SOVEREIGNS,UPSTREAM CAPITAL FLOWS,AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES

We construct measures of net private and public capital flows for a large cross‐section of developing countries considering both creditor and debtor side of the international debt transactions. Using these measures, we demonstrate that sovereign‐to‐sovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global imbalances. Specifically, we find that (i) international net private capital flows (inflows minus outflows of private capital) are positively correlated with countries' productivity growth, (ii) net sovereign debt flows (government borrowing minus reserves) are negatively correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by another sovereign, (iii) net public debt financed by private creditors is positively correlated with growth, (iv) public savings are strongly positively correlated with growth, whereas correlation between private savings and growth is flat and statistically insignificant. These empirical facts contradict the conventional wisdom and constitute a challenge for the existing theories on upstream capital flows and global imbalances.     

SOVEREIGNS VERSUS BANKS: CREDIT,CRISES, AND CONSEQUENCES

Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One interpretation speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policy. However, the two may interact in important and understudied ways. This paper examines the co‐evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries from 1870 to 2012. We find that in advanced economies financial crises are not preceded by public debt build‐ups nor are they more likely when public debt is high. However, history shows that high levels of public debt tend to exacerbate the effects of private sector deleveraging after financial crises. The economic costs of financial crises rise substantially if large private sector credit booms are unwound at times when the public sector has little capacity to pursue macroeconomic and financial stabilization.     

SOVEREIGN DEBT RELIEF AND ITS AFTERMATH

This paper studies sovereign debt relief in a long‐term perspective. We quantify the relief achieved through default and restructuring in two distinct samples: 1920–1939, focusing on the defaults on official (government to government) debt in advanced economies after World War I; and 1978–2010, focusing on emerging market debt crises with private external creditors. Debt relief was substantial in both eras, averaging 21% of GDP in the 1930s and 16% of GDP in recent decades. We then analyze the aftermath of debt relief and conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis around the synchronous war debt defaults of 1934 and the Baker and Brady initiatives of the 1980s/1990s. The economic landscape of debtor countries improves significantly after debt relief operations, but only if these involve debt write‐offs. Softer forms of debt relief, such as maturity extensions and interest rate reductions, are not generally followed by higher economic growth or improved credit ratings. (JEL: E6, F3, N0, H6)     

LACK OF COMMITMENT AND THE LEVEL OF DEBT

The tendency of countries to accumulate public debt has been rationalized in models of political disagreement and lack of commitment. We analyze in a benchmark model how the evolution of public debt is affected by lack of commitment per se. While commitment introduces indeterminacy in the level of debt, lack of commitment creates incentives for debt to converge to specific levels. One of the levels that debt often converges to implies no debt accumulation at all. In a simple example we prove analytically that debt converges to zero, and we analyze numerically more complex models. We also show in an imperfect credibility setting that a small deviation from full‐commitment is enough to obtain these results.     

THE EURO AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT FLOWS

Greater financial integration between core and peripheral European Monetary Union (EMU) members not only had an effect on both sets of countries but also spilled over beyond the euro area. Lower interest rates allowed peripheral countries to run bigger deficits, which inflated their economies by allowing credit booms. Core EMU countries took on extra foreign leverage to expose themselves to the peripherals. We present a stylized model that illustrates possible mechanisms for these developments. We then analyze the geography of international debt flows using multiple data sources and provide evidence that after the euro's introduction, core EMU countries increased their borrowing from outside of the EMU and their lending to the EMU periphery. Moreover, we present evidence that large core EMU banks' lending to periphery borrowers was linked to their borrowing from outside of the euro area.     

DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT

Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk‐averse debt and nondebtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bond holders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These results are robust to adding foreign investors, redistributive taxes, or a second asset.     

RELATIVE FACTOR ENDOWMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO CHOICE

We present a model of international portfolio choice based on cross‐country differences in relative factor abundance. Countries have varying degrees of similarity in their factor endowment ratios, and are subject to aggregate productivity shocks. Risk‐averse consumers can insure against these shocks by investing their wealth at home and abroad. In a many‐good setup, the change in factor prices after a positive shock in a particular country provides insurance to countries that have dissimilar factor endowment ratios, but is bad news for countries with similar factor endowment ratios, since their incomes will worsen. Therefore countries with similar relative factor endowments have a stronger incentive to invest in one another for insurance purposes than countries with dissimilar endowments. The importance of this effect depends on the size of countries. Empirical evidence linking bilateral international equity investment positions to a proxy for relative factor endowments supports our theory: the similarity of host and source countries in their relative capital–labor ratios has a positive effect on the source country’s investment position in the host country. The effect of similarity is enhanced by the size of host countries.     

An agency approach to debt maturity of unlisted and listed firms in the European setting

This study analyses the debt maturity of two groups of companies – unlisted and listed – throughout the period 2005–2013. The research takes an agency costs approach to explore the determinants of firms' debt maturity structure for a set of five countries, chosen for being representative of the European Union (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). Agency costs, as well as institutional and macroeconomic factors, turn out to be decisive in explaining firms’ financial policies regarding debt maturity, during the economic crisis that started in 2007–2008. Our findings indicate that contracting costs had a greater impact on unlisted firms during the post-crisis subperiod than on their listed counterparts. Additionally, the economic effect of this has been estimated, corroborating the overall findings of the study.     

VOLATILITY,LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY,AND THE PATTERN OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

This paper studies the link between volatility, labor market flexibility, and international trade. International differences in labor market regulations affect how firms can adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. These institutional differences interact with sector specific differences in volatility (the variance of the firm‐specific shocks in a sector) to generate a new source of comparative advantage. Other things equal, countries with more flexible labor markets specialize in sectors with higher volatility. Empirical evidence for a large sample of countries strongly supports this theory: the exports of countries with more flexible labor markets are biased towards high‐volatility sectors. We show how differences in labor market institutions can be parsimoniously integrated into the workhorse model of Ricardian comparative advantage of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977, American Economic Review, 67, 823–839). We also show how our model can be extended to multiple factors of production.     

基于欧洲主权债务危机背景下的金融传染分析

运用向量自回归方法(VAR)和时变多元GARCH模型(DCC-MGARCH),检验欧洲主权债务危机期间的金融传染效应。研究市场包括希腊、西班牙、爱尔兰、英国、法国、德国、美国、日本以及中国的股票市场。实证结果表明,欧洲债务危机期间各国金融市场间相关性显著上升,市场间影响程度更大、影响时间更长,存在金融传染效应;希腊是此次危机的传染源,欧洲其他国家之间的传染效应不明显;蔓延期中国股票市场也与欧洲市场存在联动性,但影响较为滞后。此外,研究发现直至2009年4月,美国次债危机的影响才基本消退。分析表明历年巨额的财政支出和较差的经济自愈能力是欧洲主权债务危机发生的主要原因。     

国际金融危机潜在传染源的识别及其传染力分析

亚洲金融危机和希腊债务危机表明中小国家也可以引发严重危机，这种现象不容忽视。基于复杂网络理论，使用2007年国际贸易数据构建了包含148个国家和地区的全球宏观经济网络；利用S.I.R模型模拟了各国在发生不同等级的金融危机时所影响到的国家数量和经济总量，发现不同国家传染力的差异存在一定的区域特征，许多经济总量不大的国家也具有引发严重危机的潜力；使用动态聚类法对各国的传染力进行分类，处于类别1至类别4的国家为国际金融危机潜在传染源；通过计算传染力与GDP、进口和网络拓扑结构指标的Spearman相关系数发现，GDP、进口较大以及聚类系数小的国家在低危机等级时就表现出一定的负面溢出；而贸易伙伴较多以及处于网络中心位置的国家在较高的危机等级下具备引发严重危机的潜力；使用2009年的数据进行模拟，本文的主要结论依然稳健。     

Doing More with Less? Employee Reactions to Psychological Contract Breach via Target Similarity or Spillover during Public Sector Organizational Change

Many countries are facing the twin pressures of austerity and recession following the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. This paper uses the UK public sector and a major national announcement of budget cuts signalling extensive organizational cutbacks as its setting. We examine (a) whether organizational changes following the national announcement affect public sector employees' psychological contract breach, (b) whether employee reactions to psychological contract breach are consistent with the target similarity model and vary across foci, namely the organization, co‐workers and public service users, and (c) whether some of these relationships are moderated by job insecurity or public sector commitment. We collected longitudinal survey data before and after the announcement of budget cuts, using a sample of 340 employees from a range of public organizations and locations. Results largely confirm the hypotheses. Increases in organizational change predicted psychological contract breach, which in turn predicted decreases in contributions towards the organization; however, contributions towards co‐workers and public service users were unaffected, which can be explained with a target similarity, rather than a spillover, model. Furthermore, the relationship between breach and employee behaviours directed toward the public was moderated by job insecurity and public sector commitment.     

Rating the Raters: Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Firms

The major credit rating agencies contributed substantially to the sub‐prime mortgage crisis by giving their highest rating (AAA) to most of the collateralized debt obligations (CDO) securities that were backed by these sub‐prime mortgages. Because the rating agencies are compensated by the issuers whose CDO bonds they rate, this relationship creates a prima facie conflict of interest, one that is compounded when the rating agency also consults for the issuers on designing the CDOs. While Congress and the Securities Exchange Commission investigate possible wrongdoing, various reforms have been proposed. This article analyzes these conflicts of interest and the cognate corporate governance issues. It then categorizes and critiques several of the reform proposals—which range in severity from requiring more disclosure to the suspension of the rating agency's license.     

Water Price Regulation: A Review of Portuguese Tariff Recommendations

The context of severe economic crisis and financial constraints has reinforced existing pressures on services considered to be of community interest by public authorities and therefore subject to specific public service obligations. This is the case of the water industry, with increased pressure for full cost recovery and on the use of prices as a tool for the management of water resources in EU countries. The Portuguese situation confirms these trends and the expected increases in water tariffs raise special concerns. In these volatile times it is particularly relevant to analyze the management and regulatory work of the Portuguese Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority, which recently acquired extended powers in pricing regulation. Findings reveal a complexity of tariff schemes in Portuguese municipalities, with tariff recommendations being a clear commitment to selected economic theory proposals and the harmonization of price schemes in the heterogeneous water utilities national context.     

Labour Market Policies in Times of Crisis: A Reaction Function Approach for the Period 1985–2010

This article examines the reaction function of labour market expenditure to unemployment in 24 OECD countries, over the period 1985–2010, using the OECD panel data. The level of public debt is also introduced as a factor that is likely to influence these expenditures. Using a fixed‐effect model with interaction terms, this research focuses on two periods of crisis (1992–93 and 2007–09). The results confirm the counter‐cyclical variation of labour market policy expenditures. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of labour market expenditure to the economic cycle has in general decreased and the policy mix has changed. This could result from the important labour market reforms undertaken in the last 20 years.     

INSTITUTION‐INDUCED PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES AND PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS

This paper studies theoretically how the cross‐country differences in the institutional quality (IQ) of domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when such IQ differences also cause productivity differences across countries. IQ affects productivity by changing productivity–agency‐cost trade‐offs across heterogeneous investment projects. Such institution‐induced productivity differences are shown to have effects on the investment and capital flows that are opposite of exogenous productivity differences. This implies that the overall effect of IQ could generate U‐shaped responses of the investment and capital flows. Among other things, this means that capital could flow from middle‐income countries to both low‐income and high‐income countries, and that, starting from a very low IQ, a country could experience both a growth and a current account surplus after a successful institutional reform. More generally, the results here provide some cautions when interpreting the empirical evidence on the role of productivity differences and institutional differences on capital flows. It also calls into question the validity of treating the degree of financial frictions as a proxy for the quality of financial institutions, as commonly done in the literature.     

Tying the Acquirer's Human Resource Management Quality to Cross‐Border Acquisition Divestment Probability: Curvilinear Connection with Slacklining

Cross‐border acquisitions are growing in volume and global economic importance, yet a considerable number end in failure. Many of these failures may be linked to people management‐related issues. We extend this stream of research by investigating the impact of the acquirer's aggregate human resource management (HRM) quality on cross‐border acquisition divestment. Our empirical analysis uses a panel database of 4128 cross‐border acquisition/year observations and an event history design. The findings confirm a curvilinear relationship and suggest that acquisition failures are not merely associated with poor HRM quality, but also with very high levels of HRM quality, that is, with both extremes. Moreover, our results show that financial slack has a significant moderating effect on the curvilinear relationship between HRM quality and the likelihood of acquisition divestment. Overall, our study reveals boundary conditions for the widely demonstrated positive relationship between HRM quality and organizational performance in an acquisition context.     

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS: PREEMPTIVE OR POST‐DEFAULT

Sovereign debt restructurings can be implemented preemptively—prior to a payment default. We code a comprehensive new data set and find that preemptive restructurings (i) are frequent (38% of all deals 1978–2010), (ii) have lower haircuts, (iii) are quicker to negotiate, and (iv) see lower output losses. To rationalize these stylized facts, we build a quantitative sovereign debt model that incorporates preemptive and post‐default renegotiations. The model improves the fit with the data and explains the sovereign's optimal choice: preemptive restructurings occur when default risk is high ex ante, while defaults occur after unexpected bad shocks. Empirical evidence supports these predictions.     

A GLOBAL VIEW OF CROSS‐BORDER MIGRATION

This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of observed levels of migration using a quantitative multi‐sector model of the world economy calibrated to aggregate and firm‐level data. Our framework features cross‐country labor productivity differences, international trade, remittances, and a heterogeneous workforce. We compare welfare under the observed levels of migration to a no‐migration counterfactual. In the long run, natives in countries that received a lot of migration—such as Canada or Australia—are better off due to greater product variety available in consumption and as intermediate inputs. In the short run, the impact of migration on average welfare in these countries is close to zero, while the skilled and unskilled natives tend to experience welfare changes of opposite signs. The remaining natives in countries with large emigration flows—such as Jamaica or El Salvador—are also better off due to migration, but for a different reason: remittances. The welfare impact of observed levels of migration is substantial, at about 5% to 10% for the main receiving countries and about 10% in countries with large incoming remittances.     

THE POLITICAL COLOR OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that yields testable implications about the fiscal policy run by governments of different political color. Successive generations of voters choose taxation, expenditure, and government debt through repeated elections. Voters are heterogeneous by age and by the intensity of their preferences for public good provision. The political equilibrium switches stochastically between left‐ (pro‐public goods) and right‐leaning (pro‐private consumption) governments. A shift to the left (right) is associated with a fall (increase) in government debt, an increase (fall) in taxation, and an increase (fall) in government expenditures. However, left‐leaning governments engage in more debt accumulation during recessions. These predictions are shown to be consistent with the time‐series evidence for the United States in the postwar period, and also with the evidence for a panel of OECD countries. (JEL: D72, E62, H41, H62, H63)