-based vulnerability index and a database of terrorist incidents and related human casualties. Via generalized linear statistical models, we study the relationships between vulnerability and terrorist events, and find that our place-based vulnerability metric significantly describes both terrorist incidence and occurrence of human casualties from terrorist events in these urban centers. We also introduce benchmark analytic technologies from applications in toxicological risk assessment to this social risk/vulnerability paradigm, and use these to distinguish levels of high and low urban vulnerability to terrorism. It is seen that the benchmark approach translates quite flexibly from its biological roots to this social scientific archetype.     

Psychometric and Demographic Predictors of the Perceived Risk of Terrorist Threats and the Willingness to Pay for Terrorism Risk Management Programs

A 2009 national telephone survey of 924 U.S. adults assessed perceptions of terrorism and homeland security issues. Respondents rated severity of effects, level of understanding, number affected, and likelihood of four terrorist threats: poisoned water supply; explosion of a small nuclear device in a major U.S. city; an airplane attack similar to 9/11; and explosion of a bomb in a building, train, subway, or highway. Respondents rated perceived risk and willingness to pay (WTP) for dealing with each threat. Demographic, attitudinal, and party affiliation data were collected. Respondents rated bomb as highest in perceived risk but gave the highest WTP ratings to nuclear device. For both perceived risk and WTP, psychometric variables were far stronger predictors than were demographic ones. OLS regression analyses using both types of variables to predict perceived risk found only two significant demographic predictors for any threat—Democrat (a negative predictor for bomb) and white male (a significant positive predictor for airline attack). In contrast, among psychometric variables, severity, number affected, and likelihood were predictors of all four threats and level of understanding was a predictor for one. For WTP, education was a negative predictor for three threats; no other demographic variables were significant predictors for any threat. Among psychometric variables, perceived risk and number affected were positive predictors of WTP for all four threats; severity and likelihood were predictors for three; level of understanding was a significant predictor for two.     

Optimal Security Investments and Extreme Risk

In the aftermath of 9/11, concern over security increased dramatically in both the public and the private sector. Yet, no clear algorithm exists to inform firms on the amount and the timing of security investments to mitigate the impact of catastrophic risks. The goal of this article is to devise an optimum investment strategy for firms to mitigate exposure to catastrophic risks, focusing on how much to invest and when to invest. The latter question addresses the issue of whether postponing a risk mitigating decision is an optimal strategy or not. Accordingly, we develop and estimate both a one‐period model and a multiperiod model within the framework of extreme value theory (EVT). We calibrate these models using probability measures for catastrophic terrorism risks associated with attacks on the food sector. We then compare our findings with the purchase of catastrophic risk insurance.     

Transparency after 9/11: Balancing the “Right-to-Know” with the Need for Security

Mandatory and voluntary environmental information disclosure has grown dramatically over the past decade. The prevailing view had become that the public has a “right-to-know” the risks they face and that more information would ultimately lead to better societal decision-making. This all changed on September 11, 2001. The concern for homeland security has led to thousands of web pages and documents at public reading rooms being withdrawn. This article reports on a panel discussion with leading environmental information disclosure experts on the change in the transparency landscape post 9-11. Among the questions addressed: Have companies begun to rethink this trend post 9/11? What is the public's “right-to-know”? Does reducing the amount of information available to the public increase or decrease the risk to communities or emergency responders? Will the heightened threat of terrorist use of chemicals put pressure on companies to find alternative chemicals and processes?     

Using Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Modeling for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis: Application to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative in the Land Environment

This article presents a framework for using probabilistic terrorism risk modeling in regulatory analysis. We demonstrate the framework with an example application involving a regulation under consideration, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for the Land Environment, (WHTI‐L). First, we estimate annualized loss from terrorist attacks with the Risk Management Solutions (RMS) Probabilistic Terrorism Model. We then estimate the critical risk reduction, which is the risk‐reducing effectiveness of WHTI‐L needed for its benefit, in terms of reduced terrorism loss in the United States, to exceed its cost. Our analysis indicates that the critical risk reduction depends strongly not only on uncertainties in the terrorism risk level, but also on uncertainty in the cost of regulation and how casualties are monetized. For a terrorism risk level based on the RMS standard risk estimate, the baseline regulatory cost estimate for WHTI‐L, and a range of casualty cost estimates based on the willingness‐to‐pay approach, our estimate for the expected annualized loss from terrorism ranges from $2.7 billion to $5.2 billion. For this range in annualized loss, the critical risk reduction for WHTI‐L ranges from 7% to 13%. Basing results on a lower risk level that results in halving the annualized terrorism loss would double the critical risk reduction (14–26%), and basing the results on a higher risk level that results in a doubling of the annualized terrorism loss would cut the critical risk reduction in half (3.5–6.6%). Ideally, decisions about terrorism security regulations and policies would be informed by true benefit‐cost analyses in which the estimated benefits are compared to costs. Such analyses for terrorism security efforts face substantial impediments stemming from the great uncertainty in the terrorist threat and the very low recurrence interval for large attacks. Several approaches can be used to estimate how a terrorism security program or regulation reduces the distribution of risks it is intended to manage. But, continued research to develop additional tools and data is necessary to support application of these approaches. These include refinement of models and simulations, engagement of subject matter experts, implementation of program evaluation, and estimating the costs of casualties from terrorism events.     

The Effect of Risk Beliefs on Property Values: A Case Study of a Hazardous Waste Site1

Health risk beliefs of homeowners near a landfill site were assessed in a survey and compared to expert judgments of the health risks of living near the site. A bimodal distribution of health risk beliefs suggested sharp disagreement between the experts and at least some of the residents. Correlates of high risk beliefs included perception of odor from the site, exposure to media coverage of the problem, having children living at home, age (younger respondents more concerned), and gender (females more concerned). An aggregated neighborhood health risk belief predicted reductions in home prices even after controlling for home physical characteristics, such as size and other disamenities such as proximity to a freeway. In the 4100 homes near the site, the estimated depression in property values was estimated to total about $40.2 million before the site was closed and to be about $19.7 million after closure. Implications of these results for community conflict and for benefit-cost analysis of hazard site remediation are discussed.     

Societal Responses to Familiar Versus Unfamiliar Risk: Comparisons of Influenza and SARS in Korea

This study examines the connections between familiar (influenza) and unfamiliar (SARS) risks among the general public in a SARS affected society. Using a survey of 350 respondents in Chonju, we find that risk perceptions and a belief that influenza vaccination reduces the incidence of SARS explain behavioral intentions for influenza vaccination and purchase responses to a hypothetical SARS vaccine. Those respondents who believe that an influenza vaccination will very likely reduce SARS incidence have a high probability (79%) of intending to vaccinate, but a much lower WTP for a SARS vaccine than those without such a belief. This belief undoubtedly was influenced by a reframing of influenza vaccination as preventing SARS. Such reframing may lead to short-term improvements in vaccination rates to the detriment of long-term SARS vaccination development. When compared with a similar study in Taiwan, societal risk perceptions of SARS and WTP for a vaccine vary greatly according to the extent of a society's experience with SARS.     

Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States

Despite the growing scientific consensus about the risks of global warming and climate change, the mass media frequently portray the subject as one of great scientific controversy and debate. And yet previous studies of the mass public's subjective assessments of the risks of global warming and climate change have not sufficiently examined public informedness, public confidence in climate scientists, and the role of personal efficacy in affecting global warming outcomes. By examining the results of a survey on an original and representative sample of Americans, we find that these three forces—informedness, confidence in scientists, and personal efficacy—are related in interesting and unexpected ways, and exert significant influence on risk assessments of global warming and climate change. In particular, more informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. We also find that confidence in scientists has unexpected effects: respondents with high confidence in scientists feel less responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. These results have substantial implications for the interaction between scientists and the public in general, and for the public discussion of global warming and climate change in particular.     

Perception of Risks From Electromagnetic Fields: A Psychometric Evaluation of a Risk-Communication Approach

Potential health risks from exposure to power-frequency electromagnetic fields (EMF) have become an issue of significant public concern. This study evaluates a brochure designed to communicate EMF health risks from a scientific perspective. The study utilized a pretest-posttest design in which respondents judged various sources of EMF (and other) health and safety risks, both before reading the brochure and after. Respondents assessed risks on dimensions similar to those utilized in previous studies of risk perception. In addition, detailed ratings were made that probed respondents' beliefs about the possible causal effects of EMF exposure. The findings suggest that naive beliefs about the potential of EMF exposure to cause harm were highly influenced by specific content elements of the brochure. The implications for using risk-communication approaches based on communicating scientific uncertainty are discussed.     

Intelligent Adversary Risk Analysis: A Bioterrorism Risk Management Model

The tragic events of 9/11 and the concerns about the potential for a terrorist or hostile state attack with weapons of mass destruction have led to an increased emphasis on risk analysis for homeland security. Uncertain hazards (natural and engineering) have been successfully analyzed using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Unlike uncertain hazards, terrorists and hostile states are intelligent adversaries who can observe our vulnerabilities and dynamically adapt their plans and actions to achieve their objectives. This article compares uncertain hazard risk analysis with intelligent adversary risk analysis, describes the intelligent adversary risk analysis challenges, and presents a probabilistic defender–attacker–defender model to evaluate the baseline risk and the potential risk reduction provided by defender investments. The model includes defender decisions prior to an attack; attacker decisions during the attack; defender actions after an attack; and the uncertainties of attack implementation, detection, and consequences. The risk management model is demonstrated with an illustrative bioterrorism problem with notional data.     

How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead Terrorism Risk Analysts

Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), of the type originally developed for engineered systems, is still proposed for terrorism risk analysis. We show that such PRA applications are unjustified in general. The capacity of terrorists to seek and use information and to actively research different attack options before deciding what to do raises unique features of terrorism risk assessment that are not adequately addressed by conventional PRA for natural and engineered systems—in part because decisions based on such PRA estimates do not adequately hedge against the different probabilities that attackers may eventually act upon. These probabilities may differ from the defender's (even if the defender's experts are thoroughly trained, well calibrated, unbiased probability assessors) because they may be conditioned on different information. We illustrate the fundamental differences between PRA and terrorism risk analysis, and suggest use of robust decision analysis for risk management when attackers may know more about some attack options than we do.     

Adaptive Management: A Paradigm for Remediation of Public Facilities Following a Terrorist Attack

Terrorist actions are aimed at maximizing harm (health, psychological, economical, and political) through the combined physical impacts of the act and fear. Immediate and effective response to a terrorist act is critical to limit human and environmental harm, effectively restore facility function, and maintain public confidence. Though there have been terrorist attacks in public facilities that we have learned from, overall our experiences in restoration of public facilities following a terrorist attack are limited. Restoration of public facilities following a release of a hazardous material is inherently far more complex than in industrial settings and has many unique technical, economic, social, and political challenges. For example, there may be a great need to quickly restore the facility to full operation and allow public access even though it was not designed for easy or rapid restoration, and critical information is needed for quantitative risk assessment and effective restoration must be anticipated to be incomplete and uncertain. Whereas present planning documents have substantial linearity in their organization, the “adaptive management” paradigm provides a constructive parallel paradigm for restoration of public facilities that anticipates and plans for uncertainty, inefficiencies, and stakeholder participation. Adaptive management grew out of the need to manage and restore natural resources in highly complex and changing environments with limited knowledge about causal relationships and responses to restoration actions. Similarities between natural resource management and restoration of a public facility after a terrorist attack suggest that integration of adaptive management principles explicitly into restoration processes will result in substantially enhanced and flexible responses necessary to meet the uncertainties of potential terrorist attacks.     

Energy Choices and Risk Beliefs: Is It Just Global Warming and Fear of a Nuclear Power Plant Accident?

A survey of 3,200 U.S. residents focused on two issues associated with the use of nuclear and coal fuels to produce electrical energy. The first was the association between risk beliefs and preferences for coal and nuclear energy. As expected, concern about nuclear power plant accidents led to decreased support for nuclear power, and those who believed that coal causes global warming preferred less coal use. Yet other risk beliefs about the coal and nuclear energy fuel cycles were stronger or equal correlates of public preferences. The second issue is the existence of what we call acknowledged risk takers, respondents who favored increased reliance on nuclear energy, although also noting that there could be a serious nuclear plant accident, and those who favored greater coal use, despite acknowledging a link to global warming. The pro‐nuclear group disproportionately was affluent educated white males, and the pro‐coal group was relatively poor less educated African‐American and Latino females. Yet both shared four similarities: older age, trust in management, belief that the energy facilities help the local economy, and individualistic personal values. These findings show that there is no single public with regard to energy preferences and risk beliefs. Rather, there are multiple populations with different viewpoints that surely would benefit by hearing a clear and comprehensive national energy life cycle policy from the national government.