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Using U.S. steel firm data, we find that lobbying for import protection appears to be habit-forming. To identify heterogeneity in lobbying behavior among firms, we use an expectation-maximization algorithm to sort our firms into groups with different propensities to lobby and estimate the determinants of lobbying in each group. A two-pool model emerges: occasional lobbyers' lobbying depends on their market performance, and habitual lobbyers' lobbying only depends on past lobbying. The latter tends to be larger steel firms whose business is more focused in steel. Our evidence is consistent with dynamic economies of scale in protection seeking breeding protection-dependent firms. 相似文献
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Behavioral finance in corporate governance: economics and ethics of the devil’s advocate 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Randall Morck 《Journal of Management and Governance》2008,12(2):179-200
The Common Law, parliamentary democracy, and academia all institutionalize dissent to check undue obedience to authority;
and corporate governance reformers advocate the same in boardrooms. Many corporate governance disasters could be averted if
directors asked hard questions, demanded clear answers, and blew whistles. Work by Milgram suggests humans have an innate
predisposition to obey authority. This excessive subservience of agent to principal, here dubbed a “type II agency problem”,
explains directors’ eerie submission. Rational explanations are reviewed, but behavioral explanations appear more complete.
Experimental work shows this predisposition disrupted by dissenting peers, conflicting authorities, and distant authorities.
Thus, independent directors, chairs, and committees excluding CEOs might induce greater rationality and more considered ethics
in corporate governance. Empirical evidence of this is scant—perhaps reflecting problems identifying genuinely independent
directors.
Randall Morck is University Professor at the University of Alberta, where he also holds the Jarislowsky Distinguished Chair in Finance; and is also a Research Associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research. He graduated summa cum laude from Yale and earned a Ph.D. from Harvard, to which he returns occasionally as a visiting professor. With numerous research articles collectively cited over 7,300 times by other scholars., he has served as a consultant to the US and Canadian governments, the World Bank and the IMF. 相似文献
Randall MorckEmail: |
Randall Morck is University Professor at the University of Alberta, where he also holds the Jarislowsky Distinguished Chair in Finance; and is also a Research Associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research. He graduated summa cum laude from Yale and earned a Ph.D. from Harvard, to which he returns occasionally as a visiting professor. With numerous research articles collectively cited over 7,300 times by other scholars., he has served as a consultant to the US and Canadian governments, the World Bank and the IMF. 相似文献
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Bigelli Marco Mehrotra Vikas Morck Randall Yu Wayne 《Journal of Management and Governance》1998,2(4):297-309
Seasoned equity issues trigger share price declines, and this is usually interpreted as evidence of signalling. We find that seasoned equity issues also typically result in much lower managerial ownership in U.S. firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict a stock price decline when managerial ownership falls. We conduct several tests to distinguish agency explanations form signalling explanations, and conclude that both effects are present. 相似文献
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