先验现象学的动机引发及其哲学观念

怀疑论构成胡塞尔先验现象学研究的重要的引发动机。通过现象学还原的实行,现象学从根本上超越了自然态度,实现了向先验主体性的回溯,并在其中考察一切客观性的根源。藉此胡塞尔就以现象学的先验主观主义克服了怀疑论的主观主义,同时也终结了整个近代哲学中先验主义与客观主义之间的旷日持久的斗争。最终,通过进一步对先验意识领域实行本质还原,先验现象学作为一门关于先验意识的普遍本质科学而确立自身。     

Merleau-Ponty and Nagarjuna – Ethics Within the Self of the No-Self

This essay explores the concept of the self in the philosophies of Nagarjuna and Merleau-Ponty by examining how it is that, according to them, the self is empty and only conventionally real rather than intrinsically so. By analyzing the similarities between their philosophies, the essay aims to shed light on new ways of understanding perception, ethics, and our relationships with others. It will include an analysis of the no-self and the emptiness of entities, as well as an analysis of Merleau-Ponty's writings and philosophy to see how it is that, according to him, in order to better understand ourselves, we must understand the reality of our intersubjectivity and intertwining with the world. It will clearly be shown that Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology and the Madhyamikan school of thought coincide and offer powerful moral philosophies, while seeing the world as being completely separate from the self, distorts both our notions of ourselves and the world we are interconnected with. Virtue must be sought in samsara (perpetually being born into the world) and sunyata (emptiness that is itself empty of inherent existence), for samsara and nirvana (the end of karma) are one. [Correction added on 03 April 2023, after the first online publication: First two sentences of the Abstract have been modified.]     

Questioning Consilience and Autonomy in Self-Determination Theory: A Critique and Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Alternative

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self-determination theorists have advanced a form of self-regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self-determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic-phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility-laden contexts of everyday practices.     

Sensory experiences and social representation – Embodied multimodality of common-sense thinking

Discussions on the body frequently foreground in empirical studies of social representations. However, there is scarce theoretical literature within social representations theory focusing on embodied social representation. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of embodied, sensory experiences as part of social representation. More precisely, it attempts to elaborate how individual, social, bodily, and material layers work together in embodied social representation. This paper approaches the topic from four viewpoints: (1) social representation as action, (2) phenomenology, (3) embodied and socially situated cognition, and (4) sensory epistemologies and sensescapes. These approaches are used to provide insight into the conscious and unconscious processes of social representation and the multimodality of social representation. The paper contributes to the understanding of the role of sensory experiences and embodiment in the theory of social representations.     

“拼凑”记忆:作为现象的电影身体

梳理电影理论的发展脉络，在对个体记忆/集体记忆的关系探讨中，“身体”立场在其中发挥的微妙平衡作用值得重视:摄影机械的再现视角无法回避记忆书写过程中的“主观过滤”，而“身体”的影像在历史记忆中对完整经验的保存具有重要潜能，即以影像身体的即时性、片段性的局部经验保持对世界完整性的暗示。从现象学立场出发，论述电影中的身体如何作为“具体经验”完成对作为“完整经验”的记忆“任意”却“丰富”的拼凑，即身体如何“重拾”记忆的“真实”。“身体”作为视角看待记忆的再现，需要重新思考记忆再现时对时间的“连续性”要求。记忆从来都不是与现在割裂的、被想象在银幕上的他者，而是与当下紧密相关的过去，需要注重对“此刻”身体感知经验的表述。同时，电影中的空间并非所叙记忆事件的背景，而是身体记忆所生成的空间，且空间中的身体往往承担着“传感器”的作用。     

《黄帝内经》“情-志”的现象学分析

基于《内经》、道家、海德格尔生存现象学三者之间的密切关系,融合海德格尔生存现象学理论与本土现象学资源对《内经》“情-志”予以分析阐发。《内经》、道家的“情”“志”分别对等于海德格尔“遮蔽”“去蔽”状态的情绪。就情、志为一而言,情志是生命真实活动内隐与外显状态的统一;就情、志为二而言,《内经》、道家之“情”处于本原性地位,是“志”的上位概念;“志”源于“情”、属于“情”,是“情”的下位概念。那种将“情”置于“志”范畴之下,而以“志”作为中医心理学重要概念的观点值得商榷。