Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

Product Positioning and Pricing Under Production Cost Considerations*

A framework in a competitive environment is proposed that incorporates production cost and economies of scale in the problem of positioning a product for a market segment. The model facilitates the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices and product positions. As such, firms can simultaneously choose prices and product positions for the segment. This result improves the traditional theory on equilibria points in prices and product positions where firms choose their product positions first and then set their prices. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates the effects of changes in the unit savings derived from economies of scale or the cost of furnishing a product with its attributes by one firm on the product positions, prices, and profits of all competing firms. More important, the paper examines the effect on prices and profits of competing firms when one of the firms repositions its product closer to the segment's ideal point. It is shown that under certain conditions, the profit of a firm may actually decrease as it redesigns its product closer to the segment's ideal point. These conditions assist management to identify the product design beyond which enhancements of the product would lead to lower profits because of increasing production costs. It is also shown that the price of this firm increases. Past research supports the idea that positioning a brand closer to the ideal point, given fixed product positions of competing firms, would lead to greater buyer preferences and eventually higher profits. The price and profits of the competing firm may increase or decrease. Conditions are derived under which a movement towards the segment's ideal point by one firm would lead to higher profits by the competing firm.     

供应不确定条件下多周期库存博弈

本文研究供应不确定条件下多周期二人库存博弈问题，证明了均衡库存策略的存在性，并刻画了均衡策略的特征，探讨了供应不确定和产品替代率对零售商库存决策的影响。研究结果表明：在供应不确定条件下，多周期库存博弈问题存在多重Nash均衡库存策略。当需求分布函数满足特定条件时，博弈存在唯一纳什均衡解。此外，本文证明均衡订货策略是产品替代率的增函数，供应可靠性高的商家更具有优势且收益更大。数值实验说明，供应不确定会直接影响均衡订货量。商家的期望收益和均衡订货量是自己供应可靠性的增函数，是对手可靠性的减函数，是产品替代率的增函数。     

厂商动态竞争性差别定价和竞争优势实现——基于消费者寻求多样化购买行为的分析

随着信息技术的发展,厂商可以根据消费者的历史购买信息实施差别定价.该文主要研究相互竞争的厂商基于消费者的购买历史实行差别定价的本质特征和形成机制,以及实施这种定价策略能否在竞争中获取竞争优势.分析结果显示,在竞争性差别定价均衡中,消费者寻求多样化购买是厂商实施差别定价的内在原因,厂商在第2期通过给予价格优惠吸引消费者重复购买,对忠诚的消费者给予奖励,并在第1期弱化竞争,导致两期竞争存在"默契合谋",消费者寻求多样化购买成为竞争厂商利润的源泉;如果厂商能够比竞争对手率先实施差别定价的营销策略,那么就能在竞争中获取优势.另外,清晰地刻画了竞争性差别定价均衡存在且唯一的充分条件.该文的研究结果可以很好地解释现实经济中许多厂商的定价竞争策略行为,对于厂商的产品营销战略具有重要的指导意义.     

考虑消费者预期后悔的价格歧视策略研究

基于行为的价格歧视（BPD）受到越来越多的关注，企业为了更好地服务于各细分市场，需要更细致的考虑消费者事前估值的不确定性，以及因此出现的消费者预期后悔。本文在双寡头垄断市场中建立模型，探讨消费者预期后悔对企业动态价格竞争和利润的影响。研究结果表明，消费者预期后悔会对自身购买决策产生显著影响；当高值实现概率相对较低，高低值差异大且切换后悔的厌恶较小或者重复后悔的厌恶较大时，企业奖励重复购买的客户，否则奖励切换者；预期后悔对企业的利润既可以有正面的影响也可以有负面的影响。     

How Costs and Heterogeneous Consumer Price Sensitivity Interact with Add‐On Pricing

Firms often cite cost savings as a reason why they charge separately for add‐ons. Firms also often face situations where consumers' price sensitivity is correlated with their valuation of add‐ons. While cost savings may directly translate into profit gains in some scenarios, this study examines the strategic implications of add‐on pricing and is the first to suggest that cost savings from add‐on pricing may in fact result in profit loss for firms when consumers are heterogeneous in price sensitivity. This is because add‐on pricing can trigger a revenue loss that exceeds any cost savings, thus leading to a negative net profit change for competing firms. Even if firms have the capability to pre‐commit to not adopting add‐on pricing, we show that competing firms can be locked in a prisoner's dilemma where all choose to adopt add‐on pricing and lose profits (as compared to none adopting add‐on pricing). We further show the possibility that the greater the cost of providing the add‐on (and the greater the cost savings generated from add‐on pricing), the worse this profit loss gets.     

A Model of Consumer Inertia with Applications to Dynamic Pricing

This paper introduces a decision model of consumer inertia. Consumers exhibit inertia when they have an inherent bias to delay purchases. Inertia may induce consumers to wait even when it is optimal to buy immediately. We embed our decision model within a dynamic pricing context. There is a firm that sells a fixed capacity over two time periods to an uncertain number of both rational and inertial consumers. We find that consumer inertia has both positive and negative effects on profits: it decreases demand (in period one) but intensifies competition among consumers for the product (in period two). We show that our model of inertia is consistent with well‐established behavioral regularities, such as loss aversion and probability weighting in the sense of prospect theory, and hyperbolic time preferences. We offer practical recommendations for firms to influence the level of consumer inertia. These include offering returns policies (to mitigate potential consumer losses), providing decision aids (to avoid perception errors), and offering flexible payment options (to lower transaction costs).     

Strategic Product/Service Innovations of an Online Firm

We study the incentives that drive an online firm to make various types of innovations in a competitive environment. We develop and use a simplified price competition model between two retailers, one online and one offline. A given fraction of consumers, called the Internet penetration, comparison shop online, independent of their customer type, thereby creating two markets for the offline retailer, a captive market and a competitive market. The online product has the steeper of the two linear utility functions, which means that the customers who buy online in our model are high end. We focus on the competitive region in which both retailers are (strictly) profitable in the competitive market and consider innovations that increase high‐end appeal, low‐end appeal, and/or reduce unit cost. We find that the online firm has a strong incentive to invest in innovations that either reduce unit cost and/or, equivalently, increase the appeal to all consumers equally. Investments of this type are strategic complements: implementing one increases the value of another, so the value of two innovations of this type is more than the sum of the values of each individually. We identify a relative strength measure of the online firm such that, as its high‐end appeal increases and/or its unit cost decreases, we say that the online firm is stronger. This strength measure facilitates drawing an explicit dividing line between strong and weak online firms. If Internet penetration increases, the online firm's profits increase if and only if it is strong. If penetration increases over time, it is possible for a strong firm to turn weak and see its profits decrease and possibly disappear completely. A strong online firm has more opportunity to profit from low‐end innovations than does a weak one, while the opposite is true for high‐end innovations. Interestingly, some innovations may actually decrease the online firm's profits. We discuss the implications of our results for existing and future online innovations.     

Optimal Digital Rights Management with Uncertain Piracy

Many firms that sell digital copies of copyrighted materials online face a common dilemma: the use of digital rights management (DRM) to impede pirates can impose restrictions on legitimate use. We introduce a two‐period model in which the use of DRM in the first period affects the probability that a consumer finds a pirated copy in the second period; the threat of legal action reduces consumers’ consumption of pirated copies; and firms choose whether to sell, and at what prices, either strongly or weakly DRM‐protected products, or both. Furthermore, we incorporate the role of uncertainty concerning future levels of piracy. Using a two‐period model with uncertainty, we investigate a firm's optimal DRM strategies and present the optimal pricing strategy as well as product launch strategy under different market conditions. We find that one important characteristic of the optimal strategy is that it is optimal to maintain the same product line configuration strategy for both periods. We also characterize the conditions under which each strategy is optimal.     

Optimal Retail Return Policies with Wardrobing

Many retailers offer refunds to consumers who, after a trial period, return a product that they find does not fit their needs. Some consumers are willing to use this return option opportunistically for short‐term consumption rather than its intended purpose of resolving fit uncertainty. Such behavior has been termed “wardrobing.” Restocking fees (partial refunds) can be used to combat wardrobing. However, there is a trade‐off involved, since partial refunds will be viewed negatively by consumers who return an item due to a true lack of fit. In this study, we consider how the extent of wardrobing (how many consumers consider such behavior) and the benefit of wardrobing (how much value can be extracted during the trial) impact firm pricing decisions and profits in this retail context. Our results imply that an increase in the extent of wardrobing is most detrimental to profits when the current extent of wardrobing is low. On the contrary, if the extent of wardrobing is already very high, and the benefit of wardrobing to consumers is also high, the retailer can set prices and refunds such that additional wardrobing actually increases firm profits. In a model extension, we show how a retailer can effectively screen wardrobers from ordinary consumers by offering a menu of price/refund pairs, and that such an approach can lead to increased profits if the extent of wardrobing is sufficiently high. Overall, our findings provide new insights into how retailers can set prices and refund policies to effectively manage opportunistic behavior by consumers.     

The Changing Face of Distribution Channels: Partial Forward Integration and Strategic Investments

Recent years have seen a drastic transformation in the organization of wholesale and retail markets. Where once clear distinctions between wholesale suppliers and retail competitors existed, now an era of blurring boundaries has emerged. This transformation has been marked by the introduction of online channels for suppliers to provide products directly to consumers while, at the same time, traditional retailers too persist. Thus, retailers are both wholesale customers and retail competitors of many manufacturers. The consequences of the rapid emergence of instances of such partial forward integration by suppliers are not yet fully known. To this end, we study how partial forward integration can affect competing firms' strategic investments. We find that integration shifts the environment from being one in which firms invest to undercut retail rivals to one in which firms invest more in boosting demand, even that of their competitors. A case in point is the tendency for a manufacturer to invest broadly in brand promotion (benefiting both itself and its retail competitor), rather than heavy promotion of its own sales channel. The shift in the nature of strategic investments arising from partial forward integration implies that such integration can benefit firms and consumers alike, even the firm which finds itself reliant on a competitor for supplies.     

Trade-offs in Online Purchase Decisions:: Two Empirical Studies in Europe

The Internet offers firms a new way to market their products and services and to interact with their end-consumers. While many firms have developed websites, very little is known about the trade-offs consumers are willing to make when making online purchases. With millions of websites competing for attention, online firms need to know in what way consumers make purchase decisions online. Consumers mainly evaluate websites on the basis of choice and convenience. In this paper, we present the results of two European studies that examine what consumers actually value in an online environment. In study 1, we assess choice-related trade-offs in terms of number of product categories, variety of products within a given category and product-related information. Conjoint analysis revealed that product-related information represents an important decision-making variable. In study 2, we assess convenience-related trade-offs in terms of logistics, fulfilment and security. Conjoint analysis revealed that fulfilment is the most important variable related to online handling. Finally, our study clearly indicates that firms have to distinguish different consumer segments on the basis of their preferences. This knowledge enables online firms to use their resources more effectively.     

水平差异产品的内生定价策略选择

本文分析了一个存在定价策略选择下的三阶段Hotelling双头垄断模型,其中厂商可以选择采用单一定价策略或者歧视定价策略。模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡表明厂商或者同时采用单一定价策略,或者同时采用歧视一价策略。当歧视定价的边际成本相对单一定价的边际成本不太高,或者消费乾注重产品特性差异时,厂商会同时选择歧视定价策略,尽管单一定价下厂商的利润要明显高于歧视定价下的利润;当歧视定价的边际成本相对较高或者消费者不太注重产品特性差异时,单一定价将成为厂商的最优选择。最后本文从社会最优的角度分析比较了两种这价策略下的社会净福利水平。     

基于混合定向方式的移动定向广告投放策略研究

以移动广告为研究背景,研究地理定向和消费者产品偏好定向相结合的混合定向方式下企业的定向广告投放策略,同时通过对比企业投放定向广告与大众广告,研究企业的广告策略选择问题。研究发现,企业运用定向广告策略应针对不同的消费者群体提供差异化较大的营销策略:对属于企业近距离范围且偏好企业产品的优势市场,企业应加大广告投放力度并实行高价;为了争取部分远端劣势市场的收益,企业应向其投放一定力度的广告并实行低价;对属于双方的竞争市场,企业应选择中等程度的广告和价格。同时,通过与企业投放大众广告相比较,发现竞争企业使用定向广告策略反而不如使用大众广告策略。     

Supply Chain Coordination in a Market with Customer Service Competition

We consider a market with two competing supply chains, each consisting of one wholesaler and one retailer. We assume that the business environment forces supply chains to charge similar prices and to compete strictly on the basis of customer service. We model customer service competition using game‐theoretical concepts. We consider three competition scenarios between the supply chains. In the uncoordinated scenario, individual members of both supply chains maximize their own profits by individually selecting their service and inventory policies. In the coordinated scenario, wholesalers and retailers of each supply chain coordinate their service and inventory policy decisions to maximize supply chain profits. In the hybrid scenario, competition is between one coordinated and one uncoordinated supply chain. We discuss the derivation of the equilibrium service strategies, resulting inventory policies, and profits for each scenario, and compare the equilibria in a numerical study. We find that coordination is a dominant strategy for both supply chains, but as in the prisoner's dilemma, both supply chains are often worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario. The consumers are the only guaranteed beneficiaries of coordination.     

竞争中的参考价格效应及承诺

消费者的社会感知会影响其对产品和品牌的评价。当消费者进行购买选择时，经常会受到参考价格效应的影响。而广告和价格不仅是企业经常要考虑的重要决策，还会对参考价格产生重要影响。为此，一个值得研究的的问题是：在考虑参考价格效应的情况下，企业该怎样确定其动态广告和价格策略？
为了研究该问题，本文构建了一个广告和价格的动态模型，来研究一个双寡头市场环境下两个寡头企业的价格和广告决策，并以此分析参考价格效应的作用。具体而言，我们假定企业可以采用广告承诺和价格承诺中的一种，其中前者承诺其在一段时间内的广告投入量恒定不变，而后者确保价格不变。两种策略不仅会影响消费者的购买决策，也会影响竞争对手的选择。在上述假定下，我们探讨了两个寡头企业在都采用广告承诺、都采用价格承诺及一个企业采用广告承诺而另一个企业采用价格承诺等三种不同情形下的最优广告和价格决策，并以此分析了三种情形下参考价格效应对最优的广告投入及定价策略的影响。最后，通过数值分析，探讨了不同情形下企业的最优策略选择。     

Cost‐Reducing Innovation and the Role of Patent Intermediaries in Increasing Market Efficiency

Patent intermediaries have gained importance as non‐practicing entities in the innovation domain, buying innovations from an external provider and then licensing them to practicing firms. In this study, we analyze the competition between two identical incumbent firms and a patent intermediary for the acquisition and licensing of a cost‐reducing innovation developed by an external innovator. We show that the outcome of the IP acquisition and licensing game critically depends on the degree of the cost‐reducing innovation. Patent intermediaries win IP rights in patent markets if the innovation is incremental. They also win the IP rights when the innovation is moderate or radical, providing they have significant efficiency advantages over incumbent firms and the uncertainty about the degree of innovation is low. We also show that patent intermediaries serve to make markets more efficient. When the innovation is incremental or moderate, they help ensure a lower cost of production and a lower price for customers, and when the innovation is radical, they help increase the profits of the incumbent firms.     

消费者寻求多样化与厂商折扣定价竞争

在很多市场环境中，消费者喜欢尝试不同产品的特性，重复消费同一商品会产生滞留成本。本文通过构建两期动态博弈模型，研究了滞留成本对企业折扣券定价行为的影响，并与其他定价策略的市场绩效进行了比较。本文研究结果表明：（1）企业会通过折扣券奖励忠诚的消费者，即企业会对重复购买自己产品的消费者给予价格优惠，而对新消费者制定高价格；（2）在均衡中，随着滞留成本的提升，消费者剩余和社会总福利降低，企业利润上升；（3）与其他定价机制相比较，折扣券定价策略下的社会总福利较低，政策制定者应当限制此类策略的应用。     

Browse‐and‐Switch: Retail‐Online Competition under Value Uncertainty

Although online shopping is becoming popular, consumers who are unsure about whether to buy a product may find it advantageous to visit a brick‐and‐mortar retail store to first examine the product before purchasing it. But, after browsing at the store, consumers have the option of switching to an e‐tailer to purchase the item at a cheaper price rather than buying at the store. Recent business press refers to this browse‐and‐switch behavior as “showrooming,” and attributes to it the declining profits of brick‐and‐mortar retailers. To study the effect of the browse‐and‐switch option on retail and online pricing strategies and profits, we analyze a stylized economic model that incorporates uncertainty in consumers' valuation of the product, captures the heterogeneity among consumers in their inclination to purchase online, and permits product returns. We consider various equilibrium scenarios for different combinations of consumer shopping behaviors, characterize the parameter ranges for each scenario, and demonstrate that browse‐and‐switch behavior can indeed occur under equilibrium. Our analysis further shows that the option for consumers to browse‐and‐switch intensifies competition, reducing the profits for both firms.     

顾客体验驱动的服务品牌建设

创建强势服务品牌是服务企业实现差别化竞争优势的重要手段。本文在对现有研究成果进行历史性回顾的基础上,从服务的过程属性出发,阐述了服务企业品牌建设的焦点应该是顾客体验的观点,然后探讨了通过塑造顾客体验来创建服务品牌的策略。