非对称信息条件下业务外包的质量评价和转移支付决策

研究了不同信息条件下业务外包的产品质量评价问题,在文献[l,2]基础上考虑购买商作为委托人和供应商作为代理人建立了业务外包的委托代理模型。其中,质量预防水平为供应商的决策变量,购买商对供应商的转移支付和质量评价水平为购买商的决策变量。本文考虑了供应商质量预防信息隐匿情况,重点研究了非对称信息下业务外包的质量评价和转移支付问题,运用极大值原理推导了购买商的质量评价和转移支付的最优解。最后结合一个农机公司拖拉机生产业务外包问题进行了仿真计算和分析,对比了不同信息环境下的决策结果。     

信息系统外包决策的AHP/PROMETHEE方法

针对信息系统外包项目优选这一重要问题,在已有方法的基础上,结合层次分析法与偏好顺序结构评估法,提出了一种基于这两种方法相结合的信息系统外包项目选择决策方法。以管理、战略、技术、经济、质量与风险6项因素作为评价准则,用层次分析法确定信息系统外包项目选择问题的层次结构与评价准则的权重,用偏好顺序结构评估法确定信息系统外包项目的排序,并通过算例说明该方法的有效性。     

企业“外包”战略研究

外包这种独特的经营方式大踏步进入中国,实行外包是企业发展战略之一,转变经营观念,积极推行外包战略,规范外包管理,扎扎实实地提高企业核心竞争力,在加入WTO之后,这种新的产业的发展、生存方式是引人瞩目的一道风景。在外包战略在被广泛应用,适用于现今追求企业弹性化的经营管理潮流。一、外包的基本诠释1.外包概念。外包是(out sourcing),是指企业致力于开发具有核心竟争力的业务,其余非核心业务由外部企业按照规定要求提供优质服务的一种经营方式。外包就是企业做自己最能干的事情(扬已所长),把其它的工作外包给能做好这些事情的专业组织(避已之短)。外包业是新近兴起的一个行业,它给企业带来了新的活力。2     

论传统企业电子商务外包的过程及控制

电子商务外包是传统企业发展电子商务的有效手段.本文以外包理论为基础,结合传统企业电子商务的特点,对电子商务外包的过程及管理控制要点进行了分析.电子商务外包的过程可以分为电子商务外包业务确定、电子商务外包商选择、电子商务外包实施、电子商务外包绩效评估等4个阶段,企业首先要确定拟外包的电子商务业务,然后根据自身需要选择合适的电子商务外包商.在电子商务外包的实施过程中要考虑电子商务业务与企业线下业务的整合,同时要注意控制电子商务外包的风险.最后,企业要对电子商务外包的绩效进行评估,为下一步的决策提供依据.     

人力资源管理外包中的成本计量与收益分析

人力资源管理外包并非解决企业经营问题的万能良药，企业的人力资源管理是否适合外包，能在多大的程度和范围上外包，外包的效果如何，这些问题不同的企业可能会得出不同的结论。总而言之，企业在进行外包决策时，首先要对外包的成本与效益进行分析，来抉择是否外包与如何外包。     

IT外包的利益相关方面的整体决策思考

IT外包已经成为全球市场里的重要商业现象,围绕IT外包有效决策的企业思考也越发凸现其重要性,既有的研究里存在大量支持IT外包决策思考的内容.本文的研究注意到IT外包企业决策中的主要利益相关方面(企业财务、信息服务、组织运营、企业员工和组织战略),联系影响它们的IT外包的收益一成本一风险,形成IT外包决策思考的整体基础,发展IT外包决策全面和深层思考及评估的有效指导,提供决策者在IT外包企业价值上全局和长远的管理视野.     

供应链企业外包战略选择模型研究

从企业核心竞争力的角度分析顾客大规模定制生产条件下供应链企业外包战略的演进层次及特征,结合企业内部能力保有和外包部件的财务影响力,建立了外包战略选择模型,为供应链企业选择适当的外包决策提供参考。     

企业业务外包战略研究综述

当今,业务外包作为一种新兴的发展战略,已经得到越来越多的企业认可和采用.当今企业之间的竞争程度和范围是史无前例的激烈,已经延伸到整个产业链.业务外包战略凭借其促进核心能力的提升、企业运营成本的降低、资源的优化整合、降低企业运营风险、提高企业资源的使用效率的等优势以迅雷不及掩耳之势成为企业一种新的经营战略.虽然外包有其固有的很多优势,但在外包的过程中随着诸多相关因素的变化,外包出去的业务将会面临新的风险.     

论企业信息系统外包的决策选择

信息系统外包是企业培育和提升核心能力以获取持续竞争优势的一种战略行为。本文在借鉴西方企业外包研究的基础上,对业务外包的理论依据进行了阐述;从运营成本、服务水平和安全管理风险等方面讨论了信息系统外包决策对企业的影响,并进一步对比国内外的外包情况。     

考虑竞争的OEM生产采购外包战略决策

生产外包和采购外包是制造商面临的重要战略决策.对此问题,建立一个博弈论模型,研究在竞争情形下制造商关于生产和采购的双重外包战略决策.在决定是否外包生产的同时,制造商还决定是否把零部件的采购外包给竞争对手.研究结果表明,制造商的最优生产和采购外包战略会受到自身和竞争对手的相对市场潜力以及生产投资成本的影响.制造商的最优外包战略可能为生产和采购都外包、生产和采购都自主进行以及生产外包但采购不外包.同时,对于制造商来说,任何情形下都不应单独把采购外包;而市场潜力较弱的竞争对手则希望制造商生产外包但采购不外包.另外,研究表明在一定条件下存在双赢策略,使得制造商和竞争对手都达到最优利润：当竞争对手和制造商的市场潜力差距较大时,制造商外包生产但自主采购能实现双赢;当它们的市场潜力差距较小时,制造商将生产和采购都外包能实现双赢.     

An analysis of vendor innovation capability in the contract electronics manufacturing industry

Limited academic research has been given to analysing the innovation capabilities of vendors in outsourcing contracts. This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by enhancing our understanding of how the innovation capability of vendors is deployed to win, run and renew outsourcing contracts with their customers. Employing the resource-based view as a theoretical basis and undertaking in-depth case study analysis of three vendors in the electronic manufacturing services industry, the research shows that to achieve the outsourcing objectives of winning, running and renewing the contract, vendors can use different configurations of the competitive priorities of cost, quality, delivery and flexibility. The research aggregates the capabilities that influence the innovative capability of a vendor into the innovation-related capabilities (IRCs) of design, new product introduction and manufacturing. Three strategies are identified for vendors on how to deploy these IRCs, and a number of propositions are developed to indicate the suitability of the three deployment strategies for different operational contexts.     

IT服务外包项目工期与费用控制的 多属性英氏逆拍卖机制

工期和费用是影响IT服务外包项目成败的两个重要因素,且两者之间呈负相关的关系。在IT服务外包项目执行前,发包方与接包方需要就项目的工期和费用达成一致。通常,发包方并不完全了解外包项目的市场行情,在这种情况下,就需要一种有效的方式使发包方和接包方之间就工期和费用达成一致。本文设计了改进的英氏逆拍卖机制,针对一对多的情况设计了新的拍卖协议;针对工期和费用的多属性情况,引入多属性效用理论解决,设计了相应的效用增加函数。最后通过一个算例来演示所设计的拍卖机制对解决此类决策问题的作用。得出一些结论:所设计机制能够以拍卖方式描述费用和工期管理流程;找到了发包方和接包方的最佳增量效用,并且建议的拍卖协议是发包方和接包方获得双赢结果的机制;从不同大小的案例中可以得到完全一致的结果,这表明设计的拍卖机制的有效性和效用增加函数对协商结果的有效性。     

Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard problem

In the past two decades many organizations have turned to other organizations to satisfy their information systems needs. Information systems outsourcing arrangements cover the spectrum from agreements involving the delivery of all information services to those providing specific services such as systems development, communications management, desktop computing provision and maintenance, and so on.In this paper we model information systems outsourcing arrangements as a non-cooperative game with two players: a company and an outsourcing vendor. The game between the two players has an inherent double moral hazard problem as the success of the information system outsourcing project depends on the actions of both players, which are costly for them and are not directly contractible. Both parties make their decisions taking into account the effects that these decisions have on the other player's actions. In our analysis, we compare the solution obtained without a moral hazard problem (the first-best solution) to the one obtained under a double moral hazard setting (the second-best solution). We demonstrate some results based on the assumption that increases in the productivity of the vendor lead to increases in the productivity of the company. Further we establish that outsourcing contracts should provide no separate payment for failure to the outsourcing vendor although effectively many of them do. We also provide a sharing rule for providing appropriate incentives for the vendor and examine the dynamics associated with this sharing rule. Finally, we further provide for the characterization of response functions and the ensuing Nash solution including the optimal outsourcing fee. This allows for the nuanced consideration of the degree of interaction between the effort of one party and the productivity of the effort of the other party. This particular interaction has not been explored formally in the extant research literature.     

How Provider Selection and Management Contribute to Successful Innovation Outsourcing: An Empirical Study at Siemens

It is becoming increasingly common to involve external technology providers in developing new technologies and new products. Two important phases involved in working with technology vendors are vendor selection and vendor management. Because for both steps theory development of key decision guidelines is still immature, we use detailed case studies of 31 innovation outsourcing projects at Siemens to develop grounded theory on provider selection criteria and on project management success drivers. A selection criterion often associated with successful outsourcing is the provider's “track record” or previous experience. Our cases suggest that there is no standard “track record” for success but that a “match” between the client firm's outsourcing motivation and the provider's strengths appears to be a necessary condition for a successful outsourcing collaboration. As to the second phase—managing the vendor—we identify a number of operational project success drivers. There seems to be no universal checklist, but the most important drivers seem to be contingent on the type of vendor chosen and on the maturity of the technology. We compare five provider types—universities, competitors, customers, start‐up companies, and component suppliers—and find that some success drivers are common to all providers, while others are relevant only for certain types of provider. Moreover, drivers in the case of a mature technology are more focused on successful transfer to manufacturing than on development itself. Our findings offer guidelines for innovation managers on how to select innovation providers and how to manage them during the project.     

不对称信息下信息技术服务外包合同设计

本文针对客户企业向IT供应商外包信息技术服务这一背景,考虑IT供应商不仅具有开发信息系统能力的私有信息,且其开发过程中的努力行为对于客户企业不可见的情况,研究了客户企业信息技术服务外包合同设计问题。研究发现,不对称信息下,客户企业可以通过设计最优合同菜单来甄别不同能力的IT供应商,但是此时客户企业需要向高能力IT供应商支付信息租金。同时,客户企业可以通过设计最优合同有效规制高能力IT供应商系统开发过程中的努力行为,但是相比于信息对称的情况,不对称信息下低能力IT供应商会存在努力不足的现象。低能力IT供应商努力不足的现象会降低社会福利和客户企业的期望利润;客户企业向高能力IT供应商支付信息租金的行为也会减少客户企业的期望利润。增加系统调试阶段的调试时间或者选择信息系统故障检出率高的IT供应商,可以降低高能力IT供应商的信息租金,并缓解低能力IT供应商努力不足的现象,进而减少信息不对称给客户企业带来的利润损失。     

R&D (Re)location and Offshore Outsourcing: A Management Perspective

The paper reviews and systematizes the management literature directly and indirectly related to (re)location of research and development (R&D), in the form of both insourcing and outsourcing. The focus in particular is on R&D offshore outsourcing and its main drivers, including locational constraints and opportunities, motives, strategic decisions and managerial challenges. The analysis synthesizes and links the main propositions and findings of the theoretical and empirical work to build an original management and strategy centred framework which looks at R&D (re)location from a client–vendor perspective. In this case, the client is the offshoring company, and the vendors are the firms located in the host country. The characteristics of the firms and locations considered vis‐à‐vis the offshoring firm's goals are examined, the strategies implemented, the management and organizational challenges that R&D offshore outsourcing entails, and the ways in which offshoring impacts on both home and host locations are investigated.     

The Role of Contracts on Quality and Returns to Quality in Offshore Software Development Outsourcing

In this study, we examine how the different incentive structures inherent in two primary contract types—time and materials (T&M) and fixed price (FP)—influence the quality provided by the vendor in the software development outsourcing industry. We argue that the incentive structure of FP contracts motivates a vendor to be more efficient in the software development process, which results in higher quality as compared to projects executed under a T&M contract. We thus argue that vendors consistently staff FP projects with better trained personnel because they face the most risk on these contracts, resulting in better outcomes on these projects. We extend our analysis to propose that providing higher quality is associated with higher profit margins for the vendor only for FP contracts. We develop and test these hypotheses on data collected from 100 software projects completed by a leading Indian offshore vendor. The results provide strong support for our fundamental thesis that the drivers of and returns to quality vary by contract type. We discuss the implications of our research for both researchers and practitioners.     

Determinants of Interoutsourcing: An Analytical Approach

Interoutsourcing is a round‐way process in which the vendor is its customer's customer and the customer is its vendor's vendor. While interoutsourcing is emerging as a prominent outsourcing strategy in many industries, there are no rigorous analytical studies focusing on this mechanism. In this article, we analytically demonstrate the efficacy of interoutsourcing by comparing it with normal outsourcing. Our results show that, compared with normal outsourcing, interoutsourcing acts as a self‐enforcer of vendor firms' behaviors toward increasing outsourcing service value. However, in situations where there is a mismatch of outsourcing activities, a high degree of incentive that is based on outsourcing service value, and a high cost of capital, interoutsourcing is not preferred to normal outsourcing. We discuss these results in detail and provide managerial implications for firms involved in interoutsourcing decisions.     

Optimal Configuration of a Service Delivery Network: An Application to a Financial Services Provider

Driven by market pressures, financial service firms are increasingly partnering with independent vendors to create service networks that deliver greater profits while ensuring high service quality. In the management of call center networks, these partnerships are common and form an integral part of the customer care and marketing strategies in the financial services industry. For a financial services firm, configuring such a call center service network entails determining which partners to select and how to distribute service requests among vendors, while incorporating their capabilities, costs, and revenue‐generating abilities. Motivated by a problem facing a Fortune 500 financial services provider, we develop and apply a novel mixed integer programming model for the service network configuration problem. Our tactical decision support model effectively accounts for the firm's costs by capturing the impact of service requirements on vendor staffing levels and seat requirements, and permits imposing call routing preferences and auxiliary service costs. We implemented the model and applied it to data from an industry partner. Results suggest that our approach can generate considerable cost savings and substantial additional revenues, while ensuring high service quality. Results based on test instances demonstrate similar savings and outperform two rule‐based methods for vendor assignment.     

Bringing IT Back: An Analysis of the Decision to Backsource or Switch Vendors

Whereas the decision to outsource information systems (IS) has been an important focus in IS research and practice, the decision to switch vendors or to backsource has received little attention. Evidence suggests that in practice, however, the decision to backsource or to switch vendors is becoming increasingly common as firms vie for ways to continue to cut information technology (IT) costs and improve IT service levels. This research specifically examines the factors associated with the decision to backsource or to switch vendors. Based on a sample of 160 IT managers involved with application development, we compare and contrast the perceptions of those who switched vendors, backsourced, or continued in an outsourcing relationship for application development. Our findings suggest that product quality, service quality, relationship quality, and switching costs are related to the decision to backsource application outsourcing. However, service and product quality did not influence the decision to switch vendors. Rather, firms that made the decision to switch vendors reported high levels of service and product quality but low levels of relationship quality and switching costs.