Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case*

In this article, we study how the operational decisions of a firm manager depend on her own incentives, the capital structure, and financial decisions in the context of the newsvendor framework. We establish a relationship between the firm’s cost of raising funds and the riskiness of the inventory decisions of the manager. We consider four types of managers, namely, profit, equity, firm value, and profit‐equity maximizers, and initially assume that they may raise funds to increase the inventory level only by issuing debt. We show that the shareholders are indifferent between the different types of managers when the coefficient of variation (CV) of demand is low. However, this is not the case when the CV of demand is high. Based on the demand and the firm’s specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, and bankruptcy costs, the shareholders might be better off with the manager whose compensation package is tied to the firm value as opposed to the equity value. We, then, extend our model by allowing the manager to raise the required funds by issuing both debt and equity. For this case we focus on the equity and firm value maximizer managers and show that our earlier results (for the debt only case) still hold subject to the cost of issuing equity. However the benefit of the firm value maximizer manager over the equity maximizer manager for shareholders is considerably less in this case compared to the case where the manager can only issue debt. The Board of Directors can take these factors into consideration when establishing/modifying the right incentive package for the managers. We also incorporate the notion of the asymmetric information to capture its impact on the board of directors’ decision about the managers’ incentive package.     

The relationship between supply chain manager capabilities and performance: empirical evidence

This study seeks to answer the question how supply chain managers’ capabilities impact individual and firm performance. Organisations have begun to recognise the importance of their supply chain and the necessity for qualified supply chain managers. Therefore, there is a need for further research on the impact of these capabilities on individual and firm performance. Sustained performance of a firm depends on dynamic capabilities and it allows firms to align and adapt strategies according to the volatile external environment. Using dynamic capabilities theory, the supply chain manager capabilities model was developed as a way for supply chain managers to effectively use their skills and past experiences to improve their own and firm’s performance. Primary data was collected through a survey distributed to supply chain management professionals. The results strongly support the relationship between technology and soft skills with supply chain manager capabilities. Interestingly, our study identifies sequential relationship amongst the three constructs such as capabilities, individual and firm performance. Capabilities are related with individual performance whereas individual performance is related with the firm performance. However, our findings revealed that there is no direct relationship between supply chain manager capabilities and firm performance.     

基于模糊综合评判收益约束的贷款组合优化模型

贷款组合优化是商业银行信贷管理中最常见的决策。本文分析了现有的贷款组合优化模型的特点和弊端,以组合风险最小化为目标,以模糊数学中的综合评判关系为约束条件,建立了贷款组合的模糊优化模型。在组合收益率的综合评判目标和评判矩阵已确定的前提条件下,利用二次规划的方法解出各类贷款额占总贷款额的比重,解决了银行各类贷款的组合决策问题。通过进一步的实例分析,又从实证角度说明了该方法的合理性和可行性。     

Cooperation in the Face of Conflict: Effects of Top Managers’ Trust Beliefs in their Firms’ Major Suppliers

As with any relationships, those between buying firms and their major suppliers are likely to experience situations of conflict. When facing such situations, top managers tend to approach conflict either cooperatively or competitively. However, when and why top managers tend towards cooperation or competition is far from clear. This study proposes a novel link between the theory of cooperation and competition and the discounting principle of attribution theory to argue that it is top managers’ trust beliefs in their firms’ major suppliers that influences their intended approach to conflict. Using survey data from 140 C‐level managers and business owners, the authors develop and test a model that differentiates between two attributional dimensions of trust (competence and goodwill) and the specific relational conditions that influence how these attributions operate. The results indicate that top managers’ trust in their suppliers’ competence and goodwill is, in fact, decisive in determining how they intend to approach conflict. Further, the authors demonstrate that a top manager's trust belief in the supplier's goodwill is of particular relevance in driving the top manager to cooperate in the face of conflict. However, this link seems to be contingent on the specific conditions of the buyer–supplier relationship in question.     

项目经理激励报酬机制与企业监督博弈分析

项目经理的投机行为可以通过监督或激励来缓解。本文建立了有关项目管理中的国有企业监督与项目经理行为之间的模型,并运用此模型分析了项目经理的激励机制、项目经理的行为和企业监督之间的关系,并为如何有效地避免项目经理的投机行为,改进当前激励报酬形式提供了一种分析工具。     

中层管理者多重角色行为对企业绩效影响的实证研究

中层管理者是企业管理中重要的一个环节.本文关注中层管理者多重角色行为对企业绩效的影响.首先,将中层管理者的多重角色划分为企业家、执行者、辅导者与协调者四个维度;其次,通过结构方程模型,实证性的验证了中层管理者多重角色行为模型及各个角色维度对组织财务绩效与运营绩效的不同影响.结论表明中层管理者企业家角色行为仅对企业财务绩效具有积极影响,其余三个角色行为仅对企业运营绩效具有积极影响.最后,分析讨论研究结论,并给出相应的对策和建议.     

What innovation managers really do: a multiple-case investigation into the informal role profiles of innovation managers

Over the last fifteen years companies tended to formalise their innovation management activities and to establish formal jobs like the innovation officer, the network manager or the innovation manager. Knowledge of the informal role profiles of these formal roles is still rare. HR and R&D Managers do not know which informal role profile might suit them best, thus having difficulties to assign the best candidates for jobs in innovation management. Researchers cannot help to resolve the problem. Our research answers the question what innovation managers really do, by analysing their tasks, skills and traits, theoretically based on informal role theories. Furthermore, we will analyse how these characteristics change with company size. To provide answers to our research questions we choose a multiple-case study approach. We found, among others, that innovation managers fulfil the role of the relationship and process promotor or a combination of both with the champion, but we also found, that the innovation manager’s roles profile becomes fuzzier with shrinking company size. Our results have practical implications for top management and also HR and R&D managers, enabling them to better select and steer employees in innovation management. Researchers will be able to build on our results because we offer a comprehensive understanding of the informal role profiles of innovation managers based on informal role theories.     

Incentives in a Stage‐Gate Process

Many large organizations use a stage‐gate process to manage new product development projects. In a typical stage‐gate process project managers learn about potential ideas from research and exert effort in development while senior executives make intervening go/no‐go decisions. This decentralized decision making results in an agency problem because the idea quality in early stages is unknown to the executive and the project manager must exert unobservable development effort in later stages. In light of these challenges, how should the firm structure incentives to ensure that project managers reveal relevant information and invest the appropriate effort to create value? In this study, we develop a model of adverse selection in research and moral hazard in development with a go/no‐go decision at the intervening gate. Our results show that the principal's uncertainty regarding early‐stage idea quality—a term we refer to as idea risk—alters the effect of late‐stage development risk. The presence of idea risk can alter the incentives offered to the agent and may lead the principal to reject projects that otherwise seem favorable in terms of positive net present value. A simulation of early‐stage ideas, found through search on a complex landscape, shows that the firm can mitigate the negative effects of idea risk by encouraging breadth of search and high tolerance for failure.     

Contingent capital makes credit crunches less likely: but do banks want to have it?

We analyze whether the use of CoCo bonds as a financing instrument improves credit supply and therefore reduces the likelihood of a credit crunch. In our simple model, banks decide about granting an additional loan. In case of the bank violating the regulatory constraint, it needs to issue equity associated with adjustment costs. The contribution of the paper is threefold: First, this simple model explains credit crunches in the sense that the loan decision does not only depend on loan characteristics but also on the bank’s prospects. Second, CoCo bonds can always be designed such that all loans with non-negative net present value are granted, which prevents the danger of a credit crunch. Third, banks might not want to issue CoCo bonds even though these instruments help to improve credit supply. This problem primarily concerns banks with favorable prospects, thereby challenging the notion that CoCo bonds should be issued in good times as a protection during bad times.     

Getting What You Pay For—Strategic Process Improvement Compensation and Profitability Impact

Profit‐maximizing firm owners who incentivize their managers with a bonus for process improvement create an intentional misalignment of their own objective and management attention. From the viewpoint of a single firm, such a local misalignment can never be profitable, but in this study we take a wider strategic perspective by investigating cost‐reducing process improvements of two firms competing in a Cournot market. We find that the use of a process improvement bonus (by firm A) can be profitable, by affecting the competitor's decision making. Informed about the reward structure at firm A, which provides an incentive for process improvement and thereby for increased production at that firm, the manager of the competing firm (B) is inclined to produce less if the owner of firm B only rewards profit. This leads to a higher profit for firm A. However, we also show that firm B's best strategy is to also offer a process improvement bonus, even if that firm is a cost laggard (with higher costs for process improvement), and that this leads to reduced profit for both firms in many situations unless one of them is sufficiently superior in its ability to improve processes. These results are robust for uncertain process improvement outcomes, multidimensional process improvement decisions, and information asymmetry in the owner–manager relationship.     

管理者关系特性对海外子公司知识获取及公司绩效的影响研究

基于组织学习理论和社会资本理论,考察了管理者关系特性对海外子公司内外部网络知识获取和企业绩效的影响。研究结果显示,母子公司管理者之间的信任和沟通频率对获取母公司知识有正向影响,海外子公司管理者和本地重要企业管理者之间的信任对获取本地商务知识有正向影响,海外子公司管理者和本地政府主要负责人之间的私人关系对获取本地制度知识有显著影响。此外,本地制度知识在母公司知识对海外子公司绩效的影响中起正向调节作用,本地商务知识起负向调节作用。     

Trustworthiness as an economic asset

The evaluation of trust in economic decision making remains on the periphery of mainstream economic analysis and teaching. Yet business managers use trustworthiness in daily exchanges to create competitive advantages for their firms. An exploratory empirical test of Barney and Hansen’s three levels of trust (weak, semistrong, and strong) and Lewicki and Bunker’s portfolio of governance mechanisms revealed that strong-form trust exists in day-to-day business relationships along with other governance mechanisms. Identity-based transactions were more prevalent than were weak trust market exchanges in important economic transactions.     

SME manager development in virtual learning communities and the role of trust: A conceptual study

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are seen as vital to economic development. However, managers in these organizations generally have fewer opportunities for training and development than their counterparts in larger organizations. In this paper, the authors argue the need for development opportunities based around ‘virtual’ learning and develop a conceptual framework. The increasing penetration of broadband technologies offers the opportunity to create learning communities to engage SME managers with peers facing similar challenges. For a meaningful experience to be achieved in a virtual community, the role of the facilitator is established as important; however, an area largely overlooked in prior research into networked learning is that of the role of trust and how facilitators can generate it. In order to develop the framework for this paper, the authors review prior research into trust, learning, facilitation and virtual learning communities – the main aim being the identification of those aspects of the facilitator intervention that are most likely to engender trust and participation. Finally, areas for further research are identified.     

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used.     

MANAGERIAL HEDGING AND PORTFOLIO MONITORING

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his compensation using financial markets and shareholders can monitor the manager's portfolio in order to keep him from hedging, but monitoring is costly. We find that the optimal incentive compensation and governance provisions have the following properties: (i) the manager's portfolio is monitored only when the firm performs poorly, (ii) the manager's compensation is more sensitive to firm performance when the cost of monitoring is higher or when hedging markets are more developed, and (iii) conditional on the firm's performance, the manager's compensation is lower when his portfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring. Moreover, the model suggests that the optimal level of portfolio monitoring is higher for managers of firms whose performance canbehedged more easily, such as larger firms and firms in more developed financial markets. (JEL: G30, D82)     

The Efficacy of Action at a Distance as a Control Mechanism in the Construction Industry When a Trust Relationship Breaks Down: an Illustrative Case Study

A paper published by one of the authors (Woodward and Squires, 1996), described a situation where the accounting information system used by a geographically‐remote project manager to report progress on a project to his headquarters proved inadequate for that task. The inadequacy was particularly relevant in the reported case, in that the object project was one of considerable significance to the company, being the largest and most complex it had ever undertaken. While the earlier paper concentrated initially upon identifying the perceived shortcomings in the organization’s accounting information system, and subsequently upon delineating the proposal for a ‘workable’ solution thereto, the purpose of the present paper is rather to analyse the situation earlier reported, in the context of a perceived breakdown in the trust relationship existing between the project manager and his superior, the company’s managing director. The managing director trusted his subordinate, although it seems apparent retrospectively that the trusting relationship existing was abused. While the underpinning precept of trust is thus fundamental to the present analysis, it is additionally necessary to utilize as relevant concepts: the veracity of the company’s control mechanism (via the concept of action at a distance) to adequately report what was happening remote from headquarters; the assumption that the project manager, as agent, had the potential to abuse his position; and, finally, that the project manager’s professional affiliation was probably insufficiently strong to sustain self‐control based upon ‘clan’ considerations. It also emerges from the analysis that multiple, rather than single, trust relationships were at work.     

Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk‐taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two‐stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time‐varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long‐term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects.     

违约风险下的信贷决策模型与机制

研究了违约风险下的信贷决策模型与机制,通过以银行个体合理性和激励相容性作为约束条件,建立了在考虑违约风险和项目成功概率条件下的信贷决策模型,分别给出了基于抵质押贷款和信用贷款策略下的信贷决策机制,探讨了信贷配给机制与无配给机制的设计方法,给出了在信贷出现配给时银行发放信用贷款和有抵质押贷款的条件.最后运用实例详细分析并讨论了不同违约概率条件下企业项目成功概率对银行期望收益的影响,得到了银行相应的贷款临界值和在不同项目成功概率条件下银行最大可接受的违约概率.     

我国上市公司高管人员过度自信与投资决策的实证研究

基于行为公司金融视角,本文对我国上市公司高管人员过度自信的现实表现及其与企业投资决策的关系进行了理论分析和实证检验。研究表明:(1)在实施股权激励的上市公司中,四分之一左右的高管人员具有过度自信行为特征。(2)同适度自信行为相比,高管人员过度自信行为不仅与投资水平显著正相关,而且投资的现金流敏感性更高。(3)过度自信高管人员投资的现金流敏感性随股权融资数量的减少而上升。(4)在我国上市公司特有的股权安排和治理结构下,过度自信高管人员在公司投资决策中更有可能引发配置效率低下的过度投资行为。