基于质量意识的复杂产品质量控制激励策略

激励在复杂产品供应链中对主供协同合作关系及质量控制发挥了重要作用。本文研究基于主制造商在复杂产品生产研发前按照客户要求形成的质量意识的激励策略是否可以实现复杂产品质量控制问题。考虑具有质量意识的主制造商和其系统供应商组成的两级供应链，建立以主制造商为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型，分别讨论无激励和存在激励时的主供生产最优决策。基于激励方式的不同，将激励策略分为根据供应商产品质量水平激励以及根据主制造商质量意识水平激励两种方式。研究结果表明激励是供应商加强协同合作、改进产品质量的内在动力，主制造商根据质量意识激励供应商可以进一步促使双方协同合作，提高产品质量，使双方获得更高的利润从而实现供应链整体利润最大化。此外用灵敏度分析发现提高主制造商质量意识水平可以增加双方协同合作努力程度，有效提升产品质量水平并实现帕累托改进。     

从主权国家的兴衰看权力博弈形态的转型

传统的国际关系理论,无论是现实主义、自由主义、建构主义还是科学行为主义理论,都是把主权国家抽象成一个统一的国际关系行为体。这一行为主体有一致的利益,也自然要有一致的对外政策目标和手段。在20世纪,尤其是在两次世界大战和冷战期间,这一概念抽象是非常准确的。但冷战结束以后,尤其是进入21世纪以后,这一概念抽象逐渐与国际关系的现实相违背。一方面,国家综合实力并不能直接转化为具体领域的竞争优势;另一方面,很多国家,包括超级大国在内,其对外政策的主要阻力可能不是所谓的竞争对手,而是其国内不同的利益集团。这导致传统的国际关系理论,从假设到概念和推理层面,都已经无法解释和预测今天的世界,而权力小博弈理论可以为认识多元复杂互动博弈时代的国际关系提供一个新的解释框架。     

多层供应链外包模式的选择及其协调

本文研究由两个原始设备制造企业（品牌企业）、一个代工企业和一个供应商组成的多层供应链的外包模式选择问题。应用主从博弈和纳什博弈理论，当一个原始设备制造企业的外包模式给定后，通过对不同外包模型求解比较，给出了后跟进的原始设备制造企业外包模式的最优选择策略。研究发现：后跟进的原始设备制造企业最优策略应采取与前一个原始设备制造企业相同的外包策略。针对最优外包策略，还设计了使供应链达到协调的二部定价契约机制，提高了外包供应链的竞争力。     

Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

In this experiment, I examine the extent to which competitive social preferences can explain over-bidding in rent-seeking contests. The Human treatment is a standard two-player contest. In the Robot treatment, a single player bids against a computerized player, eliminating potential social preference motives. The results show no difference in bids between treatments at the aggregate level. Further analysis shows evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects between impulsive and reflective subjects. Moreover, impulsive subjects are more likely than reflective subjects to deviate qualitatively from the shape of the theoretical best response function.     

Allocation of resources in asymmetric competitions: How do the weak maintain a chance of winning?

To maintain a chance of occasionally beating a stronger player in a competition waged over several fields, a weaker player should give up on some of the fields and concentrate resources on the remaining ones. But when do weak players actually do this? And which fields do they give up when the fields differ in their likelihood of being assessed? We report an experimental study of resource allocation in which asymmetric pairs of players compete over asymmetric fields. Symmetric players and symmetric fields are used for control. We find that players behave as follows: (1) Average wins are the same in the symmetric and asymmetric fields conditions and correspond to relative player strength. (2) The proportion of fields given up on decreases with a player’s greater relative strength, increases for asymmetric field likelihoods, and increases when competitions are framed in meaningful context; this proportion is related to wins. (3) When field likelihoods are asymmetric, players’ resource allocation is correlated with likelihood. Wins generally increase with that correlation but the relation is different for players of different strength. (4) The proportion of fields given up on and the correlation with likelihood change with experience towards the values corresponding to higher wins.     

我国保险公司合作竞争的博弈分析

竞争与合作相互依存,互利共生。纯粹的竞争或合作均不利于保险市场的健康发展。竞争抑或合作的最大困扰乃收益分配问题。通过构建博弈模型对我国保险公司之间竞争与合作的关系进行博弈分析,可以看到在完全信息静态博弈、非完全信息静态博弈和完全信息动态博弈三种情况下保险公司竞争与合作的难点,因此需要采取相应的对策。     

农村公共服务的自主供给困境及其治理路径

作为最原始的供给模式,农村公共服务的自主供给是指村社居民承担成本、主动参与到公共物品或服务生产提供的过程,表现为家庭自我供给、村民团队供给和村庄集体供给等。虽然其对政府、市场和志愿供给的补充有效缓解了农村公共服务供给匮乏的困局,但理性选择框架下的利益博弈和村社道德缺失、政府角色缺位等限制了自主供给作用的进一步发挥,存在资源浪费、供给不足、合作失败等困境。重塑乡村社会资本、完善服务供给机制、重新定位政府角色等成为可能的路径依赖。     

地方政府与炒房者之间的微分博弈模型——政府抑制炒房的动态房产税率设计

房产税改革的初衷是抑制炒房,而非与民争利.地方政府房产税政策是否行之有效的标准应从征税收入与居民福利两方进行面考量.抽象出两者量化水平建立政府目标函数,同时量化炒房者的囤房收益建立其目标函数,通过主从微分博弈模型分析政府的最优动态房产税政策与炒房者的最优动态囤房比例,阐述了地方政府的行动准则,并获得主要结论:(1)地方政府的动态最优房产税税率调节应尽可能做到与炒房者行动同步;(2)税率调节应遵循:间歇不宜过长、幅度不宜过大、趋势不宜改变;(3)即使囤房行为消失,普征房产税也不会被废止,而是维持一个恰好抑制囤房动机的动态临界税率为宜;(4)为了避免房产税被转嫁,房产税应以高税率开征.     

征收征用与公民基本权利保护

在我国的征收征用工作中时常出现侵权问题。为了解决这些问题,社会各界都提出了建议和对策。但现实中侵权现象仍不断出现,公民基本权利所受到的侵害始终得不到救济。本文拟从这个问题展开,探讨我国征收征用中相关公民基本权利保护问题。同时,征收征用中的侵权主要还涉及补偿问题,因而本文还将对补偿协商机制作一些探讨。     

Configuration of flexibility strategies under supply uncertainty

In this paper, we study a buyer׳s configuration of flexibility strategies under supply uncertainty. His main supplier׳s production process is uncertain, and he can either choose pricing flexibility (setting prices depending on the available supply) or operational flexibility (requesting a contingent order from a backup supplier). As the buyer may or may not find a suitable contingent supplier ex post, we study two scenarios that the backup supplier׳s supply is infinite, and that this supply is random. We also include the factor that the main supplier may determine the wholesale price. We demonstrate that the adoption of flexibility strategies is controlled by threshold policies in different scenarios whether the main supplier determines the wholesale price or not. We also investigate how the buyer׳s attribute (finding a suitable contingent supplier) affects the configuration of flexibility strategies.