企业社会责任的依据与维度

企业社会责任的理论依据和维度是两个基本的但长期存在争论的问题.首先,讨论利益相关者理论和企业公民理论,认为这两者具有统一性,但作为企业社会责任的理论依据,却都存在共同的不足;第二,运用一个代表性企业的扩展利润函数,证明企业的机会主义行为必然造成社会责任问题,从而为企业社会责任提供实证依据;第三,利用第二部分的结论,证明企业经济责任不构成企业社会责任维度.在此基础上,提出企业社会责任的两维度主张:以禁止损害和损害赔偿为原则的强制性社会责任维度和以福利增进为原则的选择性社会责任维度.按照这一主张,需要进一步完善.     

群体性突发事件中政府机会主义行为的演化博弈分析

群体性突发事件成为影响当前我国社会稳定和实现现代化平稳过渡的重要因素,但是研究主要是基于实践经验的概述和总结分析上,缺少合适的理论分析工具揭示群体性突发事件的演化规律和发展特征。本文尝试运用演化博弈理论建立了地方政府部门与社会弱势群体之间的演化博弈模型,分析了地方政府部门机会主义行为导致的群体性突发事件呈现扩大化的趋势。研究结果表明:(1)如果社会弱势群体的情绪和行动尚未激化,至多停留在集体上访或集会等体制内平和的诉求手段,机会主义的地方政府将采取高压强硬策略;此时博弈均衡结果是(妥协或平和诉求,强硬);(2)一旦弱势群体中出现少数分子采取了"打砸抢"等暴力抗争的行动,由于机会主义政府转而做出较大让步,从而诱导其他弱势成员相继采取暴力抗争行动,事态反而进一步呈现扩大趋势。因此,群体性突发事件处置过程中,地方政府的机会主义行为不仅延误事件处置的最佳时机,而且直接导致了事态的扩大化。最后结合数值分析和瓮安事件案例,剖析了地方政府部门采取的机会主义应急处置措施,以及本文理论模型的适用范围。     

Implementing the right project structure to achieve coopetitive innovation projects

This research focuses on the project structure used by coopetitors to achieve common innovation projects. Scholars have recently identified an original but complex project structure that they call the Coopetitive Project Team (CPT). However, other project structures can also be implemented by coopetitors to achieve innovation. Therefore, we address the following question: for which types of innovation projects is CPT appropriate? We argue that coopetitors need to use CPT for high-risk and high-cost projects when the aim is to develop radical innovation. CPT allows coopetitors not only to develop innovation capabilities through close resource and knowledge sharing but also to manage the risk of opportunism. Conversely, coopetitors should use another project structure, Separated Project Teams (SPTs), for low-cost and low-risk projects when the aim is to develop incremental innovation. The SPT design allows coopetitors both to achieve the goal of the project and to minimize the risk of opportunism. To confirm our assumptions, we studied the project portfolios of Airbus and Thales, two firms in the space satellite industry. Our findings confirm that coopetitors should implement CPTs to handle innovation projects that are costly, risky and highly innovative. CPTs permit the sharing of knowledge and the management of high opportunism risk, both of which are necessary to achieve radical innovation. Conversely, coopetitors rely on SPTs for low-cost projects that require a low degree of knowledge sharing, thus avoiding the risk of opportunism in achieving their incremental innovation objectives.     

The effect of supplier development on outsourcing performance: the mediating roles of opportunism and flexibility

Abstract

In this increasingly competitive business environment, firms utilise outsourcing as a strategic tool to leverage globally dispersed resources so that they may focus on their core competencies and improve efficiency. The more firms rely on outsourcing, the more they depend on their suppliers, and the more important it is to manage and develop suppliers in order to achieve and maximise the benefits of outsourcing. This paper explores the impact of supplier development on outsourcing performance. Structural equation modelling was used to analyse data collected from 213 manufacturing firms in China. The results indicate that supplier development has a strong direct positive impact on outsourcing performance, and that supplier development also leads to enhanced outsourcing performance through reducing outsourcing opportunism risk and improving outsourcing flexibility. In addition to making a contribution to current theories of outsourcing, our findings also provide outsourcing managers with practical understanding and insights about the role of supplier development in enhancing outsourcing performance.     

营销渠道中的权威治理策略与渠道投机行为:非线性关系的实证检验

文章基于交易成本理论、资源依赖理论与社会交换理论,利用问卷调查得到的制造商数据,探索了权威治理策略与投机行为之间的非线性关系.研究发现,企业不同程度地使用不同类型的权威治理策略会带来差异性的投机行为治理结果.具体表现为:企业使用权威治理策略中的强制性权力,对渠道伙伴投机行为的影响呈现出先加重后减轻的倒U型关系;企业使用权威治理策略中的非强制性权力,对渠道伙伴投机行为的影响则呈现出先减轻后加重的U型关系.企业只有高强度地使用强制性权力或低强度地使用非强制性权力才能有效控制渠道投机行为.文章结论在明晰权威治理策略与渠道投机行为之间的具体关系以及统一现有研究矛盾结论的同时,对渠道成员合理选择并使用权威治理策略制定渠道决策,规范渠道中的投机行为具有重要的意义.     

订单农业中机会主义的治理——以金兴茧丝绸有限责任公司为例

文章通过实例,分析了订单农业中机会主义的治理。认为公司守信在先、树立信誉是治理机会主义的先决条件。公司进一步采取措施预防、甄别、约束和惩罚机会主义,并对守信者予以激励。通过重复博弈,使非合作均衡走向合作均衡,实现公司、农户双赢。     

现代企业兼并及兼并理论述评

随着经济全球化的来临,企业兼并的浪潮西风东渐,国内企业兼并的数量、规模都有显著增长的趋势。目前也有许多研究兼并的文章,多数从资本运作的角度出发。本文从产业组织学的角度,把兼并划分为纵向兼并、横向兼并、混合兼并三大类,通过评述现代几种主要的兼并理论,来阐明三类兼并的动机、功能和作用。     

控股股东机会主义与非效率投资

控股股东对小股东的侵占已经成为公司治理研究中的主要问题,但控股股东与债权人的冲突还较少受到关注。通过建立模型,分析了控股股东的机会主义行为对中小股东与债权人的影响。研究结果表明:在无负债情况下,控股股东与小股东之间的信息不对称造成了企业过早及高风险的投资;在负债融资的情况下,由于收益函数性质的差别,股东与债权人之间的信息不对称是资产替代发生的根源。此外,为了获得控制权私利,控股股东大化自身价值的行为使得企业投资更早,投资的风险性更大,损害了中小股东与债权人的利益。     

所有权、市场竞争及人力资本专用性——一个模型的建立及扩展

建立了"剩余控制权与剩余索取权相互关系"模型,认为剩余控制权是连接产权与市场的中介,并通过人力资本专用性对剩余控制权的影响把当事人的工作特征纳入视野。     

信息不对称环境下企业行为与环境规制的有效性探析

信息不对称在环境规制过程中普遍存在。分析发现:信息不对称环境下,污染企业都有率先不进行污染治理的环境机会主义动机,若治理成本在可承受范围内,污染企业环境治理决策与信息不对称产生的机会主义空间大小关系更为密切;规制者依据污染企业的机会主义动机程度进行分层管理和相应提高环境违规成本,对提高环境规制的有效性具有重要启示。