Recent developments in D-optimal designs

In the paper, some issues concerned with the determining spring balance weighing designs satisfying the criterion of D-optimality under the assumption measurement errors are uncorrelated and they have the same variances are discussed. In addition, highly D-efficient spring balance weighing designs are also considered. Some conditions under which any spring balance weighing design is regular D-optimal or highly D-efficient are proved. What is more, new construction methods of regular D-optimal and highly D-efficient spring balance weighing designs are presented.     

Spatially Balanced Sampling of Continuous Populations

When sampling from a continuous population (or distribution), we often want a rather small sample due to some cost attached to processing the sample or to collecting information in the field. Moreover, a probability sample that allows for design‐based statistical inference is often desired. Given these requirements, we want to reduce the sampling variance of the Horvitz–Thompson estimator as much as possible. To achieve this, we introduce different approaches to using the local pivotal method for selecting well‐spread samples from multidimensional continuous populations. The results of a simulation study clearly indicate that we succeed in selecting spatially balanced samples and improve the efficiency of the Horvitz–Thompson estimator.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

多层供应链外包模式的选择及其协调

本文研究由两个原始设备制造企业（品牌企业）、一个代工企业和一个供应商组成的多层供应链的外包模式选择问题。应用主从博弈和纳什博弈理论，当一个原始设备制造企业的外包模式给定后，通过对不同外包模型求解比较，给出了后跟进的原始设备制造企业外包模式的最优选择策略。研究发现：后跟进的原始设备制造企业最优策略应采取与前一个原始设备制造企业相同的外包策略。针对最优外包策略，还设计了使供应链达到协调的二部定价契约机制，提高了外包供应链的竞争力。     

Moral values and increasing stakes in a dictator game

Using data from a large representative US sample (N = 1519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values.     

Stretching the borders: how international business travel affects the work–family balance

This study examined the consequences of international business travel for the balance between work–family domains by exploring how international business travellers and travellers’ partners manage the boundaries between work and family in order to maintain the balance. Interpretative phenomenological analysis was used in analysing the semi-structured interviews of 10 male travellers and 10 partners. Because of its irregular nature, international business travel affects the personal life and the family of business travellers. Work-related travel also has an impact on how travellers and their partners construct, manage and negotiate borders between work and family in order to avoid an imbalance between these domains. Integration of work and family is usually inevitable in international business traveler families. Integration may lead to role blurring and thus lead to imbalance.     

Life Balance and Work Addiction Among NCAA Administrators and Coaches

Intercollegiate athletics represent an industry prone to challenges of work addiction and life balance. Work addiction and life balance domains in male and female intercollegiate athletic coaches and administrators (N = 245) were examined using multiple regression analysis. Higher levels of stress/anxiety, sleep disturbance, and career satisfaction and lower levels of quality of relationships and friendships were the strongest predictors of work addiction. Counseling focused on reducing the negative aspects of work addiction, while maintaining job performance, may benefit this population.     

形式与意义:儿童文学作品中的游戏精神

儿童文学的"游戏精神"主要是指在儿童作品文本中体现出的、通过人物游戏所传递的一种符合儿童心理需求和审美旨趣,并实现儿童内心愿望的精神。周作人认为儿童文学的游戏精神是"幻想精神""愉悦精神"和"自由精神"。儿童文学游戏精神具有快乐性、幻想性和自由性的三性特征"。游戏精神"在儿童文学中作品的主要呈现形式为:通过"顽童""小大人""、反派"等人物形象的塑造凸显游戏精神;通过故事情节蕴涵的笨拙与聪明、嬉笑与吵闹、虚拟与真实凸显游戏精神;通过语言夸张凸显荒诞美、语言颠倒凸显逆向思维、语言突转凸显惊奇,从而凸显游戏精神。游戏精神对于儿童文学作品编创的意义在于:游戏精神是儿童文学的基本属性和内涵所在,新媒介时代儿童文学的发展需要延续游戏精神。因此游戏精神是儿童文学的作品编创的重要依据和准则。     

现代社会隐私权和知情权的边界

现代社会是权利的社会,也是权利冲突频发的社会。权利之间的冲突缘起于法律规则的模糊性、权利的滥用和权利的交互性。其实质是一种客观存在的事实而非理论预设和逻辑分析的结果。权利冲突可以大致界分为主体间的权利冲突、价值冲突、利益冲突三种类型;权利间的冲突需要借助社会控制模式(个人控制、组织控制、法律控制)并通过价值平衡方法来解决。     

Personality traits and strategic behavior: Anxiousness and aggressiveness in entry games

We demonstrate that personality has a systematic effect on strategic behavior. We focus on two personality traits: anxiousness and aggressiveness, and consider a 2-player entry game, where each player can guarantee a payoff by staying out, a higher payoff if she is the only player to enter, but a lower payoff if both players enter. We find that: anxious players enter less; aggressive players enter more; players are more likely to enter against anxious than non-anxious players; and players are less likely to enter against aggressive than non-aggressive players. We discuss the possible mechanism through which personality affects strategic behavior.