A note on the strategic aspects of the transfer paradox

It is well known that an agent can be hurt by accepting a gift, the donor of which is made better off. Why then does the recipient accept this welfare reducing gift? This paper examines the strategic aspects of the paradox. It shows that if the recipient refuses the gift, it would suffer an even greater loss of welfare since there is a mutually advantageous reallocation between the donor and a third agent. It is shown that the recipient does have a viable alternative strategy: it could destroy some of its endowment, raising its welfare level and reducing that of the potential donor.     

Analysis of Revenue Maximization Under Two Movie‐Screening Policies

A few weeks before the start of a major season, movie distributors arrange a private screening of the movies to be released during that season for exhibitors and, subsequently, solicit bids for these movies (from exhibitors). Since the number of such solicitations far exceeds the number of movies that can be feasibly screened at a multiplex (i.e., a theater with multiple screens), the problem of interest for an exhibitor is that of choosing a subset of movies for which to submit bids to the distributors. We consider the problem of the selection and screening of movies for a multiplex to maximize the exhibitor's cumulative revenue over a fixed planning horizon. The release times of the movies that can potentially be selected during the planning horizon are known a priori. If selected for screening, a movie must be scheduled through its obligatory period, after which its run may or may not be extended. The problem involves two primary decisions: (i) the selection of a subset of movies for screening from those that can potentially be screened during the planning horizon and (ii) the determination of the duration of screening for the selected movies. We investigate two basic and popular screening policies: preempt‐resume and non‐preempt. In the preempt‐resume policy, the screening of a movie can be preempted and resumed in its post‐obligatory period. In the non‐preempt policy, a movie is screened continuously from its release time until the time it is permanently withdrawn from the multiplex. We show that optimizing under the preempt‐resume policy is strongly NP‐hard while the problem under the non‐preempt policy is polynomially solvable. We develop efficient algorithms for the problem under both screening policies and show that the revenue obtained from the preempt‐resume policy can be significantly higher as compared with that from the non‐preempt policy. Our work provides managers of multiplexes with valuable insights into the selection and screening of movies and offers an easy‐to‐use computational tool to compare the revenues obtainable from adopting these popular policies.     

Farmers’ Risk‐Based Decision Making Under Pervasive Uncertainty: Cognitive Thresholds and Hazy Hedging

Researchers in judgment and decision making have long debunked the idea that we are economically rational optimizers. However, problematic assumptions of rationality remain common in studies of agricultural economics and climate change adaptation, especially those that involve quantitative models. Recent movement toward more complex agent‐based modeling provides an opportunity to reconsider the empirical basis for farmer decision making. Here, we reconceptualize farmer decision making from the ground up, using an in situ mental models approach to analyze weather and climate risk management. We assess how large‐scale commercial grain farmers in South Africa (n = 90) coordinate decisions about weather, climate variability, and climate change with those around other environmental, agronomic, economic, political, and personal risks that they manage every day. Contrary to common simplifying assumptions, we show that these farmers tend to satisfice rather than optimize as they face intractable and multifaceted uncertainty; they make imperfect use of limited information; they are differently averse to different risks; they make decisions on multiple time horizons; they are cautious in responding to changing conditions; and their diverse risk perceptions contribute to important differences in individual behaviors. We find that they use two important nonoptimizing strategies, which we call cognitive thresholds and hazy hedging, to make practical decisions under pervasive uncertainty. These strategies, evident in farmers' simultaneous use of conservation agriculture and livestock to manage weather risks, are the messy in situ performance of naturalistic decision‐making techniques. These results may inform continued research on such behavioral tendencies in narrower lab‐ and modeling‐based studies.     

Pool‐Point Distribution of Zero‐Inventory Products

We study zero‐inventory production‐distribution systems under pool‐point delivery. The zero‐inventory production and distribution paradigm is supported in a variety of industries in which a product cannot be inventoried because of its short shelf life. The advantages of pool‐point (or hub‐and‐spoke) distribution, explored extensively in the literature, include the efficient use of transportation resources and effective day‐to‐day management of operations. The setting of our analysis is as follows: A production facility (plant) with a finite production rate distributes its single product, which cannot be inventoried, to several pool points. Each pool point may require multiple truckloads to satisfy its customers' demand. A third‐party logistics provider then transports the product to individual customers surrounding each pool point. The production rate can be increased up to a certain limit by incurring additional cost. The delivery of the product is done by identical trucks, each having limited capacity and non‐negligible traveling time between the plant and the pool points. Our objective is to coordinate the production and transportation operations so that the total cost of production and distribution is minimized, while respecting the product lifetime and the delivery capacity constraints. This study attempts to develop intuition into zero‐inventory production‐distribution systems under pool‐point delivery by considering several variants of the above setting. These include multiple trucks, a modifiable production rate, and alternative objectives. Using a combination of theoretical analysis and computational experiments, we gain insights into optimizing the total cost of a production‐delivery plan by understanding the trade‐off between production and transportation.     

Differential Pricing for Information Sharing Under Competition

We consider a two‐echelon supply chain with a manufacturer supplying to multiple downstream retailers engaged in differentiated Cournot competition. Each retailer has private information about uncertain demand. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader who sets the contract terms with the retailers, and benefits from retailers sharing their private information. When all retailers are given the same wholesale price, truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium outcome. We propose two variants of differential pricing mechanisms that induce truthful information sharing by all retailers. The first variant rewards a retailer for providing optimistic information and achieves truthful information sharing as a unique equilibrium. The differential pricing mechanism is optimal in the class of linear‐price, incentive‐compatible, direct mechanisms. The second variant, which incorporates provision for a fixed payment in addition to wholesale prices, preserves all the equilibrium properties of the first variant and additionally “nearly coordinates” the supply chain. Our analysis of differential pricing with a fixed payment provides interesting observations regarding the relationship between product substitutability, number of retailers, information precision, and market power. As products become closer substitutes and/or number of retailers increase, the manufacturer's market power increases, enabling her to extract a larger fraction of the supply chain surplus.     

Migration expectancy revisited: Results for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s

Planners in a variety of situations require an improved understanding of migration trends if services and products that adequately meet constituent needs are to be provided. This note focuses on changes in migration expectancy over three decades in the context of the planning function. Using the CPS one-year migration question for the periods 1975–1976, 1980–1981, and 1987–1991, and the work of Wilber (1963) and Long (1973) as historical benchmarks, migration expectancy is found to have fallen since the earlier studies. Longer-distance migration (between counties and between states) has remained relatively constant over the same period so that these types of moves now account for a larger proportion of total residential mobility. The results are discussed in the context of their value to individuals and organizations who seek a better understanding of demographically-driven demand from services and products.This article is based on a paper presented at the Southern Demographic Association annual meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, 22 October 1993.     

A Depository Institution's Optimal Currency Supply Network Under the Fed's New Guidelines: Operating Policies,Logistics, and Impact

The overuse of its currency processing operations by depository institutions (DIs) has motivated the Federal Reserve (Fed) to propose new currency recirculation guidelines. The Fed believes that DIs should play a more active role in recirculating fit (i.e., usable) currency so that the societal cost of providing currency to the public is minimized. The Fed characterizes the overuse by the extent of cross shipping, a practice in which the same DI deposits and withdraws currency of the same denomination within five business days in the same geographic region. The Fed's proposal encourages DIs to fit sort and reuse deposited currency through two components: a custodial inventory program and a recirculation fee that would be charged on withdrawals of cross‐shipped currency. Given the geographical network of the various branches of a DI, the extent of its participation in the proposed programs depends on a variety of factors: the nature of demand and supply of currency, number and locations of the processing centers, and the resulting fit‐sorting, holding, and transportation costs. The interrelated nature of these decisions motivates the need for an integrated model that captures the flow of currency in the entire network of the DI. Based on our work with Brink's Inc., a leading secure‐logistics provider, we develop a mixed‐integer linear programming (MILP) model to provide managers of DIs with a decision‐making tool under the Fed's new guidelines. Broadly, we analyze the following questions: (i) Over all typical practical realizations of the demand for currency that a DI may face, and over all reasonable cost implications, is there a menu of “good” operating policies? (ii) What is the monetary impact of fit‐sorting and custodial inventories on a DI? and (iii) To what extent will the Fed's new guidelines address its main goal, namely, a reduction in the practice of cross shipping by encouraging DIs to recirculate currency?     

Supply Chain Scheduling: Distribution Systems

We study conflict and cooperation issues arising in a supply chain where a manufacturer makes products which are shipped to customers by a distributor. The manufacturer and the distributor each has an ideal schedule, determined by cost and capacity considerations. However, these two schedules are in general not well coordinated, which leads to poor overall performance. In this context, we study two practical problems. In both problems, the manufacturer focuses on minimizing unproductive time. The distributor minimizes customer cost measures in the first problem and minimizes inventory holding cost in the second problem. We first evaluate each party's conflict, which is the relative increase in cost that results from using the other party's optimal schedule. Since this conflict is often significant, we consider several practical scenarios about the level of cooperation between the manufacturer and the distributor. These scenarios define various scheduling problems for the manufacturer, the distributor, and the overall system. For each of these scheduling problems, we provide an algorithm. We demonstrate that the cost saving provided by cooperation between the decision makers is usually significant. Finally, we discuss the implications of our work for how manufacturers and distributors negotiate, coordinate, and implement their supply chain schedules in practice.     

Optimal Descending Mechanisms for Constrained Procurement

Descending mechanisms for procurement (or, ascending mechanisms for selling) have been well‐recognized for their simplicity from the viewpoint of bidders—they require less bidder sophistication as compared to sealed‐bid mechanisms. In this study, we consider procurement under each of two types of constraints: (1) Individual/Group Capacities: limitations on the amounts that can be sourced from individual and/or subsets of suppliers, and (2) Business Rules: lower and upper bounds on the number of suppliers to source from, and on the amount that can be sourced from any single supplier. We analyze two procurement problems, one that incorporates individual/group capacities and another that incorporates business rules. In each problem, we consider a buyer who wants to procure a fixed quantity of a product from a set of suppliers, where each supplier is endowed with a privately known constant marginal cost. The buyer's objective is to minimize her total expected procurement cost. For both problems, we present descending auction mechanisms that are optimal mechanisms. We then show that these two problems belong to a larger class of mechanism design problems with constraints specified by polymatroids, for which we prove that optimal mechanisms can be implemented as descending mechanisms.