试论胡塞尔现象学方法的多重含义

作为20世纪最有影响的哲学流派之一的现象学,其核心就是它的方法;而作为"严格科学的哲学"和"具有中立性和道路可能性"的现象学的方法,又具有多重含义。在现象学的操作方法里,"直观"、"还原"和"意向分析"是胡塞尔创立现象学最基本的方法。     

海德格尔的“本真的历史性”是本真的吗?——海德格尔早期时间现象学研究献疑

本真状态是早期海德格尔的核心概念,它的成立必须符合三个条件:属于自己;已经得到个别化;成为自由的能在.海德格尔从此在的生存论分析中析出了此在的本真状态和时间的本真状态,并在此基础上进一步提出了"本真的历史性"这一概念.本文再现了海德格尔早期时间现象学的研究思路,并依据他自己提出的本真状态的三个条件对"本真的历史性"这一表述提出了质疑.     

Merleau-Ponty and Nagarjuna – Ethics Within the Self of the No-Self

This essay explores the concept of the self in the philosophies of Nagarjuna and Merleau-Ponty by examining how it is that, according to them, the self is empty and only conventionally real rather than intrinsically so. By analyzing the similarities between their philosophies, the essay aims to shed light on new ways of understanding perception, ethics, and our relationships with others. It will include an analysis of the no-self and the emptiness of entities, as well as an analysis of Merleau-Ponty's writings and philosophy to see how it is that, according to him, in order to better understand ourselves, we must understand the reality of our intersubjectivity and intertwining with the world. It will clearly be shown that Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology and the Madhyamikan school of thought coincide and offer powerful moral philosophies, while seeing the world as being completely separate from the self, distorts both our notions of ourselves and the world we are interconnected with. Virtue must be sought in samsara (perpetually being born into the world) and sunyata (emptiness that is itself empty of inherent existence), for samsara and nirvana (the end of karma) are one. [Correction added on 03 April 2023, after the first online publication: First two sentences of the Abstract have been modified.]     

Questioning Consilience and Autonomy in Self-Determination Theory: A Critique and Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Alternative

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self-determination theorists have advanced a form of self-regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self-determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic-phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility-laden contexts of everyday practices.     

“拼凑”记忆:作为现象的电影身体

梳理电影理论的发展脉络，在对个体记忆/集体记忆的关系探讨中，“身体”立场在其中发挥的微妙平衡作用值得重视:摄影机械的再现视角无法回避记忆书写过程中的“主观过滤”，而“身体”的影像在历史记忆中对完整经验的保存具有重要潜能，即以影像身体的即时性、片段性的局部经验保持对世界完整性的暗示。从现象学立场出发，论述电影中的身体如何作为“具体经验”完成对作为“完整经验”的记忆“任意”却“丰富”的拼凑，即身体如何“重拾”记忆的“真实”。“身体”作为视角看待记忆的再现，需要重新思考记忆再现时对时间的“连续性”要求。记忆从来都不是与现在割裂的、被想象在银幕上的他者，而是与当下紧密相关的过去，需要注重对“此刻”身体感知经验的表述。同时，电影中的空间并非所叙记忆事件的背景，而是身体记忆所生成的空间，且空间中的身体往往承担着“传感器”的作用。     

《黄帝内经》“情-志”的现象学分析

基于《内经》、道家、海德格尔生存现象学三者之间的密切关系,融合海德格尔生存现象学理论与本土现象学资源对《内经》“情-志”予以分析阐发。《内经》、道家的“情”“志”分别对等于海德格尔“遮蔽”“去蔽”状态的情绪。就情、志为一而言,情志是生命真实活动内隐与外显状态的统一;就情、志为二而言,《内经》、道家之“情”处于本原性地位,是“志”的上位概念;“志”源于“情”、属于“情”,是“情”的下位概念。那种将“情”置于“志”范畴之下,而以“志”作为中医心理学重要概念的观点值得商榷。