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| 公司股权结构、经理市场与管理层激励 | |
| 引用本文： | 张进,李文,王海燕.公司股权结构、经理市场与管理层激励[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2001,3(1):62-64,90. |
| 作者姓名： | 张进 李文 王海燕 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 东南大学经管学院博士后流动站, 2. 南京理工大学, 3. 东南大学, |
| 基金项目： | 江苏省“九五”社科规划基金资助项目!(编号为:04-3103)的阶段性成果。 |
| 摘 要： | 公司股权结构的差异直接影响着公司管理层(代理人)的利益实现,大股东控股比例越高则对于代理人的均衡激励也越多,反之亦然。另一方面,经理市场的存在使得委托代理合约均衡中的最优剩余索取权分配变得更加有利于委托人而不是代理人。 |
| 关 键 词： | 委托代理关系 剩余索取权 经理市场 股权结构 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-441X(2001)01-0062-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000年3月6日 |
Large shareholder, manager's market and the benefits of agents |
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| ZHANG Jin,LI Wen,WANG Hai-yan.Large shareholder, manager's market and the benefits of agents[J].Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science ),2001,3(1):62-64,90. | |
| Authors: | ZHANG Jin LI Wen WANG Hai-yan |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we find that the existence of rela tive concentrated share holdings is important to the corporate governance. And t he more the large stockholder holds of a firms' stock, the more the professiona l ma nagers will be able to share the residual claimant right. We also argued that a developed manager's market will be favorable to the benefits of principals and the equilibrium of incentive contract is also influenced by the agents' risk av ersion. |
| Keywords: | the benefits of Agents manager's market res idual claimant right relative concentrated share holdings |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |