内部纷争：我痛定思痛!

老板,是很不好伺候的在一项关于中国企业的调查中,几乎超过一半的董事成员对自己企业的CEO不尽满意。但在代表经营权的CEO一边,也时常感到上层带来的痛苦。股东们要求太多,变化太多的时候．真让CEO无所适从。他们担忧的是,无法完成董事会高额的经营指标,     

公司治理、盈余质量与经理报酬研究——来自中国上市公司数据的检验

本文从经理报酬契约设计的一般原理出发,系统论证了经理报酬、盈余管理和董事会三者之间的关系。在此基础上,运用我国上市公司2004年度的数据,对经理报酬业绩敏感度与盈余管理、董事会的关系进行了研究。研究发现,盈余管理对经理报酬业绩敏感度具有显著的正向影响,表明当经理报酬契约基于会计业绩设计时,经理有动机为增加其报酬利用盈余管理调增了会计收益。同时,研究结果还表明,尽管董事会对经理的选聘、报酬契约的合理确定和会计业绩的真实性负有重要职责,然而董事会并未对会计收益中包含的操纵性应计利润部分进行调整,并根据调整后的真实的会计业绩确定经理报酬,显示出董事会并未很好地履行股东赋予其的职责。     

论"联合政府"--关于上市公司法人治理结构问题的思考

一般地说，无论是股东之间的股权之争或控制权之争，还是董事会与总经理或董事会与监事会之争，都不是个人之间的摩擦，而是股东之间的利益之争。这正是上市公司法人治理结构及其运行机制问题的主要特征，同时也是造成一系列尴尬问题的症结所在。权利与利益的对立统一几乎所有上市公司的董事和高级管理人员都把对自己的提名股东负责看成天经地义，而这样，以股权多元化为主要特征的现代企业制度就成了“联合政府”。“联合政府”的董事会一般是以交叉委派、互相制衡为原则的。在董事会成员中，各大股东分别按股权比例方面的人选分别担任董事…     

2001年企业发展前卫话题:企业管理5大趋势

趋势之一 改造董事会迫在眉睫 世界500强里面的董事会的构成非常有意思，独立董事会要占到35——60%之间，而且独立董事会都是专业人士，大多数做过同类型企业的CEO。而中国企业的董事会，不论上市的还是非上市的股份公司，大部分还只是企业的股东代表会，党委书记要退休了，工会主席要退休了，安排一个荣誉职务，到董事会去。 目前我国企业的董事会有4大毛病：第一是公众化程度不够，就是说独立董事会的比重太小，甚至没有；第二是专业化水平很低。聘请独立董事，就是要利用他们的专业知识，提高董事会的决策能力，但我们的董事会有太多…     

双重委托代理下独立董事治理效应研究

为深入理解独立董事在双重委托代理关系下的治理功用,并为构建具有中国特色的公司治理结构提供理论借鉴,运用双重委托代理理论对独立董事治理效应进行分析,结果表明:一方面为监督CEO而提高董事会中独立董事比例,CEO会越不愿意与董事会共享公司内部信息,使得独立董事难以直接降低第1类代理成本;另一方面,为监督大股东侵占而必须进行的独立董事"独立化"有可能在抑制第2类代理问题的同时,削弱大股东治理机制的有效性,诱发严重的股东与经理层之间的利益冲突,间接增加第1类代理成本。     

家族成员在董事会中的角色研究——基于家族非执行董事的视角

本文研究家族企业中家族成员担任非执行董事的治理效果。本文发现,家族非执行董事能够监督高管提高投资效率、实现更好的会计业绩,而家族执行董事不具备上述治理作用。进一步分析发现,家族持股比例较低或CEO由非家族成员担任时,家族非执行董事的治理效果更能突显;机构持股比例较低时,家族非执行董事的治理作用更强。本文研究表明,合理安排非执行董事的比例有利于提高董事会效率。尤其对于家族企业而言,家族成员担任非执行董事更有利于家族企业长期稳定发展。     

民营上市公司高管人员报酬的决定因素研究

高管报酬的确定并非单纯的技术设计,而是与财务、公司治理机制密切相关的整体.以2002年～2004年深、沪两市的224家民营上市公司为样本,采用面板数据处理方式,实证检验企业绩效、治理机制与高管报酬的相关性.实证结果表明,中国民营上市公司的企业绩效与高管报酬正相关,内部股东比例与高管报酬正相关,外部董事比例与高管报酬负相关;民营上市公司的内部股东比例越大反而带来更高的高管报酬水平,二者之间存在互补关系,说明中国民营上市公司中存在大股东对高管层的赎买行为;外部董事的治理机制可以有效地解决高管层的内部人控制问题,降低代理成本,表明董事会在民营上市公司治理中发挥着重要的战略参与作用.     

管家理论与代理理论的比较分析——对上市公司董事会与CEO关系指导思想的一种新阐释

上市公司治理理论丰富多彩，其中特别引人关注的是两种思想几乎完全相背的理论；代理理论与管家理论。代理理论将CEO(代理人)视为完全追求个人私利最大化的机会主义行为者，因而主张直接代表股东利益的董事会应该对CEO实施严格控制，而管家理论则将CEO(代理人)视作为实现股东利益而兢兢业业、勤勉尽责的管家，故主张董事会应该与CEO发展一种相互合作、完全信任的关系。本文借鉴代理理论与管家理论的思想，结合现实环境，对上市公司董事会与CEO关系的指导思想作出一种新的阐释．即当CEO在公司尚处于领导地位和权力的发展阶段，在工作中还没有获取重大成就之前的任职期间，董事会应该借鉴管家理论思想与CEO发展一种相互合作、彼此信任的工作关系，而当CEO在公司中的领导地位和权力得到较强发展，其潜能得到充分展示，在工作中取得重大成就以后的任职期间，董事会则应该借鉴代理理论思想对CEO可能出现的自负心态及机会主义行为实施严格控制。     

浅谈独立董事制度在我国实施现状及对策

一、独立董事制度独立董事是指具有完全意志、代表公司的全体股东和公司整体利益的董事会成员 ,独立董事独立于公司的管理和经营活动以及那些有可能影响他们做出独立判断的事物之外 ,不能与公司有任何影响其客观、独立判断的关系。它不代表出资人、管理层、股东大会、董事会任何一方的利益 ,因此会从企业自身出发 ,顾全大局 ,改变董事会决策一家之言的局面 ,并将最终给所有股东带来利益。独立董事制度首创于美国。美国法学研究所公布的《公司治理原则》对独立董事的界定是 :与公司没有“重要关系”的董事。所谓“重要关系”是指董事在过去两…     

基于年龄视角的CEO接班人遴选机制对企业战略创新的影响

以CEO接班人年龄为视角,整合了组织行为理论、委托代理理论以及期望理论,研究了董事会成员遴选CEO接班人的决策机制以及这一机制对CEO继任后企业战略创新水平的影响.以1998～2011年发生CEO继任的中国A股上市公司为样本进行了实证检验,研究发现:CEO接班人年龄与公司董事会成员平均年龄同方向变化;董事会成员平均年龄与CEO接班人年龄的差距与CEO继任后企业的战略创新水平正相关.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

Does Board Ethnic Diversity Impact Board Monitoring Outcomes?

This study investigates whether board ethnic diversity is associated with stronger board monitoring outcomes. We explore a range of outcomes – CEO compensation, accounting misstatements, CEO turnover–performance sensitivity and acquisition performance – but find no evidence to support this. We also find no evidence that board ethnic diversity improves overall firm performance, even for those firms with higher agency problems. Our results are robust across different methodologies and have important practical implications, by informing the current public policy debate on board ethnic diversity.     

New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation: an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater.     

The Effect of Board of Directors’ IT Awareness on CIO Compensation and Firm Performance

Chief information officers (CIOs) play increasingly strategic roles in firms in this competitive global economy, which is now largely powered by information technology (IT). However, research has shown a lack of board of directors’ oversight on CIO‐ and IT‐related issues. Drawing on agency, resource dependence, and alignment theories, we investigate the effect of board of directors’ IT awareness on CIO compensation structure and firm performance. We conduct cross‐sectional time series analyses of data collected from various sources. Our study underlines three important findings. First, we show that some commonly known executive compensation determinants, such as individual characteristics and governance structure, do not have significant effects on CIO compensation structure. Second, with regard to CIO compensation structure, firms respond to increasing information asymmetry differently according to the level of IT awareness of their boards. Finally, firms perform better when their boards have higher levels of IT awareness, and this positive effect of IT awareness is considerably larger in IT intensive industries. Overall, our study provides empirical support for the important role of boards’ IT awareness in shaping CIO compensation and improving firm performance. Our results suggest that boards with functional area knowledge—or higher IT awareness in this case—can more effectively monitor and better incentivize executives, and consequently lead to better firm performance.     

Power and Pay: The Politics of CEO Compensation

This paper examines CEO compensation, with an emphasis on the power of CEOs to influence their own compensation by managing the compensation process. It analyzes the CEO's power over the board of directors and the political tactics used by the CEO to manage the board and its compensation decisions. An empirical examination of CEO compensation in 203 large American manufacturing firms in 1985 illustrates the effect of CEO power on compensation and the flexibility available to the CEO in establishing the legitimacy of compensation. The implications of this perspective for management control of corporations and for CEO compensation research are considered.     

An Examination of Socially Responsible Firms' Board Structure

This study investigates the structure of the board of directors at socially responsible (SR) firms. Using a sample of 394 SR firms and comparing these to a matched sample of firms, I find that SR firms have characteristics associated with effective board structures. For instance, SR firms have more outsiders and women directors, and less instance of CEO/Chairman duality than non-SR firms. Results are similar when using a continuous measure of social responsibility. Also, I document that SR firms have higher Governance Index scores than the matched sample. Overall, this suggests that a reason for shareholders' appeal in socially responsible firms and mutual funds may be because these firms have stronger governance mechanisms in place than do non-SR firms. In addition, it appears that effective governance structures are more likely to exist in firms that focus on a broad range of stakeholders, rather than in firms that have a strict focus on shareholder wealth maximization.     

为什么CEO解职如此罕见? 一种基于前景理论的解释

基于前景理论和公司行为理论,本研究将商业风险、所有权集中度及CEO解职后的继任来源整合于同一框架。基于中国上市公司数据所进行的大样本实证分析表明,商业风险、CEO与董事长兼任、所有权集中度与CEO解职率正相关,所有权集中度负向调节商业风险对CEO解职关系。但针对CEO解职后不同继任来源的分析显示,这种调节作用尽管在两类CEO解职中仍然得到保持,但其它所考察变量在外部继任型解职中则有着明显不同。这些发现,进一步加深了对高所有权集中度情境下,CEO解职这一极为重要的战略决策过程的理解。     

Monitoring the monitor: Enabling strategic change when the former CEO stays on the board

Firms often retain their former CEOs on the board after succession to benefit from the former CEOs’ firm-specific expertise. However, their presence can inhibit successor CEOs from implementing meaningful strategic change, as the former CEOs seek to preserve their personal legacy and may see the strategic landscape differently, especially when the successor CEO is hired from outside the firm. Using a strategic leadership interface perspective, we propose that board members can alleviate this potential tension and enable strategic change. To test our theory, we focus on a subsample of succession events: when the former CEO stays on board as chair and the successor CEO is an outsider. This scenario is likely to result in strategic tension and cognitive differences between these two organizational leaders. We find that in such situations, boards with a higher proportion of outside directors experience greater post-succession strategic change; we find no effect in other succession scenarios. We isolate legacy conservation as a motivating factor by showing that the effect manifests for divestitures but not for acquisitions.     

现代公司治理结构与会计舞弊关系的实证研究

本文以我国证券交易所成立至2003年12月31日期间被证监会公开查处的财务报告舞弊的上市公司为样本,比较全面地选取了分别代表公司治理结构中董事会特征、监事会特征、经理层特征、股权结构等方面的14个指标对公司治理结构与会计舞弊之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究结果发现内部人控制度、国家股比例、股权制衡度与财务报告舞弊显著正相关,法人股比例、股权集中度、高级管理层持股比例与财务报告舞弊显著负相关。     

Directors’ human capital,firm strategy,and firm performance

Ideally, corporations are directed by boards whose directors provide valuable human capital that match the firms’ strategy. We investigate how directors’ human capital (international experience, industrial know-how, CEO experience, and financial know-how) affects firm performance including the firm’s strategy (diversification and internationalization) and how human capital is related to acquisition strategies (non-diversifying and international acquisitions). Our sample consists of 560 firm-year observations in Switzerland. We find empirical evidence that directors’ human capital affects firm performance and that this relationship depends on the firm’s strategy. Furthermore, human capital is also correlated with acquisition strategy. The study shows that focusing on board independence and compliance issues may be unrewarding in board research and practice.