两级供应链上质量控制的动态协调机制研究

文章应用微分博弈的方法研究了由单一制造商和单一供应商组成的两级供应链上的质量控制的协调问题.首先讨论了制造商作为供应链上质量控制的领导者而供应商作为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈情形,得到了一般的非协同质量控制博弈情形下制造商和供应商的最优行动选择;接着探讨了双方在协同质量控制博弈情形下的最优行动选择;通过对比两种情形下的博弈均衡结果,阐明了在两级供应链上的质量管理过程中,协同质量控制博弈结构严格优于一般的非协同质量控制博弈结构.     

供应链中产品与信息质量改进的战略联盟策略研究

本文分析了一个包含单个供应商和单个制造商的供应链,研究了关于供应商的产品质量和市场需求的信息质量改进的战略联盟策略的设计,分析了成本共担策略能提高供应链绩效的条件及其对供应链的影响和价值.在供应链联盟中制造商参与到供应商的质量改进活动中,使供应商具有改进质量水平的激励,相应的使市场需求均值增加或使需求信息精度提高,供应商的期望收益比分散决策的供应链中的收益增加,当质量成本共担参数满足某些条件时,制造商也将获得比无战略联盟情况中更高的收益.     

工艺设计质量信息不对称环境下质量激励合同设计

工艺设计质量决定了产品可制造性，从而对产品质量产生重要影响。在生产外包环境下，不仅供应商的质量努力难以合同化，而且工艺设计质量可能是设计者的私人信息，因此在供应商和制造商之间往往是不对称的，从而为质量激励合同设计带来挑战。本文考虑一个制造商和一个供应商构成的两级供应链。制造商可能自己设计产品，然后将生产外包给供应商，也可能将设计和生产都外包给供应商。本文分析了在这两种外包策略下，制造商的质量激励合同设计。研究发现：1）当工艺设计质量是对称信息时，制造商可以通过质量合同设计实现全局最优质量和利润；2）当工艺设计质量是制造商的私人信息时，工艺设计质量高的制造商可以通过降低对供应商的质量惩罚强度以及增加采购价格来传递工艺设计质量的信号；3）当工艺设计质量是供应商的私人信息时，制造商可以通过质量合同菜单来甄别工艺设计质量信息。与工艺设计质量是对称信息时的均衡合同相比，在针对低工艺设计水平供应商的合同中，制造商降低质量惩罚强度和采购价格；在针对高工艺设计水平供应商的合同中，质量惩罚强度不变，但采购价格提高。     

资金价值影响下的供应链最优能力与定价策略

综合考虑市场不确定、产品销量以及资金价值对供应链能力决策的影响,研究了供应链集中决策与分散决策下的最优能力与定价决策问题,并求得了不同参数条件下的解析解.研究表明,当供应链信息对称,供应商必须满足制造商的能力需求时,批发价合同不能使供应链能力协调.如果制造商能对供应商没有利用的能力提供合适的补偿,供应链能力协调可以实现.     

电子商务环境下两阶段供应链网络均衡模型

研究了在电子商务环境下产品存在现货市场时,由供应商和制造商组成的两层供应链网络在两阶段交易情况下的均衡问题.假定制造商的需求具有不确定性,制造商和供应商有两次行动的机会,在初始时刻决定合同交易量,在需求到来时决定现货市场交易量.利用变分不等式方法建立了供应商和制造商的决策模型,考虑了同质的供应商/制造商之间存在竞争并且存在交易成本的情况,讨论了模型解的性质,给出了模型求解算法.     

供应链质量风险管理的单委托-多代理激励模型研究

质量激励合同是供应链质量风险管理的重要途径,本文考虑由一个制造商和两个供应商组成的供应链,从制造商对供应商质量风险监管的角度出发,建立了单委托人—多代理人质量激励模型,拓展分析了影响激励报酬系数和供应商质量风险防范水平的各种不同因素,为供应链质量风险管理环境下建立有效的质量激励合同提供理论依据。     

嵌入Supply-hub的供应链联合生产与订货批量模型研究

考虑JIT环境下基于Supply-hub的供货模式,建立了制造商、Supply-hub和供应商的平均成本函数,提出了供应链分散决策和集中决策情形下的制造商和供应商的生产与订货批量模型。结果表明,制造商的生产批量在供应链分散决策时变化无规律,而在供应链集中决策时随着供应商与Supply-hub之间距离的增加而增加;相比分散决策,供应链集中决策时制造商的成本增加而供应商的成本减少,而整个供应链的总成本减少,供应商可以通过转移支付让制造商和供应商均受益,从而实现整个供应链的帕累托优化,随着供应商与Supply-hub之间的距离增加,协调能够让供应链得到更多的收益。     

基于随机产出与随机需求的农产品供应链风险共担合同

本文采用单位价格补贴的风险共担机制,分析了农产品供应链中随机产出和随机需求下供应商-制造商采取不同的风险共担合同对农资投入、供应商、制造商以及整个供应链的利润的影响。文中的风险共担合同包括风险无共担合同、需求风险共担合同、产出风险共担合同、产出-需求风险共担合同,结合算例,结论得出:需求风险分担可以使供应链利润增加;产出风险分担可以增加供应商的利润收益,而赋予制造商控制供应商农资投入积极性的权利;产出-需求共担合同既能增加供应链及各成员的利润收益,同时还使得双方相互制约、相互协调,促使供应链良好发展。最后,结合非线性补贴的风险分担形式对上述合同的有效性进行了验证,研究表明,不同的补贴形式只在量上对决策存在影响,而本质上的结论并没有变化。     

基于补偿合约的供应链定价与能力设计的协调问题研究

研究和分析了在需求不确定并且受价格影响的情况下,供应链中制造商与供应商的产品定价与能力设计的协调问题。制造商从供应商处采购用于产品生产的关键零部件,供应链面临的潜在需求服从随机分布,有效需求则受产品定价的影响。当供应商的生产能力出现约束时,制造商可以从外部其他渠道获取关键零部件,但是需要付出一个更高的采购价格。制造商确定产品的销售价格,供应商确定生产能力。分析比较了在集成供应链与独立决策的供应链中的定价与能力计划策略,提出了一种能够有效协调制造商和供应商的决策行为的补偿合约。最后,进行了数值分析,证明补偿合约的有效性。     

时间价值下供应链多期道德风险激励机制研究

本文在供应链中提出基于时间价值的激励契约设计理论,研究了在信息对称和不对称情况下,供应链企业中制造商如何对供应商设计多期最优激励机制来达到防范道德风险的问题。在信息对称的情况下,帕累托最优水平可以达到,制造商支付给供应商固定工资,且制造商支付给供应商的固定工资与供应商的努力成本系数呈负相关,与供应商的能力、最大保留收入呈正相关;在信息不对称的情况下,帕累托最优合同无法实现,制造商必须付出代理成本。当制造商与供应商合作期限无限长时,制造商的期望收益现值总额与激励成本现值总额分别趋近于一个定值。     

Improving supplier performance using a comprehensive scheme

Improving and coordinating buyer and supplier efforts to increase productivity and competitive advantage in a supply chain is an important issue. Numerous studies have proposed models, principles and criteria for supplier evaluation and selection. Hence, evaluating and improving supplier performance are important when building long-term supply chain competitiveness. This study presents a novel and comprehensive framework that illustrates the linkages between evaluating supplier performance and planning improvements. The proposed framework comprises four parts: building an evaluation model, evaluating supplier performance based on the buyer perspective, evaluating supplier performance based on the supplier perspective and scheduling improvement tasks. This study applies a hybrid genetic algorithm to help suppliers schedule improvement tasks based on the evaluation findings. Finally, evaluation data of a light-emitting diode (LED) manufacturer in Taiwan is used to interpret the procedure and verify model effectiveness.     

The Effect of Socialization Mechanisms and Performance Measurement on Supplier Integration in New Product Development

This article examines the effect of socialization mechanisms and supplier performance measurement on the level of supplier integration in new product development and subsequent firm performance outcomes. Prior research has found socialization mechanisms and performance measures to be effective in managing supplier relationships, though research examining their impact within a product development context has been limited. Socialization mechanisms, such as supplier conferences and on‐site visits, help establish communication and information‐sharing routines necessary to achieve supplier integration in the product development process. Using performance measures to evaluate a supplier helps focus managerial attention on areas such as innovation and communication that are important to integration success. A structural equation model, using a sample of 142 manufacturing firms based in the United Kingdom, indicates that the level of supplier integration in new product development is positively influenced by socialization mechanisms and innovation‐focused measures of supplier performance, but not significantly associated with the use of communication measures. In turn, increased levels of supplier integration led to improvements in both collaboration outcomes and business performance. Socialization mechanisms were also found to have a direct effect on collaboration outcomes achieved by the firm. Managerial implications and future research directions are discussed.     

Supplier‐Switching Inertia and Competitive Asymmetry: A Demand‐Side Perspective*

Building on strategic management, operations strategy, and supplier management literatures, this article presents a framework for supplier selection from the demand‐side perspective. We highlight the role of a purchasing firm's switching inertia in the supplier‐selection process and demonstrate the usefulness of our framework for the industrial automation industry. Empirical data for this study was collected from 171 corporate and plant‐level executives in pharmaceutical, chemical, and paper‐and‐pulp manufacturing industries in the United States. A series of Web‐based individually customized discrete choice experiments asked the respondents to either switch to the new supplier or stay with the existing supplier. Based on the results of these experiments, we demonstrate the existence of switching inertia in the supplier‐selection process and discuss the managerial implications for incumbent and challenger supplier firms.     

Risk Mitigation Benefit from Backup Suppliers in the Presence of the Horizontal Fairness Concern

The backup supply strategy is demonstrated as an effective approach to mitigating supply risk. We study a supply chain in which a leader manufacturer designs a contract to a potential backup supplier to mitigate the yield uncertainty of the primary supplier. In this context, the backup supplier may compare with the primary supplier and have horizontal fairness concerns. We model the contract design problem using a Stackelberg game and characterize the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and backup supplier, in both fairness and off‐fairness settings. The theoretical results show that the leader manufacturer must sacrifice his own payoff to balance the payoffs of both suppliers. As a result, using a self‐interested backup supplier is the dominating strategy, whereas using a fair‐minded backup supplier is only suggested when the reliability of the primary supplier is low and the fairness concern of the backup supplier is not strong. Additionally, the backup supplier only benefits from fairness concerns when the level is not exceeding a threshold value. With regard to high fairness levels beyond this threshold, fairness concern has negative effects on the monetary payoff and even might lead to loss of the business. By conducting laboratory experiments, we provide evidence of the horizontal fairness concern from the backup supplier. Further, we show that if the primary supplier also has horizontal fairness concerns, the leader manufacturer can conditionally benefit from a promoted yield reliability due to an extra effort from the primary supplier.     

Supplier integration,operational capability and firm performance: an investigation in an emerging economy environment

Abstract

The literature on supplier integration’s (SI) impact on firm performance is intertwined with mixed findings in terms of definitional differences, study context, specific integration components, and the types of relationships examined. This study contributes to the supplier integration and firm performance (SI-FP) literature by investigating how and when supplier integration influences firm performance. Drawing on the relational view, the resource-based view, and the Dynamics Capability theories, we suggest that improvements in firm performance from the supplier integration perspective are dependent on gains in operational capabilities. We test this dependency with survey data from firms in Ghana, a developing economy. The results show positive significant relationships between supplier integration and competitive operational capabilities and between supplier integration and firm performance. Our results highlight the importance for managers in developing economies and elsewhere to improve their firms’ operational capabilities and competitiveness by investing in supplier integration. We also discuss implications of these findings for research.     

Supplier Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier New Product Development: A China‐U.S. Study of Antecedents,Consequences, and Cultural/Institutional Contexts

Collaborating with a supplier in a buying firm's new product development (NPD) project is commonly advocated and adopted, but does not always improve project performance. Some pre‐existing collaboration contexts, such as buyer–supplier NPD projects, are especially exposed to supplier opportunism due to the uncertain nature of the collaboration process. Adopting agency theory and transaction cost theory perspectives, we examine: (i) contextual antecedents and project consequences of supplier opportunism and (ii) if these causal influences vary in different cultural and institutional contexts. Using a survey sample of 214 United States (U.S.) and 212 Chinese buying firms’ responses about buyer–supplier NPD projects, we find that supplier opportunism is significantly influenced by the task and relational contexts. We also show that supplier opportunism damages both design quality and efficiency, two aspects of project performance. When comparing U.S. to China, we find that task and relational contexts have a greater impact on supplier opportunism in the U.S., but design efficiency is less hurt by supplier opportunism there. Finally, we show challenges of preventing supplier opportunism in certain NPD collaboration contexts, and offer solutions for overcoming these challenges.     

Governance Choice,Sourcing Relationship Characteristics,and Relationship Performance

Past work on exchange relationships has debated the efficacy of partnership versus arm's‐length governance on performance of a buyer–supplier relationship. However, how these governance approaches leverage key supplier specific relationship characteristics has not been examined. In this study, we examine the moderating role of governance choice (arm's‐length versus partnership governance) in leveraging key supplier specific characteristics to achieve superior performance for the buyer in a relationship. Specifically, drawing from residual rights theory, we argue that the governance choice buyers make moderates the impact of supplier flexibility, supplier human capital and relationship dependency on performance. Our findings suggest that, for a buyer, the benefits of supplier flexibility and relationship dependency are better realized in partnership governance as opposed to arm's‐length governance. Further, our findings suggest that although buyers choose a specific governance approach consistent with their outsourcing motivation, the choice of governance is critical to leveraging the impact of supplier characteristics due to the moderation effects studied. We elaborate on these effects and discuss the implications of our findings.     

Performance of spare parts supply chains in developing industries

Spare parts supply chains of manufacturing equipment in developing industries such as the Saudi manufacturing sector often operate in one direction. Importing production machinery and setups to run such developing industries, from more developed industrial countries, sway the flow of spare supplies upstream. Based on empirical data collected from 210 local manufacturing firms, this study characterises and models such supply chains. The effects of supplier proximity, diversity and time lag on spare parts supply chain performance were explained using structural equation modelling. Delivery time lag and supplier diversity increased the deficiency of spare parts availability. Opposite to earlier consensus found in the literature, the impact of supplier proximity on spare parts supply chain performance was insignificant. Recent improvements in the agility and capacity of logistical services might have diminished the influence of supplier remoteness. However, supplier proximity correlated with supplier diversity in such supply chains.     

考虑供应商产品交付水平的供应链融资策略研究

供应商产品的交付水平直接影响下游制造商的生产，但是这种现象没有得到供应链金融研究的重视。为此，本文将供应商交付水平和供应链的运营融资问题结合起来研究。在考虑供应商产品交付水平的情况下，通过研究资金不足的供应商分别利用制造商预付款融资和风险投资方股权融资时，供应商的最优运营决策和融资策略，最后考虑了供应商对两种融资方式的选择。研究结果表明，供应商的自有资金水平对供应链均衡决策及其收益影响很大，有限的自有资金严重制约了供应商产品的交付水平，降低了供应链的运作效率；不管是资金充足，还是选择融资，供应商的利润不仅与自身的运营效率有关系，而且与替代供应商产品的批发价格有很大关系，当供应商的运营效率较低时，供应商的利润随着替代供应商产品的批发价格先增大后减小，当供应商运营效率较高时，供应商的利润随着替代供应商产品的批发价格逐渐增大。当供应商进行融资时，若自有资金水平较低，应通过股权融资的方式进行融资，若自有资金水平较高，供应商应该选择制造商预付款的方式进行融资，若自有资金量超过预付款融资时供应商所需资金的阈值时，供应商选择不融资。