MLP:风险投资基金的有效治理结构

近年来 ,在美国经济中持续的企业重组和组织创新过程中产生了一种新的企业组织形式———业主有限合伙制（ＭａｓｔｅｒＬｉｍｉｔ ｅｄＰａｒｔｎｅｒｓｈｉｐ，ＭＬＰ） ,这是一种介于公司制企业和合伙制企业之间的一种企业组织形式 ,既具有公司制企业的权益流动性和有限责任的特征 ,又具有合伙企业的避免双重纳税优势。其通常由一名总合伙人（ＧｅｎｅｒａｌＰａｒｔｎｅｒ）和数名有限合伙人（ＬｉｍｉｔｅｄＰａｒｔｎｅｒ）出资组成 ,其中总合伙人出资占总出资额的比重很小 ,但对ＭＬＰ企业债务承担无限责任 ,有限合伙人出资占总出资…     

风险控制能力差异下的薪酬契约研究

道德风险和逆向选择问题是委托代理理论的研究重点，也是企业薪酬机制设计的核心。本文在道德风险和逆向选择同时存在的框架下，创新性地将利润风控能力作为能力差异的体现引入异质经理人，求解出单一契约和两种契约情况下薪酬契约的显式最优解，并对结果进行了数值模拟验证。本文与单一契约相比，两种契约情况下股东的期望收益较高，对低能力经理的激励降低，对高能力经理的激励上升，但高能力经理的效用由于受到契约的扭曲反而会下降。股东还可针对高能力经理设计单一契约，但当低能力经理所占的比例足够高时，设计两种契约将成为股东的最优选择。本文的研究结果可为私募基金等重视经理风控能力的行业提供薪酬契约设计方面的参考。     

不同权力结构下竞争性供应链合作广告策略研究

鉴于现有文献广泛研究的单边参与策略不能协调合作广告冲突问题，本文以具有替代性的同质产品的竞争性供应链为研究对象，探讨生产商Stackelberg(MS)、零售商Stackelberg(RS)和垂直Nash(VN)博弈结构下成本共享比例内生和外生对合作广告协调的影响。同时，基于平等讨价还价模型探讨不同博弈结构下成本共享比例内生对合作广告协调的影响。研究表明：当市场竞争不激烈时，外生成本共享比例在三种博弈结构下都可以协调整个供应链，而内生成本共享比例只有在平等讨价还价模型中才能协调。研究结论对涉及成本共享契约的合作广告决策具有指导意义。     

基于Rubinstein讨价还价的激励契约研究

传统的激励契约理论通过假设委托人提供一个"要么接受,要么走人"的契约给代理人,从而搁置了委托人与代理人就契约进行的讨价还价问题.这种假设下,委托人能获得最大收入,但代理人只能获得保留收入.本文假设代理人可以与委托人就激励契约进行Rubinstein讨价还价,从而得到一份均衡的契约.在均衡契约中,代理人的收益往往会高于传统契约.     

对我国实行经理股权激励的理性思考

一、经理股权激励的必要性与意义在现实生活中，由于企业经营的复杂性、不确定性和交易人的有限理性，股东与经理所订立的契约总是一个不完全契约，即契约总会有漏洞，有空子可钻。在信息不对称的情况下，股东无法全面了解经理的行动，而且经理还可以利用其信息优势来逃避监督，所以试图对经理的任何一项决策都进行有效的监督在实践中是不可能的。这样，就给决策留下了很大的自由空间。另一方面，股东和经理所追求的利益目标也往往不一致，股东希望实现企业市场价值的最大化，从而获得更多的投资回报和剩余收入，而经理所追求的是自身人力资…     

相对业绩与投资组合思想在期权激励契约设计中的应用

传统股票期权激励契约以股票价格来度量经理人的业绩,但股票价格实际上受到经理人不可控因素(系统风险)的影响,从而导致用股票价格来衡量经理人业绩时会出现反向激励现象,错误惩罚有能力的经理人或慷慨奖励无能的经理人。针对传统股票期权激励契约的缺陷,一些学者把期权激励契约的执行价格和一些指数相联系起来,消除了部分市场水平噪音对期权激励契约的影响。但这种绝对指数股票期权也没有改变指数期权激励契约的结构性缺陷,即不能完全消除市场和行业噪音对期权激励契约的影响。因此,本文借鉴相对业绩和投资组合思想,重新对股票期权的执行价格进行设计,即改变期权到期时权益结构或把执行价格设计成基准绩效投资组合形式,从而达到完全消除市场和行业噪音对期权激励契约的影响,提高期权报酬契约的绩效。     

业绩的隐性激励与经理报酬契约的改进

本文认为经营业绩对经理有隐性激励作用是完全有可能的,将业绩的隐性激励作用引入经理的效用函数后建立了对经理的最优报酬激励模型,并通过对模型进行求解得到改进的最优报酬契约。通过分析给出了主要结论。     

不公平厌恶偏好、股权结构与管理层薪酬激励效果--一个实验分析

传统经济学理论建立在自利的人性假设之上,但事实上在许多情形下,公平意识会影响人的行为。以薪酬激励合约为中介,构建不同产权基础的公司与不同经理人员特质的内生配置模型,把不公平厌恶偏好的异质性纳入到配置模型中,以310位企业经理人员作为实验对象,通过一组独裁者博弈实验和两组策略博弈实验共9014次分配决策,检验被试几种主要类型的社会偏好,从中甄别出经理人员不公平厌恶偏好的相对强度,结合调查问卷的数据证实经理人员不公平厌恶偏好、努力水平、公司股权结构和公司绩效之间由薪酬激励契约联结起来的内生配置关系。研究结果表明,具有不同公平性偏好的行为人对于等额的薪酬不公平的反应有所不同,从而影响合约的履行效果,控制权收益对薪酬的浮动部分具有替代效应,产生反向的激励效应,替代程度越大,反向激励效果越大。     

基于心理契约的基金经理激励机制分类设计

已有的基金经理激励机制研究多假定激励对象的心理和需求是同质的,忽视了对基金经理异质性特征的分析。这与实际的经济活动并不相符合。本文通过建立数学模型,将心理契约理论引入基金经理激励问题研究。结果表明,在信息对称条件下,即基金经理的不同心理需求能够被辨别时,应依据其心理契约类型,分类设计激励机制;在信息非对称条件下,即基金经理的不同心理需求无法被辨别时,应依据基金经理特征,如风险厌恶程度、工作成本、投资能力,及其所管理基金的风险大小和外部市场环境的变化方向,分类设计激励机制。并且,在多代理人环境下,基金经理间的合作程度也将对激励机制设计产生影响。本研究不仅是对已有基金经理激励机制研究的拓展与完善,使之更接近现实,也从心理契约视角为解决基金经理激励问题提供了新思路。     

基金管理费激励契约对基金经理努力程度与风险选择的影响

引入二次效用函数并结合资本资产定价模型(CAPM),分析基金管理费这一线性激励契约对基金经理的激励效应.研究发现这种线性激励契约导致基金经理付出的努力水平低于投资者所期望的努力水平,当基金经理的风险厌恶程度小于投资者的风险厌恶程度时,基金经理选择的风险水平要高于投资者所期望的风险水平.为了有效地缓解基金管理中的代理问题,需要建立基于剩余索取权与风险分担相匹配的基金管理费激励方式.     

MORAL HAZARD AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DYNAMICS

We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in the realized profit of the firm. All message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria (and no third parties) are considered. Within this class of contracts/equilibria, and regardless of who has the renegotiating bargaining power, debt and convertible debt maximize the entrepreneur's incentives to exert effort. These contracts are optimal if the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in renegotiation. If the investor has the bargaining power, the same is true unless debt induces excessive effort. In the latter case, a nondebt simple contract achieves efficiency—the noncontractibility of effort does not lower welfare. Thus, when the noncontractibility of effort matters, our results mirror typical capital structure dynamics: an early use of debt claims, followed by a switch to equity‐like claims. (JEL: D820, L140, O261)     

Power and control in professional partnerships

Strategic management controls in professional partnership firms are different from controls in companies. A recently developed model of strategic management controls in the partnership firm was applied in a modified form to a sample of 60 firms in three traditional professions—law, accounting and architecture. Strategic management in the partnerships was broadly consistent with the model but we identified three adaptations in 10 of the sample of firms: corporate planner, corporate monitor and operations monitor. This article explains these adaptations and suggests that the form which strategic control takes in a partnership depends on the distribution of power in the firm.     

CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions

We propose that outside CEO candidates will have greater bargaining power than insiders. As a result, outside CEO successors will likely receive greater total compensation than inside CEO successors. Outside successors, meantime, pose more risk to the hiring firm than inside successors due to higher information asymmetry. As a result, outside successor compensation packages are tilted towards more performance-related pay-at-risk, while inside successor packages have a higher percentage in salary. In addition, outside successors may want to utilize the structure of their compensation at their previous firm in their new contracts. Using a sample of 99 firms with outside successors who were not CEO in their prior firms, matched by industry and size to firms that hired inside candidates, we find evidence supporting these hypotheses.     

经理声誉考虑、任务关联性和长期报酬激励的效果研究

为研究如何激励经理努力提高企业未来业绩,假设经理承担着两项任务:声誉激励其提高企业当前业绩,报酬激励其提高未来业绩;在多任务委托代理模型框架下,本文研究了声誉和长期报酬对经理提高未来业绩的激励效果.本文把企业业绩分为当期业绩和长期(即未来)业绩,并假设委托人目标是长期企业业绩最大化,而不是当期业绩最大化.同时本文对经理努力成本函数的假设有重大改进:给出了经理长期和短期努力的具体的成本函数形式,考虑了两种任务即努力间的关联性情况,假设长期努力和当期努力有不同的成本系数.目前相关模型的成本函数最多只能满足以上三个条件中的前两个.因此,运用本文多任务委托代理模型分析得出的结论更明确、直观,并且更符合实际.本文发现,经理不同努力的成本、两项任务之间的关联性对经理的努力行为选择有重要的影响,要激励经理提高企业长期业绩,应该减少经理长期努力的成本或者弱化当期激励.     

Managerial commitment to the status quo and corporate divestiture: Can power motivate openness to change?

CEOs' commitment to the status quo (CSQ) is a prominent psychological factor leading to their resistance to organizational change. In this study we focus on the moderating role of managerial power, a central element in strategic choice, in the relationship between CEOs' CSQ and corporate divestiture activity. Drawing from the resource dependence perspective of power, we identify multiple aspects of power (structural, ownership, prestige/social, and expert power) that reduce CEOs' resistance to corporate change arising from CSQ. This study contributes to the strategic leadership and organizational change literatures by underscoring the importance of considering how different power bases shape the decision making of top managers who may have tendencies to hold onto firm assets when the situation warrants change. With a better understanding of how various power bases may uniquely influence strategic outcomes in the presence of managerial psychological bias, we can more accurately assess the impact of power on firms' strategic actions.     

POWER INSIDE THE FIRM AND THE MARKET: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH

Recent years have witnessed an enormous amount of reorganization of the corporate sector in the United States and Europe. This article examines the role of market competition in this trend of corporate reorganization. We find that, at intermediate levels of competition, the CEO of the corporation decides to have less power inside the firm and to delegate control to lower levels of the firms' hierarchy. Workers' empowerment and the move to a flatter organizational structure emerge as an equilibrium when competition is not too tough and not too weak. The model predicts merger waves or waves of outsourcing when countries become more integrated in the global economy as the corporate sector reorganizes in response to an increase in international competition. (JEL: F12, D23, L22, L1)     

Corporate Governance and New Organizational Forms: Issues of Double and Multiple Agency

This paper addresses corporate governance inthe light of two relatively new developments inorganizational form, respectively towardsdevolved initiative within firms andpartnerships between firms. In so doing, itargues for an extension of corporate governancetheory and practice to take better account ofthe problems arising from double and multipleagency. New organizational forms can bereconciled with the requirements for corporategovernance through a number of complementarydevelopments, including the cooptation ofemployees and junior partners into ownershipand governance, more inclusive forms ofcontrol, mutual monitoring and the promotion oftrust.     

Differences and similarities in managing technological collaborations in research,development and manufacturing: a case study

This case study is aimed at exploring the characteristics of technological collaborations (TC) in the different phases of the innovation process. While the literature widely discussed the motives for collaboration and the organizational forms that can be adopted, little is known on the role of the phase of the innovation process in the collaboration in shaping its original form. Empirical evidence from 18 in-depth case studies allows to highlight how TC in research, development and manufacturing intrinsically differ in terms of content, motivations and partners involved. We also argue that these characteristics lead to different organizational forms of collaboration, in terms of number of partners, contractual formalization, structure of control, time horizon and density of relationships. The most common organizational forms adopted, respectively, in research, development and manufacturing collaborations are discussed. Finally, we derive guidelines for managers that are facing decisions about external technology sourcing or are managing TC evolving from one phase of the innovation process to another.     

国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释

本文突出管理者权力在企业激励契约中的作用,对不同管理者权力下国有企业高层管理者货币性补偿与企业绩效的关系进行研究。通过理论与实证分析,我们发现,权力强大的管理者可以自己设计激励组合,在获取权力收益的同时实现高货币性补偿,并不需要盈余管理迎合董事会的激励要求;而权力较弱的管理者则更关注货币性补偿,只能通过盈余管理虚构利润,以达到薪酬考核的目的。