我国市场经济制度创新探析

市场经济制度创新问题是我国深化改革的核心任务之一.西方发达国家的市场经济模式虽然取得了经济社会发展和科技发展方面的巨大成功,但仍存在难以克服的矛盾,不能成作为中国深化改革的样板.中国的市场经济制度建设应当立足于已有的政治、经济和文化条件,继续走创造和完善社会主义市场经济模式之路.     

Role of Gambling Media Exposure in Influencing Trajectories Among College Students

In the study, a model of the relationship between mass media depictions of gambling and subsequent gambling attitudes and behavioral intentions of college students was developed. A survey was conducted with 229 undergraduate students (79.5% female, mean age = 20.5, SD = 2.04) enrolled in three different communication courses at a large southeastern university. Through structural equation analysis, the six hypotheses of this study were analyzed using the method of maximum likelihood with AMOS 6. The model was consistent with the hypotheses that media exposure impacts gambling attitudes and behavioral intentions both positively and negatively, depending on the valence of the gambling depiction. Theoretical and practical implications of mass media exposure and gambling behaviors are discussed, and future research directions are outlined.     

具有最优学习率的RBF神经网络及其应用

传统固定学习率的RBF神经网络在金融时间序列预测方面已经有比较成功的应用,但网络学习率的选择问题却给传统RBF神经网络的使用带来了不便.利用梯度下降法及优化方法推导出了RBF神经网络的动态最优学习率并将其应用于网络学习算法,具有最优学习率的RBF神经网络能够在保证网络稳定学习的同时兼顾网络的收敛速度.为了检验具有动态最优学习率的RBF神经网络的预测效果,对沪深300指数波动率进行了预测实验.实验结果表明,具有动态最优学习率的RBF神经网络比传统的固定学习率的RBF神经网络有着更快的收敛速度,同时也避免了人为选定学习率的不便.     

Revenue Management with End‐of‐Period Discounts in the Presence of Customer Learning

Consider a firm that sells identical products over a series of selling periods (e.g., weekly all‐inclusive vacations at the same resort). To stimulate demand and enhance revenue, in some periods, the firm may choose to offer a part of its available inventory at a discount. As customers learn to expect such discounts, a fraction may wait rather than purchase at a regular price. A problem the firm faces is how to incorporate this waiting and learning into its revenue management decisions. To address this problem we summarize two types of learning behaviors and propose a general model that allows for both stochastic consumer demand and stochastic waiting. For the case with two customer classes, we develop a novel solution approach to the resulting dynamic program. We then examine two simplified models, where either the demand or the waiting behavior are deterministic, and present the solution in a closed form. We extend the model to incorporate three customer classes and discuss the effects of overselling the capacity and bumping customers. Through numerical simulations we study the value of offering end‐of‐period deals optimally and analyze how this value changes under different consumer behavior and demand scenarios.     

论宋元时期的文章学

南宋至元代创立并蓬勃发展的文章学,长期以来备受学界冷落。这时期的文章学著作甚多,内容极为丰富,学者们解析文章作法,取得了杰出的成就,当然也有局限。可以预言,与诗学、词学、赋学等古代文学研究中的“显学”一样,文章学应该也必然会成为传统文学研究中的一个热点。     

竞争条件下企业生存能力的研究

从企业生物性和管理熵的角度分析了企业生存的三大能力 :基本生存能力、竞争力和应变力 ,形成企业能力的因素主要是企业的文化、学习和创新 ,以及企业的战略管理、经营管理     

管理者关系特性对海外子公司知识获取及公司绩效的影响研究

基于组织学习理论和社会资本理论,考察了管理者关系特性对海外子公司内外部网络知识获取和企业绩效的影响。研究结果显示,母子公司管理者之间的信任和沟通频率对获取母公司知识有正向影响,海外子公司管理者和本地重要企业管理者之间的信任对获取本地商务知识有正向影响,海外子公司管理者和本地政府主要负责人之间的私人关系对获取本地制度知识有显著影响。此外,本地制度知识在母公司知识对海外子公司绩效的影响中起正向调节作用,本地商务知识起负向调节作用。     

Balancing Revenues and Repair Costs under Partial Information about Product Reliability

We consider the problem faced by a company selling a product with warranty and under partial information about the product reliability. The product can fail from multiple failure types, each of which is associated with an inherently different repair cost. If the product fails within the warranty duration, then the company is required to pay the repair cost. The company does not know the probabilities associated with different failure types, but it learns the failure probabilities as sales occur and failure information is accumulated. If the failure probabilities turn out to be too high and it becomes costly to fulfill the warranty coverage, then the company may decide to stop selling the product, possibly replacing it with a more reliable alternative. The objective is to decide if and when to stop. By formulating the problem as a dynamic program with Bayesian learning, we establish structural properties of the optimal policy. Since computing the optimal policy is intractable due to the high dimensional state space, we propose two approximation methods. The first method is based on decomposing the problem by failure types and it provides upper bounds on the value functions. The second method provides lower bounds on the value functions and it is based on a deterministic approximation. Computational experiments indicate that the policy from the first method provides noticeable benefits, especially when it is difficult to form good estimates of the failure probabilities quickly.     

Short‐Run Subsidies and Long‐Run Adoption of New Health Products: Evidence From a Field Experiment

Short‐run subsidies for health products are common in poor countries. How do they affect long‐run adoption? A common fear among development practitioners is that one‐off subsidies may negatively affect long‐run adoption through reference‐dependence: People might anchor around the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay more for the product later. But for experience goods, one‐off subsidies could also boost long‐run adoption through learning. This paper uses data from a two‐stage randomized pricing experiment in Kenya to estimate the relative importance of these effects for a new, improved antimalarial bed net. Reduced form estimates show that a one‐time subsidy has a positive impact on willingness to pay a year later inherit. To separately identify the learning and anchoring effects, we estimate a parsimonious experience‐good model. Estimation results show a large, positive learning effect but no anchoring. We black then discuss the types of products and the contexts inherit for which these results may apply.     

Understanding Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Financial Decisions

Using a high‐stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we implement a novel design to separately identify two channels of social influence in financial decisions, both widely studied theoretically. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it, both because they learn from his choice (“social learning”) and because his possession of the asset directly affects others' utility of owning the same asset (“social utility”). We randomize whether one member of a peer pair who chose to purchase an asset has that choice implemented, thus randomizing his ability to possess the asset. Then, we randomize whether the second member of the pair: (i) receives no information about the first member, or (ii) is informed of the first member's desire to purchase the asset and the result of the randomization that determined possession. This allows us to estimate the effects of learning plus possession, and learning alone, relative to a (no information) control group. We find that both social learning and social utility channels have statistically and economically significant effects on investment decisions. Evidence from a follow‐up survey reveals that social learning effects are greatest when the first (second) investor is financially sophisticated (financially unsophisticated); investors report updating their beliefs about asset quality after learning about their peer's revealed preference; and, they report motivations consistent with “keeping up with the Joneses” when learning about their peer's possession of the asset. These results can help shed light on the mechanisms underlying herding behavior in financial markets and peer effects in consumption and investment decisions.