Bequests as a heir "disciple device."

This paper develops a model ofinter vivos gifts and bequests in a setting of moral hazard and adverse selection. Altruistic parents do not perfectly know how much effort their children make to earn their living, nor do they know their true level of ability.Inter vivos gifts take place prior to the realization of the children's earnings whereas at the moment of bequests, parents do observe them. We show that an optimal transfer policy generally uses a mix ofinter vivos gifts — deemed as more efficient — and bequests — deemed as more redistributive.We are thankful to Allessandro Cigno, Jacques Cremer, Claude d Aspremont and anonymous referees for their comments.Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno     

When being overpaid makes me feel good about myself: It depends on how the other feels

The present research examined whether the emotions of others (i.e., disappointment versus happiness with respect to a received outcome) influence own self-esteem when being overpaid. Results from two experiments demonstrated that participants reported higher performance self-esteem when the other expressed happiness rather than disappointment. This effect was only found in the condition where one was overpaid relative to the condition where one did not yet know one’s own outcome. In the second experimental study we further found that this interaction between the emotion of the other and the distribution situation only emerged among participants low (relative to high) in personal need for structure. Implications with respect to the relationship between overpayment and self-esteem and the interpersonal effects of emotions in this process are discussed.     

Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules

We consider a repeated electoral competition game between two parties, each representing a constituent with a given income level. Parties are unable to commit to a policy before the election; they choose a nonlinear income tax schedule once elected. In each period, citizens cast a vote either for the incumbent or for the challenger. We first show that there exist (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibria where both parties choose the most-preferred tax schedule of their constituent, subject to the constraint that they are reelected. We characterize a specific class of these BPR (Best Policy with Reelection) equilibria in which one of the parties plays its constituent’s unconstrained optimal tax function. Equilibrium tax schedules are always piecewise linear. Depending on the income levels of the two parties’ constituents, we obtain either classical left-vs-right equilibria (where the poor vote for one party and the rich for the other one) or ends-against-the-middle equilibria (where both poor and rich vote for one party while the middle class votes for the other party). In both types of equilibria, both parties propose the same tax schedule to a subset of the population.     

Family size and optimal income taxation

This paper studies the role of family size in the design of optimal income taxation. We consider a second best setting where the government observes the number of children and the income of the parents but not their productivity. With a linear tax schedule the marginal tax rate is shown to decrease with the number of children, while the relationship between the demogrant and family size appears to be ambiguous. With two ability levels, optimal non-linear income tax implies zero marginal tax rates for the higher ability parents; low ability parents have positive marginal tax rates that decrease with family size. Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 17 May 2001     

United but (un)equal: human capital,probability of divorce,and the marriage contract

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization is optimal with no divorce risk. Couples can self-insure through savings which offers some protection to the uneducated spouse, but at the expense of a distortion. Alternatively, for large divorce probabilities, symmetry in education, where both spouses receive an equal amount of education, may be optimal. This eliminates the risk associated with the lack of education, but reduces the efficiency of education choices. We show that the symmetric allocation will become more attractive as the probability of divorce increases, if risk aversion is high and/or labor supply elasticity is low. However, it is only a “second-best” solution as insurance protection is achieved at the expense of an efficiency loss. Finally, we study how the (economic) use of marriage is affected by the possibility of divorce.     

To pay or to apologize? On the psychology of dealing with unfair offers in a dictator game

Prior research has largely failed to focus on how transgressors can promote trust when having made unfair offers in bargaining. I investigated in the context of receiving an unfair offer in a dictator game when financial compensations and when apologies are most effective in motivating trust behavior by the violated party. I hypothesized that when losses were allocated, the violated party would be motivated to show more trust behavior towards the transgressor when a financial compensation (resulting again in equal final outcomes) relative to an apology was delivered, whereas when gains were allocated, apologies would be more effective in promoting trust behavior than a financial compensation. Results from a laboratory study indeed supported this prediction as such demonstrating the importance of how allocation decisions are framed (i.e., loss or gain) in testing the effectiveness of trust repair strategies (financial compensations vs. apologies).     

Income taxation of couples and the tax unit choice

We study the optimal income taxation of couples. We determine the resulting intra-family labor supply allocation and its implication for the choice of the tax unit (individual versus joint taxation). We provide a general condition for full joint taxation to arise. We also study how the spouses’ respective labor supply decisions are distorted when the condition does not hold. In particular, we show that, depending on the pattern of mating, the celebrated result according to which the spouse with the more elastic labor supply faces the lower marginal tax rates may or may not hold in our setting.     

Detangling Alzheimer's disease

Alzheimer's disease (AD) afflicts 4 million people in the United States and is expected to strike 14 million by the year 2050, as the population ages. Researchers are scrambling to find genetic risk factors, decipher disease mechanisms, and develop reliable diagnostic tests that detect the illness at its earliest, potentially most treatable stage. Using these findings, they hope to devise new therapeutic approaches. Current clinical trials are testing novel techniques that stall or reverse AD-like neuropathology in mice.