公司股权结构、经理市场与管理层激励

公司股权结构的差异直接影响着公司管理层(代理人)的利益实现,大股东控股比例越高则对于代理人的均衡激励也越多,反之亦然。另一方面,经理市场的存在使得委托代理合约均衡中的最优剩余索取权分配变得更加有利于委托人而不是代理人。     

渝东南少数民族贫困地区文化旅游发展探析

渝东南是少数民族聚居的老少边穷地区,但是其自然风景优美,国家历史文化名镇分布较多,土家苗族文化风情异彩纷呈,应该充分利用资源优势,开发少数民族地区特色文化生态旅游产品,发展少数民族文化生态旅游产业,加快实现民族地区的和谐发展。因此,本文分析了渝东南少数民族地区文化旅游发展的条件、优势、存在问题,进而提出渝东南民族贫困地区文化旅游开发的思路和对策。     

Do Auction Parameters Affect Buyer Surplus in E‐Auctions for Procurement?

Although the initial euphoria about Internet‐enabled reverse auctions has given way to a cautious but widespread use of reverse auctions in business‐to‐business (B2B) procurement, there is a limited understanding of the effect of auction design parameters on buyer surplus. In this paper, we study the effect of bidding competition, information asymmetry, reserve price, bid decrement, auction duration, and bidder type on buyer surplus. We collected field data on more than 700 online procurement auctions conducted by a leading auctioneer and involving procurement items worth millions of dollars. Consistent with the predictions of auction theory, the results indicate that bidding competition, reserve price, and information sharing affect buyer surplus. Unlike previous findings in the consumer‐to‐consumer context, we find that bid decrement and auction duration have no effect in B2B procurement auctions. Our results suggest that use of the rank‐bidding format increases buyer surplus when incumbent suppliers participate in the auction. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings for future research and for optimal design of online procurement auctions.     

“This rabid fight for survival”: Small NGO manager's experiences of funding reform

This article explores the experiences of small Non‐Government Organisation (NGO) managers who are experiencing significant funding reforms. Drawing on a desk review of the literature, and semi‐structured interviews with managers of small NGOs in a case study site of Glebe, New South Wales, we present some of the issues arising from these new modes of funding governance. Findings revealed that funding is increasingly complex, with variations in timeframe, funder and geographic boundaries. The short‐term nature of funding contributed to NGO managers stating that they have been operating in a “survival” mode characterised by a high‐level uncertainty. Changes to funding regimes have led to a need to seek out future funding, engage in competitive tendering processes and comply with multiple and growing funding reporting requirements – tasks that are time‐consuming and at times stressful. Overall, managers experienced overwhelming funding complexity, which impeded the NGO's ability to focus on the needs of clients — an outcome which is surely antithetical to the aims of the various reforms to funding governance.     

浅析加强包头市政府采购工作的对策

实行政府采购制度是建立公共财政体制的内在要求,是推进依法行政,规范政府行为,加强行政监督和廉政建设的重要举措。文章分析了包头市政府采购的现状,对其中存在的问题提出了改进建议。     

An Experimental Investigation of Procurement Auctions with Asymmetric Sellers

Electronic reverse auctions are a commonly used procurement mechanism. Research to date has focused on suppliers who are ex ante symmetric in that their costs are drawn from a common distribution. However, in many cases, a seller's range of potential costs depends on their own operations, location, or economies of scale and scope. Thus, understanding how different bidder types impact auction outcomes is key when designing an auction. This study reports the results of the first controlled laboratory experiment designed to compare prices between first‐price and second‐price procurement auctions for homogeneous goods when seller cost types are asymmetric and the number of bidders varies. The results indicate that first‐price auctions generate lower prices regardless of market composition. The results also reveal that first‐price auctions are at least weakly more efficient than second‐price auctions despite the theoretical prediction that the reverse should hold in asymmetric auctions. Post hoc analysis of individual bidders' behavior in first‐price auctions revealed evidence that bidders systematically underbid when their cost realizations were close to the lower bound. Furthermore, bidders adjust their behavior based on the type of the other bidders in the market in a manner inconsistent with theory. Consequently, adding a third bidder to a two‐bidder market is not advantageous to the buyer unless that third bidder is a low‐cost type.     

Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions: An Experiment

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price‐based and buyer‐determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price‐based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer‐determined auctions. Only the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply higher quality in buyer‐determined auctions leading to higher market efficiencies in these auctions. Accordingly, buyers prefer the buyer‐determined auction over the price‐based auction, while only half of the bidders do so. A more detailed analysis of buyers' and bidders' behavior and profits provides insights into their mechanism choice.     

Optimal Descending Mechanisms for Constrained Procurement

Descending mechanisms for procurement (or, ascending mechanisms for selling) have been well‐recognized for their simplicity from the viewpoint of bidders—they require less bidder sophistication as compared to sealed‐bid mechanisms. In this study, we consider procurement under each of two types of constraints: (1) Individual/Group Capacities: limitations on the amounts that can be sourced from individual and/or subsets of suppliers, and (2) Business Rules: lower and upper bounds on the number of suppliers to source from, and on the amount that can be sourced from any single supplier. We analyze two procurement problems, one that incorporates individual/group capacities and another that incorporates business rules. In each problem, we consider a buyer who wants to procure a fixed quantity of a product from a set of suppliers, where each supplier is endowed with a privately known constant marginal cost. The buyer's objective is to minimize her total expected procurement cost. For both problems, we present descending auction mechanisms that are optimal mechanisms. We then show that these two problems belong to a larger class of mechanism design problems with constraints specified by polymatroids, for which we prove that optimal mechanisms can be implemented as descending mechanisms.     

Split‐Award Procurement Auctions—Can Bayesian Equilibrium Strategies Predict Human Bidding Behavior in Multi‐Object Auctions?

We analyze if and when symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium predictions can explain human bidding behavior in multi‐object auctions. We focus on two sealed‐bid split‐award auctions with ex ante split decisions as they can be regularly found in procurement practice. These auction formats are straightforward multi‐object extensions of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction. We derive the risk‐neutral symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium strategies and find that, although the two auction mechanisms yield the same expected costs to the buyer, other aspects of the two models, including the equilibrium bidding strategies, differ significantly. The strategic considerations in these auction formats are more involved than in single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions, and it is questionable whether expected utility maximization can explain human bidding behavior in such multi‐object auctions. Therefore, we analyzed the predictive accuracy of our equilibrium strategies in the laboratory. In human subject experiments we found underbidding, which is in line with earlier experiments on single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions. To control for regret, we organize experiments against computerized bidders, who play the equilibrium strategy. In computerized experiments where bid functions are only used in a single auction, we found significant underbidding on low‐cost draws. In experiments where the bid function is reused in 100 auctions, we could also control effectively for risk aversion, and there is no significant difference of the average bidding behavior and the risk‐neutral Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function. The results suggest that strategic complexity does not serve as an explanation for underbidding in split‐award procurement auctions, but risk aversion does have a significant impact.     

Vehicle Procurement Policy for Humanitarian Development Programs

This article aims to identify optimal vehicle procurement policies for organizations engaged in humanitarian development programs and to derive general insights on the characteristics of these policies. Toward that end, we follow an inductive approach. First, we study the operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in three representative countries: Sudan, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. Using a linear programming (LP) model primed with field data provided by the ICRC, we calculate the optimal vehicle fleet size and compare it with the policies actually implemented. Second, drawing from results of the LP model, we develop a stylized quadratic control model and use it to characterize the general structure of the optimal policy under different demand scenarios and operational constraints. After demonstrating that the results of the control model are consistent with those of the LP model in the specific context analyzed, we discuss the optimal policies and the applicability of the former as a practical tool for strategic asset planning.