How to Evaluate Government Performance while Building a Rule of Law Government in China*

Building a law-based government is a central element of the comprehensive framework for promoting the rule of law in China, while using evaluation to catalyze growth is in line with the incentive principle of management studies. Since China started to implement reform and opening up over thirty years ago, rule of law development and organizational evaluation have gone through several stages, each with different characteristics. Efforts to build a law-based government have met with success, but what the country now has is essentially still goal-oriented assessment. At present, this suffers from the lack of a clear goal orientation or definition of functions, an imperfect technical system and unsound motivation mechanisms, not to mention the practical problems of each government department going its own way, duplicating evaluations or being left rudderless. Drawing on a combination of value rationality and instrumental rationality and using government performance evaluation to promote the building of a law-based government not only conforms to the spirit of the rule of law and value rationality in government performance, but also strengthens the role of evaluation as an instrument for organizational management. Therefore, we need to create new evaluation theories, expand public participation, introducing diversified evaluating entities, improve technical systems, strengthen institutional buildup, and foster a performance-based culture. In addition, replacing goal-oriented assessment with performance evaluation will help the emergence of a new discipline—the performance evaluation of rule of law government, thus promoting multidisciplinary efforts to integrate and create new public administration theories in China.     

地方政府审计职能软化问题研究

政府审计是对权力的监督和制约,现阶段,我国地方政府审计面临的发展困境主要是审计职能软化问题,针对地方政府审计存在的主要问题,剖析原因,从多角度提出解决审计职能软化的对策。     

试论中国政府形象构建的路径选择——以全球化为背景

良好的政府形象是政府巩固统治合法性的基础,是社会稳定和发展的必要条件,也是政府赢得国际良好声誉的保障。在全球化背景下,政府形象本身所承载的价值也被提升和扩展到全球,因此政府形象构建面临着前所未有的压力和挑战。就我国政府形象构建而言,应进一步增强形象塑造意识,着力构建能力型政府和开放型透明政府,以构建起理想的政府形象体系。     

汉代政府公务“招募”活动研究

汉代社会中广泛存在着雇佣关系,此种关系也被汉政府以＂招募＂的形式大量利用。除募兵外,汉政府在许多经济、政治活动中采用了＂招募＂的形式,像募凶杀人、募人出使、募人除害等。其薪酬除金钱给付外,还有封王赐爵、赐田宅、赦免罪行等。其有着自己的特点,如带有强制性、种类多样化、报酬多元性及非等价性、主体范围特别大。它们保证了政务活动的顺利实施,加强了社会的稳定,促进了社会经济的发展,优化了社会资源的配置。     

移动政府构建:技术进步与政府创新

移动技术进步推动社会变迁,催生行政生态的全新图景。这一方面对政府行政提出更高要求,另一方面孕育庞大的行政潜能。运用好这把双刃剑,既要避免技术沦为维护传统制度的工具,又要创新与移动时代相匹配的行政模式,关键在于移动政府构建,即从政府观念、组织结构以及驾驭能力三层面进行变革。     

土地征收进程中不同参与主体行为研究

城镇化进程中农民集体所有土地转变为城市国有土地,在该过程中产生大量的土地增值收益。地方政府、用地企业、村委会和农民在土地增值收益分配中有不同的行为表现,其根本原因在于利益分配冲突。从不同主体行为角度对土地增值收益分配中利益冲突问题进行研究,有利于探讨利益冲突背后的原因并提出有针对性的政策建议。     

Global Governance,neoliberalism and national responses: The case of Bangladesh’s ready‐made garment (RMG) sector

This article on the ready‐made garment (RMG) sector of Bangladesh shows how over‐reliance on foreign capital for development financing and deregulated investment—a hallmark of neoliberal economic arrangements—undermines the incorporation of SDGs’ and INGOs’ equity principles, contributing to biased policy responses yielding unequal outcomes. The article cautions that while countries prioritize economic growth over social and environmental nourishment and continue to adopt neoliberal economic policies to promote economic growth, inequity is unavoidable, if not inevitable. Thus, the way forward may be to shift the focus of ‘development’ from the economy to society, to building ‘good societies’ where institutions and strategies, including those that contribute to economic growth, are organized such that these complement not compromise the evolution of such societies.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

以政务诚信引领全社会诚信建设的对策与思考

国务院颁布《社会信用体系建设规划纲要（2014—2020年）》后，各省、市分别结合本地的特点制定了信用体系建设规划纲要，将全社会的诚信建设纳入规划。针对社会诚信建设的需要，在分析我国当前社会诚信缺失的基础上，提出了加强政务诚信建设，通过政务诚信建设示范引领全社会诚信建设的对策建议。     

Reputation spillover effects from grant‐providing institutions

There is a broad academic discussion about the impact of funding grants from a foundation or a government department on individual support intentions toward the nonprofit organization receiving the grant. However, the role of the grant provider's reputation has frequently been overlooked. In this study, we experimentally tested whether there is a reputation spillover effect of a grant‐providing organization. Based on a real‐life example, we asked citizens to rate their willingness to donate to a nonprofit organization, and we experimentally manipulated the available information on funding sources. We test this for both a government department and a foundation as a grant provider. Our results suggest that not the act of receiving a grant, but the citizens' awareness about the funding organization—at least in the case of a foundation—has an impact on support intentions. In contrast, for a prominent government department as a grant provider, we did not find support for a reputation spillover effect.